Harrison v. State
| Decision Date | 17 July 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. A-279,A-279 |
| Citation | 104 So.2d 391 |
| Parties | R. C. HARRISON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
R. C. Harrison, in pro. per.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant was charged in the Circuit Court of Jackson County with the crime of grand larceny, for which crime he was convicted, adjudged guilty and sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for a term of five years. This appeal assigns as error the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and judgment.
The evidence adduced by the State was entirely circumstantial. The defendant offered no evidence and elected not to testify in his own behalf.
The evidence shows that defendant was employed by his uncle, E. D. Harrison, as a farm hand for some six months prior to the alleged larceny and was paid for his services at the rate of $3 per day plus certain meals. On January 22, 1957, defendant, together with members of his immediate family, and the uncle and his wife drove to Marianna. At that time the uncle had in his possession cash in excess of $1,300, from which he purchased an automobile license tag and a pair of shoes for his wife, and made a loan of $5 to defendant's mother, purportedly for defendant's benefit. Around noon the entire party returned to their respective homes in the northern part of the county near the community of Malone. The distance between their homes and Malone does not appear from the evidence. Defendant and his family debarked from the uncle's car at the cross-roads and the uncle, accompanied by his wife, proceeded to his home, where they remained for the rest of the day and night. Defendant was not seen again by the uncle until shortly before the trial of this case.
The uncle testified that around 8:00 p.m., after returning home from Marianna on the day in question, he took his money from his 'Sunday pants' and placed it in the pocket of a 'brand new pair of overalls.' At that time he had three or four fives, four or five ones, and one ten dollar bill; the remaining $1,300, he was positive, was in twenty dollar bills. After 'snapping' the pocket containing the money, the uncle placed the overalls on the table between the beds on which he and his wife slept. The couple retired around 10:00 p. m. that night and slept until around 11:00 p. m. when they were awakened by rain or some unidentified noise. The uncle left his bed and went outside the house, but seeing nothing unusual returned to the bedroom where he discovered his overalls on the floor under the bed and the table moved. Neither of the couple was sufficiently alarmed at the time to check on the money that had been placed in the overalls pocket. The next morning the pocket was examined and the money was discovered missing. The uncle was permitted to express his positive opinion at the trial that defendant was guilty of the theft of his money. This opinion, which was later admitted to be only a strong suspicion, was apparently based in part upon the fact that the uncle owned a bulldog that would not allow strangers on the premises; that defendant was friendly with the dog; and that the defendant failed to report for work on the morning following the theft. Further, according to defendant's uncle, defendant had been present on numerous occasions when the 'hands' were being paid and was the only person who knew he kept large sums of money. But, defendant had not seen his uncle's money while they were together on the day of the theft. The record is silent as to whether the uncle's bulldog was at home on the night in question or whether he had other friends. Likewise, just how the defendant came to be the only person who knew of the uncle's wealth when large sums were apparently displayed to the other 'hands' is not made clear.
The State produced one Hatcher who testified that he saw the defendant around midnight on the date of the alleged theft when he came to the witness' home, the location of which is not disclosed, seeking a ride to Marianna or Malone; that enroute to Malone he stopped at defendant's home where he heard the defendant tell his mother 'that was a hundred dollar bill I gave you;' that the two then proceeded to the 'oil mill' at Malone where defendant gave the witness a dollar bill in payment for his transportation, which was the only money he saw in defendant's possession; and that he, the witness, then returned to his home.
One Baxter testified that he met the defendant at the 'peanut mill' in Malone on the night of the theft and agreed to transport him to Marianna for $5. According to this witness, defendant stated he was going to Dallas, Texas, to visit his wife who was allegedly hospitalized there. Further, while enroute to Marianna, defendant offered to purchase the witness' car for $500 and 'slipped' the witness five one hundred dollar bills. The deal was called off when the witness said defendant would have to drive him back to the mill before the sale would be consummated. Upon arriving in Marianna the witness drove defendant to a cab company owned by one Callaway and left him there at about 1:00 a. m. Defendant paid the witness with a twenty dollar bill and received $15 in change.
Callaway testified that he was called to the office of his company at around 1:00 a. m. on the morning after the alleged theft and there met the defendant, who stated he wanted to hire a cab to drive him to Lakeland, Florida, for the alleged purpose of accepting employment with a construction company in that area. The witness agreed to furnish a cab for defendant's trip for $80, whereupon defendant produced a 'roll of money' and paid the agreed price with a one hundred dollar bill. One Dozier, the cab driver who transported defendant to South Florida, testified that he saw the defendant with a 'roll of bills,' but did not know the amount or denomination. He also testified that the defendant appeared as any one else in a hurry to get somewhere, but that his conduct was not otherwise unusual.
Defendant's motion for directed verdict was denied and the cause was submitted to the jury on the State's evidence alone, the defendant having elected not to offer any evidence.
From the foregoing facts it clearly appears that the only circumstances from which guilt could be reasonably inferred were the defendant's unexplained acquisition of a large sum of money and his sudden departure from home on the night the crime was alleged to have been committed.
Where the larceny of money is at issue, evidence tending to show the accused had no money before the larceny and considerable money thereafter is admissible, since a sudden and unexplained possession of means about the time a larceny is committed has the tendency to connect the defendant with the crime where there are other circumstances to support it. One such supporting circumstance has been held to be the fact that money in the possession of the accused corresponds in description to that which was stolen. 1 It is well settled that exclusive possession of the whole or some part of stolen property by a defendant recently after a theft, is sufficient when standing alone, to cast upon the accused the burden of explaining how he came by it, or of offering some explanation, and, if he fails to do so, to warrant the jury in convicting him of larceny. 2
In the instant case the State's own evidence conclusively showed that the stolen money consisted of $1,300 in twenty dollar bills, together with a few ones and fives, and one ten dollar bill. The money seen in defendant's possession consisted almost exclusively of one hundred dollar bills. Furthermore there is no positive evidence that the defendant here in fact had no money prior to the larceny charge but merely the inference that such was the case. Considering that the theft here charged necessarily occurred in the middle of the night, and in a rural community, we do not consider that the jury could with justification infer that the defendant, in a matter of not more than some ninety minutes, converted some if not all of the $1,300 in stolen twenty dollar bills into one hundred dollar bills. Such an inference would necessarily assume the defendant anticipated capture and therefore sought to alter the identity of the stolen money, either through some innocent party or through a prearranged accomplice. While there may be instances in which an...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Jones v. State
...reviewing criminal convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence, Head v. State, 62 So.2d 41, 42 (Fla.1952); Harrison v. State, 104 So.2d 391, 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958), and have applied the above-stated circumstantial evidence standard fairly rigorously when evaluating the sufficiency ......
-
Diecidue v. State, 30913
...98 Fla. 877, 124 So. 444, and the opinion and decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in the case of Harrison v. State, Fla.App., 104 So.2d 391, 394. For the reasons stated the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, challenged herein is hereby quashed an......
-
Lord v. State
...for conviction, a result prohibited by the rule stated in Gustine v. State, 86 Fla. 24, 28, 97 So. 207, 208 (1923); Harrison v. State, 104 So.2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); Torres v. State, 520 So.2d 78, 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); and Chaudoin v. State, 362 So.2d 398, 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). ......
-
Jackson v. State
...of liberty and freedom is far too precious a garment to be trampled in the dust of mere inference compounded." Harrison v. State, 104 So.2d 391, 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). The state relies on the statutory inference of section 812.022(2), to argue that its evidence was sufficient to support a......