Hartfield v. East Grand Rapids Public Schools

• Decision Date: 14 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 1:96-cv-318.,1:96-cv-318.
• Citation: 960 F.Supp. 1259
• Parties: Kevin HARTFIELD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EAST GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

960 F.Supp. 1259

Kevin HARTFIELD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EAST GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:96-cv-318.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

February 14, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kevin Hartfield, East Grand Rapids, pro se.

Joyce Hartfield, East Grand Rapids, pro se.

John Patrick White, Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett, Grand Rapids, for defendants.

OPINION

HILLMAN, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff parents and their minor children have brought this pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants deprived them of their rights to due process and equal protection in receipt of a public education. Presently before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss. Having reviewed the submissions of the parties, the court concludes that the complaint should be dismissed because plaintiffs have failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

FACTS

Plaintiffs Joyce and Kevin Hartfield and their minor children have filed suit against defendant East Grand Rapids Public Schools, as well as various individual school officials and members of the school board. It appears from the complaint that plaintiffs have had ongoing disputes with the East Grand Rapids Public Schools concerning the education of the Hartfield children.¹ As a result of some of these disputes, plaintiffs allege that they removed their children from the defendant schools and elected to home school them. After defendants reported plaintiff children absent from school, plaintiffs were prosecuted and convicted for truancy violations in a Michigan district court. Plaintiffs appealed the convictions to the Kent County, Michigan Circuit Court, where those appeals presently are pending.

Plaintiffs originally filed a complaint in this court on August 16, 1995, against multiple defendants, including East Grand Rapids Public Schools and the related individual defendants, as well as the Michigan Department of Education and the Kent County Prosecutor. In that complaint, plaintiffs alleged that their prosecution for truancy violated their rights under the Constitution. While motions to dismiss were pending, plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal without prejudice on November 20, 1995.

The present action was filed on April 17, 1996. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and/or for more definite statement of plaintiffs' claims. (Docket # 8) Because of the vagueness of plaintiffs' complaint, the magistrate judge granted defendants' motion for more definite statement and ordered plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. (Docket # 15) The parties also were ordered to submit supplemental briefing on the pending motion to dismiss, should plaintiffs' amended complaint not resolve all issues. Plaintiffs submitted a pleading entitled "Response to More Definite Statement Requested," which will be treated by this court as an amended complaint. (Docket # 17) Both sides filed supplemental briefs.

Taking plaintiffs' more definite statement together with the original complaint, it appears that plaintiffs have raised four claims. First, plaintiffs allege that the school district suspended LaQuan Alexander without due process of law, and failed to advise the parents of the manner in which they could appeal the school board's decision. Second, plaintiffs apparently allege that on April 15, 1993, they were denied the right to review LaQuan Alexander's educational records. Third, plaintiffs allege that on February 21, 1991, April 21, 1992, and October 23, 1991, they refused testing of Kevin and Doye Hartfield for placement in special education classes. As a consequence of that refusal, plaintiffs allege that the school district required the two children to repeat eighth grade, allegedly without providing a due process hearing. Fourth, plaintiffs contend that they were deprived of due process when the school district filed a complaint for truancy on the basis of the Hartfield children's absence from school, which led to plaintiffs subsequently being found guilty of truancy charges. Plaintiffs also generally suggest that the underlying cause of many difficulties was racial discrimination and unequal treatment.

Defendants have moved to dismiss on several grounds. First, defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to set forth any due process or equal protection claim in the suspension of LaQuan Alexander. Second, defendants claim that the alleged failure to allow inspection of LaQuan's educational record is barred by the statute of limitations. Third, defendants contend that any claim based on the failure to hold a hearing to determine whether Doye and Kevin should be tested for special educational needs is barred by the statute of limitations and fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Fourth, defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim with respect to their allegations that defendants violated their rights by reporting the Hartfield children's truancy. Even had plaintiffs stated such a claim, however, defendants contend that this court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over such a claim because the truancy charges are pending state criminal proceedings.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a motion to dismiss an action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court will construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys P.C., 76 F.3d 692, 697 (6th Cir.1996). Accepting all factual allegations as true, the court must determine whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would merit relief. Id. Under the liberal pleading standard of the federal rules, "all that a plaintiff must do in a complaint is give a defendant `fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102-03, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

In addition, a court will review a complaint drafted by pro se litigants less stringently than those prepared by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). The court need not, however, conjure up allegations where the complaint is inadequate. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

DISCUSSION

A. Suspension of LaQuan Alexander

According to plaintiffs' submissions, on March 31, 1993, LaQuan Alexander was suspended for ten days by defendant school district on the basis of evidence that he had misappropriated certain computer program disks from Lakeside Elementary School. Plaintiffs claim that they were denied due process when the school district neglected to inform them that they had a right to appeal the June 16, 1993, school board decision to uphold that suspension. In support of their claim, plaintiffs refer to an excerpt from a school district handbook for parents, which they have attached to their amended complaint.

In essence, plaintiffs allege that defendants violated state law when they failed to give plaintiffs appeal rights beyond the decision of the board of education for the district. On June 30, 1993, the time of the alleged deprivation, however, Michigan law provided that a local school board "may authorize or order the suspension or expulsion of a pupil guilty of gross misdemeanor or persistent disobedience when in the board's judgment the interest of the school may demand the authorization or order." Mich. Comp. L. § 380.1311 (subsequently amended, effective December 31, 1993). State law did not provide that plaintiffs were entitled to have a higher body decide the question of the school suspension.

In addition, the handbook excerpts provided by plaintiffs relate to expulsion, not suspension, and do not state that additional appeal procedures existed in this case, only that the district should notify the parent of "the appropriate appeal authority" in cases when such an appeal is available. While plaintiffs note that police reports refer to the suspension as an "expulsion," plaintiffs own admissions demonstrate that LaQuan was suspended for ten school days and eligible to return to school on April 15, 1993. See Plaintiffs' chronology attached to Docket # 13. Plaintiffs therefore have failed to allege adequately any breach of district policy or state law.

Moreover, even had plaintiffs established a right to particular procedures under state law, they nevertheless have failed to state a deprivation of constitutional dimension. Under federal law, a "[v]iolation of a state's formal procedure ... does not in and of itself implicate constitutional due process concerns." Purisch v. Tennessee Tech. Univ., 76 F.3d 1414, 1423 (6th Cir.1996). "A state cannot be said to have a federal due process obligation to follow all of its procedures; such a system would result in the constitutionalizing of every state rule, and would not be administrable." Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir.), cert.denied, 509 U.S. 907, 113 S.Ct. 3001, 125 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993).

In the context of school discipline, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires that before a school may order a suspension of ten days or less, a student be given notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence against him, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581, 95 S.Ct. 729, 739-40, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). See also Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1358 (6th Cir.1996). Here, plaintiffs have not alleged that they were deprived of notice of the suspension, the nature of the charges, or an opportunity to be heard. In fact, in Exhibit 2 to their opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket # 13) plaintiffs recite a chronology of events that demonstrates that they received more than notice and an opportunity to be heard. Plaintiffs admit that they received opportunities to appeal the principal's decision to Superintendent Morse, to a committee of the board of education,...