White v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 September 1988
• Docket Number: Docket No. 79194
• Citation: 429 N.W.2d 576,431 Mich. 387
• Parties: Frederick WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 576

429 N.W.2d 576

431 Mich. 387

Frederick WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 79194.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Oct. 7, 1987.

Decided Sept. 27, 1988.

[431 Mich. 389] Matthew A. Tyler, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt, Watters, Stanczyk & Pedersen by Jonathan T. Kopit, Paul F. Paternoster, Bloomfield Hills, Evans, Nelson, Pletkovic & Hays, P.C. by John J. Hays, William Nole Evans, Huntington Woods, and Willard W. Wallace, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O'Hare, Helveston & Waldman, P.C. by Theodore Sachs, on brief, Detroit, for Michigan State AFL-CIO amicus curiae.

OPINION

Before the entire Bench.

RILEY, Chief Justice.

In this case, we are asked to decide whether M.C.L. Sec. 418.373(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(373)(1) ¹ of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act has retroactive application. We would hold that Sec. 373 affects substantive rights and, thus, applies prospectively to those employees injured on or after January 1, 1982, the amendment's effective date. Accordingly, we would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff White was employed for thirty-seven years by defendant. On March 31, 1980, plaintiff retired under defendant's "thirty and out" nondisability, early retirement plan. On May 29, 1980, plaintiff filed a claim with the Workers' Compensation Bureau, alleging that he was disabled as of the date of his early retirement by chronic bronchitis and pulmonary emphysema, arising out of prolonged exposure to dust, smoke, paint, and other irritants. The hearing referee, finding that plaintiff had a work-incurred disability and had retired early because of his respiratory condition, awarded plaintiff weekly benefits effective from his retirement date, payable until further notice from the bureau. Defendant appealed to the WCAB, arguing that plaintiff was not disabled.

While the case was pending before the WCAB, the Michigan Legislature enacted 1980 P.A. 357, effective January 1, 1982. M.C.L. Sec. 418.373; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(373), which provides:

"(1) An employee who terminates active employment and is receiving nondisability pension or retirement benefits under either a private or governmental pension or retirement program, including old-age benefits under the social security act, 42 USC 301 to 1397f, that was paid by or on behalf of an employer from whom weekly benefits under this act are sought shall be presumed not to have a loss of earnings or earning capacity as the result of a compensable injury or disease under either this chapter or chapter 4. This presumption may be rebutted only by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee is unable, because of a work related disability, to perform work suitable to the employee's qualifications, including training or experience. This standard of disability supersedes other applicable standards used to determine disability under either this chapter or chapter 4.

"(2) This section shall not be construed as a bar to an employee receiving medical benefits under section 315 upon the establishment of a causal relationship between the employee's work and the need for medical treatment." (Emphasis added.)

On May 2, 1986, the WCAB affirmed the referee's award and declined to apply the presumption set forth in Sec. 373, stating that defendant was not entitled to assert Sec. 373(1) because it concerned substantive rights and that the Legislature intended the amendment to apply prospectively to employees injured after its effective date.

The Court of Appeals remanded the action to the WCAB to be reconsidered in light of Wojciechowski v. General Motors Corp., 151 Mich.App. 399, 390 N.W.2d 727 (1986).

This Court then granted leave to appeal, limited to the issue whether Sec. 373 of 1980 P.A. 357 should be given retrospective application. 428 Mich. 873 (1987).

II. ANALYSIS

This Court has addressed the issue of retroactive versus prospective application of amendments of the WDCA in several recent cases. First, in Selk v. Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich. 1, 9, 345 N.W.2d 184 (1984), we stated that as a general rule, "statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless the contrary intent is clearly manifested." A year later, in Franks v. White Pine Copper Div., 422 Mich. 636, 375 N.W.2d 715 (1985), this Court recognized an exception to the general rule for statutes which are remedial or procedural in nature. Most recently, in Hurd v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Mich. 531, 534, 377 N.W.2d 300 (1985), this Court considered another provision of the same public act, Sec. 301(2), and concluded that it "was enacted to invalidate this Court's decision in Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc. (After Remand), 403 Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d 1 (1978), thus effecting a substantial change in the law and that the provisions of this amendment have prospective application."

A

It is against this backdrop that this Court must examine Sec. 373. Defendant characterizes Sec. 373 as procedural. ² However, careful analysis of this section reveals that it is not procedural. Section 373(1) provides in pertinent part:

"An employee who terminates active employment and is receiving nondisability pension or retirement benefits ... shall be presumed not to have a loss of earnings or earning capacity as the result of a compensable injury or disease under either this chapter or chapter 4. This presumption may be rebutted only by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee is unable, because of a work related disability, to perform work suitable to the employee's qualifications, including training or experience." (Emphasis added.)

Relying upon the language highlighted above, defendant argues that Sec. 373 creates a rebuttable presumption of law and is, therefore, procedural in nature. However, Michigan law specifically provides:

"The function of a presumption is solely to place the burden of producing evidence on the opposing party.

" 'It is a procedural device which allows a person relying on the presumption to avoid a directed verdict, and it permits that person a directed verdict if the opposing party fails to introduce evidence rebutting the presumption.' " McKinstry v Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, PC, 428 Mich 167, 180; 405 NW2d 88 (1987) (quoting Widmayer v. Leonard, 422 Mich. 280, 289, 373 N.W.2d 538 [1985].

Section 373 does not shift the claimant's burden of producing evidence. Therefore it does not create a "presumption." Rather, we conclude that the "presumption" language in Sec. 373 merely classifies those persons entitled to benefits under Sec. 373.

B

In reiterating the general rule that statutes which affect substantive rights should be applied prospectively, the Hurd Court noted that prior to enactment of Sec. 301(2), ³ the eligibility of an employee with a mental disorder for workers' compensation was determined by the "honest perception" standards set forth in Deziel, supra. Section 301(2) changed the standard of disability; ⁴ thus, the Court concluded that the change affected substantive rights of the employee. Emphasizing the fact that the Legislature had not indicated whether Sec. 301(2) should be applied retrospectively, the Hurd Court held that the amendment must be applied prospectively for injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1982. We find Hurd indistinguishable. As the Hurd Court stated:

" 'In accordance with the rule applicable to original acts, it is presumed that provisions added by the amendment affecting substantive rights are intended to operate prospectively. Provisions added by the amendment that affect substantive rights will not be construed to apply to transactions and events completed prior to its enactment unless the legislature has expressed its intent to that effect or such intent is clearly implied by the language of the amendment or by the circumstances surrounding its enactment.' " Hurd, supra, 423 Mich. at 535, 377 N.W.2d 300.

Similarly, in the present case, prior to enactment of Sec. 373, a claimant need only prove an impairment of wage-earning capacity within his field of employment. Kaarto v. Calumet & Hecla, Inc., 367 Mich. 128, 116 N.W.2d 225 (1962). Section 373 changed this standard. ⁵ Specifically, Sec. 373 provides that "[t]his standard of disability supersedes other applicable standards used to determine disability under either this chapter or chapter 4." The effect of Sec. 373 on claimants is similar to the effect on claimants under Sec. 301(2) in Hurd. Both Secs. 301(2) and 373(1) changed a standard of disability. Thus, in accordance with Hurd, Sec. 373 should be applied prospectively for injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1982, the effective date of the statute.

Cases relied upon by defendant are distinguishable from Hurd and the present case. The statutory amendment in Selk, supra, affected the amount of interest an individual was entitled to receive after it was already determined that compensation was due. As we noted in Franks, supra, "[i]n Selk, we found the interest rate on overdue compensation payments related to a remedy or mode of procedure and was 'but an incident and not the essence of a right or liability.' " Franks, supra 422 Mich. at 672, 375 N.W.2d 715. Unlike the provision in Selk, Sec. 373 involves the question whether a retired employee has a substantive right to compensation under Sec. 373, thus directly affecting the essence of his right, and not merely calculating the amount of compensation which he may eventually receive.

Similarly, in Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning, 416 Mich. 558, 331 N.W.2d 456 (1982), this Court held that the newly enacted comparative negligence statute ⁶ applied retroactively to a pending products liability action. However, actions under the WDCA are, by their very nature, different than products liability actions. ⁷...