Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino

• Decision Date: 03 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 3:03 CV 00313(GLG).,3:03 CV 00313(GLG).
• Citation: 290 F.Supp.2d 265
• Parties: The HARTFORD COURANT COMPANY, Plaintiff, American Lawyer Media, Inc., d/b/a the Connecticut Law Tribune Intervening plaintiff, v. Joseph PELLEGRINO, Chief Court Administrator and William J. Sullivan, Chief Justice Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

290 F.Supp.2d 265

The HARTFORD COURANT COMPANY, Plaintiff American Lawyer Media, Inc., d/b/a the Connecticut Law Tribune Intervening plaintiff, v. Joseph PELLEGRINO, Chief Court Administrator and William J. Sullivan, Chief Justice Defendants.

No. 3:03 CV 00313(GLG).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

November 3, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Paul Guggina, Ralph G. Elliot, Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Daniel J. Klau, Jodi Lynn Zils Gagne, Pepe & Hazard, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff/Intervenor Plaintiff.

Anthony M. Fitzgerald, Carmody & Torrance, New Haven, CT, Defendant.

James K. Robertson, Jr., Jonathan M. Weiser, Maureen Danehy Cox, Carmody & Torrance, Waterbury, CT, for Defendant/Intervenor Defendant.

RULING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

GOETTEL, District Judge.

Plaintiffs in this action of first impression challenge the constitutionality of the judicial rules of the Connecticut Superior Court and state statutes providing for orders to seal Connecticut state court files. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief. Before this court are defendants' motions for dismissal of the complaint and intervening complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docs. # 10 and # 22).

I. Factual Background

On February 21, 2003, plaintiff the Hartford Courant Company ["the Courant"] filed a complaint against defendant Joseph Pellegrino, the Chief Court Administrator of the state courts in the State of Connecticut ["Judge Pellegrino"]. On June 18, 2003, American Lawyer Media, Inc. d/b/a the Connecticut Law Tribune ["the Law Tribune"] filed an intervening complaint against Judge Pellegrino and an additional defendant, William J. Sullivan, Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court ["Chief Justice Sullivan"]. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1984, plaintiffs allege violation of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article First §§ 4, 5, 8 and 10 of the Connecticut Constitution resulting from judicial orders to seal Connecticut state court files.

In the complaint and intervening complaint, plaintiffs allege that a memo dated June 12, 2000, from Judith Stanulis, Civil Court Manager to Trial Court Administrators and Judicial District Chief Clerks [the "Stanulis Memo"], sets forth a practice of sealing files according to a three tiered system. As described in the Stanulis memo, Level 1 sealing is used when a case is statutorily sealed or sealed upon order of the court. Court personnel may not acknowledge the existence of such cases; nor do such cases appear on the official docket system or motions calendar. (Intervening Compl., Exh. B). Level 2 sealing is used when the court orders all documents of a file sealed, but permits disclosure of the docket number and the case caption. Under Levels 1 and 2, the sealing orders are also under seal. Level 3 sealing is used when the court orders that a specific motion, document or pleading be sealed. Plaintiffs do not object to Level 3 sealing.

In the complaint and intervening complaint, plaintiffs allege that Levels 1 and 2 sealing practices abridge their right to access the courts and deny plaintiffs notice and opportunity to intervene in such cases for purposes of challenging the sealing orders. Plaintiffs seek an order with respect to each Level 1 and Level 2 case compelling defendants to provide the names and status of the parties, the docket number of the case and the judicial district where the case is pending, the list of every document in the case file, the nature of the case, and a copy of the order pursuant to which the case was granted either Level 1 or Level 2 sealing status.

Defendants state that in a press release dated February 3, 2003, Chief Justice Sullivan announced that a group of judges had reviewed these sealing practices and agreed that the practice of maintaining secret files under Level 1 should be eliminated. This matter, as well as development of specific criteria for sealing family cases, was referred to the Rules Committee of the Superior Court for its consideration at the judges' annual meeting in June 2003. (Def. Pellegrino's Mem., Ex. B). At oral argument on August 21, 2003, defendants stated that there is only one Level 1 sealed case in the system and that all other pending cases are now Level 2 cases. (Tr. at 12). Additionally, defendants claim that they have provided plaintiffs with electronic information regarding cases sealed under Level 2 which will permit plaintiffs to intervene on any motions to seal. (Tr. at 12).

However, the Hartford Courant counters that the data concerning the Level 2 cases only lists the name of the case and the docket number, and that it cannot ascertain whether these files are opened or closed; or whether any sealing order was ever issued and if a sealing order was issued what the scope of the order was. (Tr. at 28-29). Furthermore, the Hartford Courant claims that the new rules regarding sealing adopted by the judges in June 2003 do not affect the 10,000 Level 2 cases currently pending. (Tr. at 32).

II. Discussion

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911, 112 S.Ct. 1943, 118 L.Ed.2d 548 (1992). A complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted). The issue on a motion to dismiss "is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims." United States v. Yale New Haven Hosp., 727 F.Supp. 784 786 (D.Conn.1990) (citing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683).

Disclaimer of Power

Defendants first argue that they lacked the power and authority to provide plaintiffs with the relief they seek. (Def. Pellegrino's Mem. at 6-7). Citing Connecticut General Statutes § § 51-5a and 51-5(b)a, defendants assert that neither Judge Pellegrino nor Chief Justice Sullivan in their administrative capacities are empowered by statute to overrule or vacate sealing orders entered by the Superior Court judges. (Def. Sullivan's Mot. at 3-4). Their administrative duties comprise mainly of accounting, personnel, scheduling and record keeping for the Judicial Department. (Def. Pellegrino's Mem. at 18). Defendants make reference to Rules Committee of the Superior Court of Connecticut v. Freedom of Information Comm'n, 192 Conn. 234, 245, 472 A.2d 9 (1984), Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 326, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998), and Blumenthal v. Barnes, 261 Conn. 434, 463, 804 A.2d 152 (2002), to support their argument that administrators' powers are defined and limited by statute. Thus, defendants assert, that as administrators, defendants may not amend the rules of practice and provide plaintiffs with the relief they seek. (Def. Pellegrino's Mem. at 19). Defendants note that only through Judge Pellegrino's judicial capacity as an Appellate Court judge and through Chief Justice Sullivan's judicial capacity as a Supreme Court justice may they review or reverse any sealing orders. (Def. Sullivan's Mot. at 4).

In response, plaintiffs counter that defendants' disclaimer of power argument fails because the Level 1 and 2 files were sealed in accordance with memoranda issued by defendants' office and that because of the secrecy of these files, it is not known whether any Superior Court judge ever entered any sealing order in these cases. (Pl.'s Mem. at 3-5). Plaintiffs argue that defendants are the proper parties because defendants have the administrative authority to direct the state court clerks to disclose the dockets sheets. (Intervening Pl.'s Mem. at 13).

First Amendment

Defendants object to plaintiffs' argument that they have a first amendment right to the requested docket sheets. Defendants counter that there is no first amendment guarantee to access certain court records. (Defs.' Reply Br. at 2). In support, defendants cite the case Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. 435 U.S. 589, 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978), where the court held that "the right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files." In U.S. v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir.1997), the court notes that "[t]here is not yet any definitive Supreme Court ruling on whether there is a constitutional right of access to court documents and, if so, the scope of such a right." Defendants opine that there is no definitive case decided in the Second Circuit. (Defs.' Reply Br. at 5). In support, defendants cite Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee, 263 Conn. 39, 66, 818 A.2d 14 (2003), for the proposition that the courts must balance the public's right to access the courts and the litigants' legitimate privacy concerns.

Defendants also object to plaintiffs' argument because the cases they cite involve orders and documents in criminal cases and the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, as distinguished from the present case which involves civil and family law matters. (Defs.' Reply Br. at 6). Defendants also contest the relevancy of the plaintiffs' arguments in regard to cited "gag order" cases, noting that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the parties in the Level 1 and 2 cases would speak to the press but for the sealing orders. (Defs.' Reply Br. at 6).

A. Abstention Doctrines

Although the abstention arguments are not the first objections raised by defendants, the court will consider the abstention argument first because a decision on this issue could obviate the need to reach the remaining issues. The court also...