Harrison v. Metz

• Decision Date: 17 October 1868
• Citation: 17 Mich. 377
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: John B. Harrison et al. v. Henry Metz

17 Mich. 377

John B. Harrison et al. v. Henry Metz

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 17, 1868

Heard October 17, 1868 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Case made after judgment from Wayne circuit.

This was an action of debt brought by the plaintiffs against the defendant upon a judgment.

The declaration consisted of six counts upon the judgment on which suit was brought. The plea was the general issue, with a notice thereunto annexed, that the causes of action alleged in the plaintiffs' declaration, and neither of them, accrued to the plaintiffs within ten years next before the commencement of this suit. The cause was tried by the court without a jury.

On the trial of said cause, it was admitted by the counsel for the plaintiffs and for the defendant respectively, that the judgment upon which this suit was brought was rendered on the 17th day of September, A. D. 1857, in the circuit court for the county of Wayne, in favor of said plaintiffs and against said defendant, and that nothing had ever been paid on said judgment; and that the same was not satisfied, reversed, or otherwise vacated; that this action was commenced on the 12th day of November, A. D. 1867; and that the date of the final adjournment of the legislature for the state of Michigan, in the year 1867, was March 28, 1867.

The statute relied upon by defendant is as follows:

"Every action upon a judgment or decree rendered in a court of record of the United States, or of this or any other state, shall be brought within ten years next after the judgment or decree was entered, and not afterwards; and any action upon such judgment or decree which shall not be commenced within the time above specified, shall be forever thereafter barred."

Judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs for the sum of $ 422 68/100 damages, and the costs of suit to be taxed.

Wilkinson & Post, for plaintiffs:

Courts will construe no law to have a retroactive effect, unless the legislative intent, that it shall so operate, expressly and clearly appears upon the face of the statute itself, and if a construction of any statute which shall limit it to a prospective effect only can be found, that is at the same time consistent with the express letter of such statute, such construction will universally be adopted: Sedgwick on Const and Stat. Law, pp. 202, 406; Cooley on Const. Limitations, p. 370, and cases cited in note 1.

The following amendment to a statute of limitations was passed February 27, 1867 (Laws, 1867, p. 39): "Every action upon judgment or decree rendered in a court of record of the United States, or of this or any other state, shall be brought within ten years next after the judgment or decree was entered, and not afterwards; and any action upon such judgment or decree, which shall not be commenced within the time above specified, shall be forever thereafter barred."

We contend that its operation is prospective only.

Statutes of limitations in reference to the question of their retrospective operations, as found in the books, may be divided into four classes:

a. Those which expressly apply only to future causes of action, or expressly except existing causes of action.

b. Those which expressly apply to both existing and future causes of action alike.

c. Those which expressly provide a distinct and different limitation to apply to all existing or accrued causes of action alike, fixing a limitation of a fixed period, which commences to run from the taking effect of the act.

d. Those which provide a general limitation of a fixed period, commencing to run from the accruing of the right of action, but do not specify in terms whether they apply to existing or only to future causes of action, or to both.

The first three classes rarely ever call for any judicial construction, except it be to determine whether the terms of a particular statute bring it within one of these classes, and, if so, which one, and when this is once decided, then the question of its retrospective operation is governed by its express terms, and no room for construction, and consequently no discretion, is left to the courts.

As to the fourth class, the legislature having failed to express clearly and definitely in the statute itself, whether it shall apply to future causes alone, or to past causes alone, or to both alike, the courts decide the question in favor of such a construction as shall give the statute a prospective cast only.

The first question, then, is which class does this statute belong to? Its terms are general, and broad enough to cover both existing and future causes of action, but not so specific and definite as to indicate a manifest and unmistakable legislative intent that it should operate retrospectively as well as prospectively, and to preclude, or be inconsistent with the intent that it should operate prospectively only. This amended section, standing alone, and unconnected, with the following section, would clearly belong to the fourth class.

The decided weight of authority is that such statutes should be construed to have no retroactive force: 21 Conn. 351; 18 Johns. 138; 16 Mass. 215; 11 Wis. 422; 12 La. An., 793; 15 Id. 649; 5 B. Mon., 564; 14 Gratt. 24; 11 Ill. 54; 14 Id. 495; 15 Id. 200; 1 Breese Ap., 30; 26 Miss. 304; 23 Id. 270; 24 Id. 377; 15 How. U.S., 421; 36 Barb. 447; 10 Ohio St., 588.

If such a statute be given a retrospective construction, it must inevitably operate upon some causes of action to take away all remedy whatever, and for that reason, as to such cases be unconstitutional and void. This of itself might be a very good reason for giving to such a statute such a construction only as shall make it apply alike to all cases that come within its provisions,...