Hart Twin Volvo Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 23 May 1973
• Citation: 165 Conn. 42,327 A.2d 588
• Parties: HART TWIN VOLVO CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 588

327 A.2d 588

165 Conn. 42

HART TWIN VOLVO CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

May 23, 1973.

Morton W. Appleton, Hartford, with whom was Sydney W. Elkin, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Richard R. Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., for the appellee (defendant).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

BOGDANSKI, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from the decision of the defendant commissioner of motor vehicles in finding that the plaintiff violated § 14-51 of the General Statutes regarding the qualifications of a new car dealer and in finding that the plaintiff violated § 14-63-2(f) of the regulations of the Connecticut motor vehicle department in not having sufficient personnel and equipment to service a customer's car. The commissioner, pursuant to § 14-64, suspended the plaintiff's license for five days for each violation, to run consecutively. From this decision the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed the appeal. From the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this court.

In its assignment of errors, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in failing to find that the decision reached by the commissioner was illegal, arbitrary and unsupported by the evidence.

Section 14-51 of the General Statutes reads in part: 'A 'new car dealer' includes any person, firm or corporation engaged in the business of merchandising new motor vehicles under a manufacturer's or importer's contract for each such make of vehicle who may, incidental to such business, sell used motor vehicles and repair motor vehicles or cause them to be repaired by qualified persons in his employ. He shall be a person qualified to conduct such business and have § suitable and adequate place of business (emphasis added), which shall be determined to be such by the commissioner.'

The notice of the charge made against the plaintiff with respect to the violation of § 14-51 reads as follows: 'It is alleged you are no longer qualified to be licensed as a dealer in that you did conspire to defraud Mr. Tait out of the guarantee that was part of the sale of the 1967 Ford Country Squire. It is alleged you instructed R & R Atlantic Service, Inc., the approximate price to assess Mr. Tait for the replacement of the rear engine seal. It is further alleged that you did not expect R & R Atlantic to charge Hart Twin Volvo $66.50 for the replacement of the seal on Mr. Tait's vehicle.'

Pursuant to the provisions of § 14-64 the commissioner held a hearing and found the plaintiff in violation of § 14-51, stating as follows: 'A violation of Section 14-51, regarding qualifications of a new car dealer, if found in that you represented the 1967 Ford you sold to Mr. Tait to be under a 100% guarantee, yet reduced this to a 50/50 guarantee without Mr. Tait's knowledge.'

With respect to this charge and the finding made, the plaintiff contends that it was misled by the notice and asserts that it was prepared to defend a charge of conspiracy to defraud in the repair of a car, but instead was found in violation of reducing a guarantee at the time of the sale of the car, a charge it was not prepared to defend based upon the notice given. The plaintiff further contends that the charge as alleged was not proven and that it violates the fundamentals of natural justice to find a violation on a theory different than that alleged in the notice.

[I]f . . . (administrative) agencies deemed to be necessary in our complex society are to serve the purposes for which they are created and endowed with vast powers, they must accredit themselves by acting in accordance with the cherished judicial tradition embodying the basic concepts of fair play.' Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 22, 58 S.Ct. 773, 778, 82 L.Ed. 1129. The right to a hearing means the right to a meaningful hearing with the awareness of what matters must be countered. It embraces the right to a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. Morgan v. United States, supra, 18, 58 S.Ct. 773.

The concept of due process, when the government seeks to deprive a person of life, liberty or property, is that the thoroughness of the procedure by which the deprivation is effected must be balanced against the gravity of the potential loss and the interests at stake, and due process requires that the procedure involved must be appropriate to the nature of the case. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865; Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246, 64 S.Ct. 599, 88 L.Ed. 692. Consequently, it has been held that an appropriate hearing is necessary before a governmental agency may, on the basis of an alleged state of facts, impair the means of a person's livelihood, whether the means be wages or welfare benefits, price rates or a right pursued under a license. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349; Morgan v. United States, supra. The right to a hearing includes the right to notice of the matters to be heard. 'The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them . . .. Those who are brought into contest with the Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command.' Morgan v. United States, supra, 304 U.S 18-19, 58 S.Ct. 776. The entire purpose of notice and a hearing is to allow an accused person to test the sufficiency of the charges and to enable the agency, before it acts, to ensure that a proper basis exists in fact and law for its action. There is a failure of due process whenever either notice or hearing, where required, has been so defective that a party has not been reasonably apprised of nor had the opportunity to contest the charges found against him.

Clearly, here the plaintiff had the right to fair notice and hearing before its license could be suspended. Section 14-64 of the General Statutes, which empowers the commissioner to suspend or revoke dealers' licenses, predicates such action on notice and hearing. Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States, grounding its decision on procedural due process, has held that not even a driver's license, which could be essential in the pursuit of a livelihood, can be suspended without prior notice and an appropriate hearing. Bell v. Burson, supra. The purpose of the hearing required by § 14-64 is to enable the commissioner to determine whether a license accused of misconduct under a statute pertaining to his license has, in fact, violated the statute. The effect of the procedure, if a violation is found, is revocation or suspension of the license, a valuable property right ¹ on which the licensee and many people may depend for their livelihood. In such circumstances, ² due process requires that the notice given must advise the party of the facts or conduct alleged to be in violation of the law and must fairly indicate the legal theory under which such facts are claimed to constitute a violation of the law. See Rodale Press, Inc. v. F.T.C., 132 U.S.App.D.C. 317, 407 F.2d 1252; N.L.R.B. v. Tennsco Corporation, 339 F.2d 396 (6th Cir.); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. West Production Co., 121 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 682, 62 S.Ct. 186, 86...