Harrison v. State Bank of Bussey
| Decision Date | 23 February 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-1038,87-1038 |
| Citation | 440 N.W.2d 398 |
| Parties | James H. HARRISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE BANK OF BUSSEY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Marvin V. Colton of Colton Law Office, Albia, for plaintiff-appellant.
David A. Johnson of Johnson, Lane & Vogel, Knoxville, for defendant-appellee.
Considered by OXBERGER, C.J., and SACKETT and HABHAB, JJ.
Plaintiff, James Harrison, appeals the district court's order overruling his motion for summary judgment and sustaining the defendant's same motion. He contends the district court erred in this regard. We affirm.
The plaintiff and his parents, George and Mary Harrison, were joint owners of a $50,000 certificate of deposit purchased on February 19, 1981, at the offices of the defendant, State Bank of Bussey. George Harrison requested the defendant bank issue a duplicate certificate because the original was lost. He also asked that the plaintiff's name be deleted from the face of the duplicate certificate.
The bank obliged and issued the duplicate as the elder Mr. Harrison requested. George Harrison subsequently cashed the duplicate certificate and reinvested the proceeds in other certificates of deposit. When he did so, the plaintiff was not named as a joint owner. Both Mr. and Mrs. Harrison are now deceased.
The plaintiff, in July 1985, filed an action (Cause No. 22224) against the bank and executors of his parents' estates alleging that he was legally entitled to the proceeds of the second set of CD's because they were derived from funds of the original CD, and that he, as joint owner, was harmed because his name was deleted on the substitute. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff did not appear in order to contest this motion. The district court granted the defendant's motion and entered judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff in December of 1986 filed the present action alleging again against the bank that it was liable to him for the proceeds from the original CD. He claims under a theory of contract that as a joint tenant he is due the proceeds because his name was deleted from the face of the duplicate without his permission.
Both the plaintiff and defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in this second case. The trial court found the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, among other conclusions, the plaintiff's claim in this second suit was barred under the theory of res judicata.
On appeal, the plaintiff reiterates his claim to the proceeds under his contractual theory; the defendant asserts the court did not err in applying the theory of res judicata. Both parties agree there are no material facts in dispute.
When reviewing a judgment entered by the district court sustaining a motion for summary judgment, we review on errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4. We are not bound by the trial court's determinations of law. Raymon v. Norwest Bank of Marion, 414 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa App.1987). Since the facts are not in dispute, we need only decide whether the law was correctly applied. Id.
We find no error in the trial court's opinion granting summary judgment to the defendant and overruling the plaintiff's similar motion and dismissing his petition. We conclude the plaintiff is barred from proceeding in this suit under the doctrine of res judicata.
Res judicata takes on two forms, claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Res judicata in its meaning as claim preclusion is a bar to further litigating a claim, while res judicata in its meaning as issue preclusion is a bar to further litigation of a specific issue. See Goolsby v. Derby, 189 N.W.2d 909, 913 (Iowa 1971).
"Res judicata in the sense of claim preclusion exists when the litigant has brought an action, an adjudication has occurred, and he is foreclosed from further litigation on the claim." Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 Iowa L.R. 27, (1964). It is based on the principle that a party may not split or try As the Iowa Supreme Court stated in B & B Asphalt Company v. T.S. McShane Company, 242 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Iowa 1976):
his claim piecemeal, but must put in issue and try his entire claim or put forth his entire defense in the case on trial. Swisher & Cohrt v. Yardarm, Inc., 236 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa 1975).
An adjudication in a former suit between the same parties on the same claim is final as to all matters which could have been presented to the court for determination. A party must litigate all matters growing out of his claim at one time and not in separate actions. Warnecke v. Foley, 234 Iowa 348, 350, 11 N.W.2d 457, 458 (1943) and citation.
The doctrine of claim preclusion is further clarified by the following statement taken from the Restatement of Judgments, section 63:
Where a judgment on the merits is rendered in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff is precluded from subsequently maintaining an action on the same cause of action although he presents a ground for the relief asked other than those presented in the original action, except where the defendant's fraud or misrepresentation prevented the plaintiff from presenting such other grounds in the original action.
We must now determine whether plaintiff's first and second actions were the same claim or cause of action within the meaning of claim preclusion. For the reasons hereafter set forth, we answer this in the affirmative.
Before proceeding with our reasoning, we note the following from Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Company, 186 F.2d 464, 470 (3rd Cir.1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921, 71 S.Ct. 743, 95 L.Ed. 1355 (1951) ():
The plaintiff having alleged operative facts which state a cause of action because he tells of defendant's misconduct and his own harm has had his day in court. He does not get another day after the first lawsuit is concluded by giving a different reason than he gave in the first for recovery of damages for the same invasion of his rights. The problem of his rights against the defendant based upon the alleged wrongful acts is fully before the court whether all the reasons for recovery were stated to the court or not.
Our supreme Court has stated that identity of cause of action is established when the same evidence will maintain both causes of action. Id. at 287. Here, the same evidence would be probative in both actions.
It is clear that both causes of action arise from the same circumstance and depend on evidence of the same events. Plaintiff in his first petition essentially claims that since he was named as a joint owner in the original certificate, he, as the sole surviving joint tenant, has a "legal right" to a sum of money equal to the proceeds under that certificate. In this respect, he asserts he is entitled to the funds for the defendant bank issued the duplicate certificate which omitted his name as a joint owner without his authority and consent.
In his second petition, the plaintiff claims judgment against the bank on the contractual theory that the bank by virtue of the wordage in the certificate has an obligation to pay plaintiff the proceeds for he is the sole surviving joint tenant.
Claim preclusion is clearly applicable here. In his second action, plaintiff seeks a second day in court on the same claim he made in the first action. The plaintiff alleges that res judicata should not apply for the second claim is based on the contractual obligation which was not a part of his first claim. We do not agree for the reasons set forth under the heading of "Issue Preclusion." But, assuming arguendo, that there is merit in this contention, it is still without dispute that both actions stem from the same claim with the only difference resting in the terminology used in advancing the theories of recovery.
The plaintiff could have advanced both theories in the first action. He is accordingly Although we believe this appeal is dispositive under claim preclusion, since both parties argue the legal effect of issue preclusion in their briefs, we will discuss it here.
barred by the defense of claim preclusion from seeking to do so in this second action. We affirm the trial court.
Res judicata in its meaning as issue preclusion applies when a party attempts to relitigate an issue which has already been raised and decided in a prior action. Clark v. Glanton, 370 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Iowa App.1985); Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1981). As stated in the Restatement (2d) of Judgments, section 68 (tentative draft # 4, 1977), cited with approval in Hunter ):
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a...
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...“A party must litigate all matters growing out of his claim at one time and not in separate actions.” Harrison v. State Bank of Bussey , 440 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (internal citations omitted). Thus, claim preclusion may foreclose matters that were never actually litigated. Ar......
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