Harrison v. Harrison

• Decision Date: 13 July 1904
• Citation: 100 N.W. 344,124 Iowa 525
• Parties: HARRISON v. HARRISON.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

124 Iowa 525

100 N.W. 344

HARRISON

v.HARRISON.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 13, 1904.

Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; J. H. Applegate, Judge.

The plaintiff is the daughter of G. W. Harrison, deceased, and files a claim against his estate for services rendered him during his lifetime. There was a trial to a jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. Affirmed.D. H. Miller and Shortley & Harpel, for appellant.

White & Clarke, for appellee.

SHERWIN, J.

Mrs. May Chestnutwood testified for the defendant, and after her testimony on the merits of the case she further testified that she had attempted to avoid being a witness in the case, and that before she had been subpœnaed the plaintiff, at her request and with knowledge of her purpose, had taken her to a railway station in pursuance of her design to secrete herself during the trial of the case. She also testified fully as to the conversation between the plaintiff and herself relative thereto, and as to where she went. This testimony was all given in the presence of the jury, and after it was concluded the plaintiff moved the exclusion of so much thereof as related to where the witness went, and as to what she did, as immaterial, and because the witness had already testified fully as to material facts in the case. This motion was sustained, and the ruling is assigned as error. There was no error in the ruling. The testimony as to the plaintiff's part in the transaction was not stricken out, but was left for the consideration of the jury. Furthermore, the witness was present and gave her testimony on the merits of the case.

It is contended by the appellant that the attempt to suppress the testimony of this witness was in the nature of an admission that the plaintiff's cause was without merit, but we are cited to no case which holds the admission to be as broad as claimed. The rule is that the suppression of evidence is an admission that it is deemed unfavorable to the party suppressing it. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 195a; 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (1st Ed.) 72. In Kidd v. Ward, 91 Iowa, 371, 59 N. W. 279, we held that an attempt to bribe witnesses or jurors was an admission that the party's cause was unjust, and with this rule we are well satisfied, but an attempt to keep an adverse witness from testifying is not in our judgment an admission that the party is making an unjust or a false claim; witnesses see facts differently, and almost every trial of an issue of fact demonstrates that they may testify honestly and still be mistaken. When the witness is in fact present and testifies, the jury has before it his full knowledge, and is the sole judge of its character and weight, and determines whether it is favorable or unfavorable to the party.

There was evidence tending to show that the understanding between the appellee and her father was that she should remain at home and assist him in the care of the house, farm, and stock, and help pay off the debts, and that when the debts were paid off he would compensate her for her services. There is but little question that the appellee worked faithfully and well towards the consummation of this understanding. The death of her father before the debts were paid or materially reduced made it impossible for her to complete the agreement, but this should not deprive her of the just compensation which her faithfulness and years of toil merit. We conclude, therefore, there was no error in rejecting evidence of the indebtedness at the time of the father's death. There was no showing that she was responsible for the debts, or that she had in any manner or in any respect failed to...