Hart v. State , s. 1D09–2300

• Decision Date: 13 May 2011
• Docket Number: 1D09–2302.,Nos. 1D09–2300,s. 1D09–2300
• Citation: 70 So.3d 615
• Parties: Kadeem Quaishawn HART, Appellant,v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

70 So.3d 615

Kadeem Quaishawn HART, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 1D09–2300

1D09–2302.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 13, 2011.

[70 So.3d 616]

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Gail E. Anderson, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, and Michael S. Bossen, Jacksonville, for Appellant.Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Joshua R. Heller, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.WEBSTER, J.

In these two consolidated direct criminal appeals, appellant presents three issues challenging his judgments of conviction and sentences imposed in case number 1D09–2300 for carjacking, and in case number 1D09–2302 for sexual battery, battery, kidnapping, aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and armed robbery. Without diminishing the brutal and terrifying manner in which these crimes were committed, we are constrained to reverse appellant's convictions, vacate his sentences, and remand for new trials because the trial court abused its discretion in granting the state's motions to join the offenses for a single trial pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.150(a). This ruling moots appellant's remaining issues.

In trial court case number 16–2007–CF–1251–AXXX–MA, appellant was charged by fourth amended information with two counts of sexual battery during which he used force likely to cause serious personal injury and/or used a deadly weapon (a BB gun), kidnapping, aggravated battery and armed robbery. In trial court case number 16–2007–CF–1250–AXXX–MA, appellant was charged with a single count of carjacking involving a different victim. The offenses occurred on January 25, 2007. In both cases, the state filed a “Motion for Joinder of Charges” claiming that the cases were “inextricably intertwined and such factual entanglement necessitate[d] their joinder so they may be tried together in order to properly introduce to the jury all relevant evidence in both cases.” Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motions without explanation, instead, attaching to its order in each case a copy of the state's motion.

Our analysis begins with the joinder provision of rule 3.150(a), which provides that “[t]wo or more offenses that are triable in the same court may be charged in the same indictment or information ... when the offenses ... are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more connected acts or transactions.” (Emphasis added.) However, where joinder is concerned, our supreme court has cautioned that “interests in practicality, efficiency, expense, convenience, and judicial economy, do not outweigh the defendant's right to a fair determination of guilt or innocence.” Garcia v. State, 568 So.2d 896, 898 (Fla.1990) (citing

[70 So.3d 617]

State v. Williams, 453 So.2d 824, 825 (Fla.1984)). See also Ellis v. State, 622 So.2d 991, 999 (Fla.1993) (quoting Wright v. State, 586 So.2d 1024, 1030 (Fla.1991), which, in turn, quoted Garcia ); Crossley v. State, 596 So.2d 447, 449–50 (Fla.1992) (holding that while “[t]he justifications for the consolidation of charges are convenience and the preservation of the courts' valuable resources ... practicality and efficiency cannot outweigh the defendant's right to a fair trial,” citing State v. Vazquez, 419 So.2d 1088 (Fla.1982)).

Here, the state's justification for joinder as articulated at the hearing on its motions was based on the fact that the offenses occurred on the same evening within a three or four block area of the same neighborhood, and were separated by approximately three and a half hours. The state also noted that the same BB gun was used in both offenses, and the cell phones of both victims were stolen. (The carjacking victim's cell phone was discovered at the scene of appellant's apprehension, while the cell phone belonging to the sexual battery victim was discovered in appellant's belongings at the jail on the night of appellant's arrest following the carjacking.) The state argued that the cases should be joined under either a “crime spree” or an “inseparable evidence” rationale. The state also urged that the fact that both victims had described appellant holding a similar weapon three or four hours apart was “extremely relevant” because it bolstered the credibility of the sexual battery victim.

In Garcia, our supreme court observed:

The applicable principles were made clear in Paul v. State, 385 So.2d 1371, 1372 (Fla.1980), adopting in part 365 So.2d 1063, 1065–67 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (Smith, J., dissenting). The primary “purpose of requiring separate trials on unconnected charges is to assure that evidence adduced on one charge will not be misused to dispel doubts on the other, and so effect a mutual contamination of the jury's consideration of each distinct charge.” 365 So.2d at 1066.

568 So.2d at 898. The court also noted that, in Paul, it had

construed the “connected acts or transactions” requirement of rule 3.150 to mean that the acts joined for trial must be considered “in an episodic sense [.] [T]he rules do not warrant joinder or consolidation of criminal charges based on similar but separate episodes, separated in time, which are ‘connected’ only by similar circumstances and the accused's alleged guilt in both or all instances.” Paul, 365 So.2d at 1065–66.

Id.

In addition, in Crossley, the supreme court...