Marsh v. Randolph
| Decision Date | 07 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:09-cv-13,1:09-cv-13 |
| Parties | CLIFFORDERIC MARSH, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE SHERIDAN RANDOLPH; JUDGE AMY REEDY; ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL MATT MCCOY, DETECTIVE DEWAYNE SCOGGINS, Sued in Their Official and Individual Capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
Mattice/Lee
Plaintiff Clifford Eric Marsh ("Marsh"), a pro se prisoner, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Court Doc. 1). Plaintiff Marsh seeks monetary damages against Tennessee 10th Judicial District Sessions Court Judge Sheridan Randolph ("Judge Randolph") and Tennessee 10th Judicial District Criminal Court Judge Amy Reedy ("Judge Reedy"),claiming they set an excessive bond at a million dollars in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and against Assistant District Attorney Matt McCoy ("ADA McCoy") and Defendant Detective Dewayne Scoggins ("Detective Scoggins") for requesting the allegedly excessive and unconstitutional bond of a million dollars. In addition, Marsh contends Detective Scoggins violated his constitutional rights when he used excessive force when interrogating him by choking him in an attempt to obtain evidence about another suspect.
Considering the facts alleged in the complaint and the applicable law, for the reasons explained herein, the Court will DISMISS the defendant judges and assistant district attorney from this lawsuit. Although the Court will also DISMISS all the claims against Detective Scoggins in his official capacity and the claim against him for excessive bond in his individual capacity, Marsh will be permitted to go forward with his claim against Detective Scoggins in his individual capacity for excessive use of force.
The Court will first address the pending in forma pauperis motions (Court Docs. 6 & 9).
It appears from the application to proceed in forma pauperis submitted by Marsh that he lacks sufficient financial resources at the present time to pay the required filing fee of $350.00. Marsh is not relieved of the ultimate responsibility of paying the $350.00 filing fee. Since Marsh is a prisoner in custody at West Tennessee State Penitentiary ("WTSP"), he will be ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00 under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Marsh shall pay the full filing fee of three-hundred and fifty dollars ($350.00) pursuant to Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B), the custodian of Marsh's inmate trust account at the institution where he now resides shall submit to the Clerk, United States District Court, 900 Georgia Avenue, Room 309, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402, as an initial partial payment, whichever is the greater of
inmate trust account; or
Thereafter, the custodian shall submit twenty percent (20%) of Marsh's preceding monthly income (or income credited to his trust account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds $10.00, until the full filing fee of $350.00 as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The Clerk of Court will be DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memorandum and accompanying Order to the Warden and Custodian of Inmate Accounts at WTSP, the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction, and the Attorney General for the State of Tennessee to ensure the custodian of Marsh's inmate trust account complies with the portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to payment of the filing fee.
The agency having custody of the plaintiff shall collect the filing fee as funds become available. This order shall become a part of inmate Marsh's file and follow the inmate if he is transferred to another institution. The agency having custody of the plaintiff shall continue to collect monthly payments from plaintiff's prisoner account until the entire filing fee of $350.00 is paid.
The plaintiff will also be ORDERED to notify this Court and defendant or defendant's attorney of any change of address if he is transferred to another institution, and to provide the prison officials at any new institution with a copy of this order. Failure of the plaintiff to notify this Court of an address change and/or the new prison officials of this order and outstanding debt, may result in the imposition of appropriate sanctions against plaintiff, upto and including dismissal of this action, without any additional notice or hearing by the Court.
Pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). However, pro se status does not exempt plaintiffs from the requirement that they must comply with relevant rules of procedure and meet the requirements of substantive law. Hulsey v. State of Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991); Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981). Pro se plaintiffs must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Authority, 55 F.3d 1097, 1104 (6th Cir. 1995). Although the standard of review is liberal, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. Of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (); LRL Properties, 55 F.3d at 1103-04; Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993); Hartfield v. East Grand Rapids Public Schools, 960 F. Supp. 1259, 1268 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
The complaint must give the defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Lillard, 76 F.3d at 726; Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994). "In practice, 'a . . . complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.'" Lillard, 76 F.3d at 726 (citations omitted).
This Court has an ongoing responsibility under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 1915 (e)(2) and 1915(A), to review plaintiff's action and dismiss the action or any portion of the action which fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 2008); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
Construing Marsh's complaint in the light most favorable to him and taking into consideration his lack of legal training, the Court has determined that he alleges the following facts.
On or about August 8, 2008, Marsh was arrested for aggravated burglary and theft under $500.00, after being apprehended by a homeowner at gunpoint outside the homeowner's garage. Once Marsh was "under the guardianship of the arresting" officer, Detective Scoggins, without reading Marsh his constitutional rights, "forcefully" placed his hands around Marsh's throat to interrogate him about the identity of the other suspect. Because Marsh refused to provide any information, Detective Scoggins "made it clear that their (Scoggins [sic] & Stones [sic])2 judicial state court associates would set [Marsh] a bond so high that [he would] wish [he] had cooperated." (Court Doc. 1, p. 4).
Marsh's bond was subsequently set at one million dollars by Judge Randolph at the request of Detective Scoggins and ADA McCoy. At a second bond hearing, Judge Reedy upheld the million dollar bond.
To state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under color of law, without due process of law. Flagg Brothers Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Chatman v. Slagle, 107 F.3d 380, 384 (6th Cir. 1997); Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1996); O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 119 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1032 (1992). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to set out in detail the facts underlying the claim, the plaintiff must provide sufficient allegations to give defendants fair notice of the claims against them. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotic Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). To state a § 1983 claim, Marsh must allege sufficient facts that, if true, would establish that the defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States while acting under color of law. See Brock, 94 F.3d at 244.
Marsh has sued Judge Randolph, Judge Reedy, and ADA McCoy in their official and individual capacities. Before addressing the excessive bond claim against these three defendants in their individual capacities, the Court will explain why the claims against thesethree defendants in their official capacity must be dismissed.
To the extent Marsh sues the state judges and assistant district attorney in their official capacity, he is suing...
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