Hartford Hospital v. City and Town of Hartford

• Decision Date: 02 February 1971
• Parties: HARTFORD HOSPITAL v. CITY AND TOWN OF HARTFORD.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 561

279 A.2d 561

160 Conn. 370

HARTFORD HOSPITAL v. CITY AND TOWN OF HARTFORD.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Feb. 2, 1971.

Richard M. Cosgrove, Deputy Corp. Counsel, with whom, on the brief, was John M. Fitzgerald, Corp. Counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

David Schwartz, Hartford, with whom were Arthur L. Shipman, Jr., and Daniel P. Brown, Jr., Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Before ALCORN, C.J., and HOUSE, RYAN, SHAPIRO and RUBINOW, ^* JJ.

RYAN, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff appealed to the board of tax review in Hartford, seeking exemption from taxation on the tax list of July 1, 1967, for real estate located in Hartford, on the ground that the property was used exclusively for hospital purposes. From the denial of its appeal the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. That court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, directing the board of tax review to correct the assessment against the plaintiff accordingly and that the defendant remit to the plaintiff any payment of taxes made by virtue of an assessment against such property on the tax list of July 1, 1967, with interest to the date of the judgment. The defendant has appealed to this court.

The case was presented to the trial court on a stipulation of facts. The plaintiff is a corporation without capital stock, located in Hartford where it maintains and conducts a hospital pursuant to its charter. On July 1, 1967, the plaintiff owned certain real estate in Hartford known as No. 268-270 Washington Street, located in close proximity to buildings owned by the plaintiff which are used for the care of patients. The building thereon consisted of an apartment house containing twelve apartments used and occupied exclusively for residence of interns and residents-collectively termed members of the house staff-employed by the plaintiff hospital, with the exception of one apartment used and occupied by the janitor, an employee of the hospital, to care for the building. The members of the house staff who occupy these apartments are charged rent by the plaintiff. It is necessary for the plaintiff to provide housing for a large number of its house staff in close proximity to those buildings which are used for the care of patients in order properly to perform its services as a hospital. From these stipulated facts the trial court concluded that the plaintiff was aggrieved by the action of the board of tax review in refusing to exempt the subject property; that the property in question is used exclusively for hospital purposes; that the exclusiveness of the use if not impaired by the fact that the plaintiff charges rent for occupancy; and that the property is tax exempt.

The defendant concedes that the plaintiff is a hospital corporation whose property is entitled to an exemption under the terms of § 12-81(16) of the General Statutes subject to the provisions of § 12-88 of the General Statutes. It assigns error in the conclusion of the trial court that the property in question, used for residential purposes for members of the house staff, is tax exempt under the provisions of those statutes. Section 12-81(16) exempts from taxation '(s)ubject to the provisions of § 12-88, all property of, or held in trust for, any Connecticut hospital society or corporation or sanatorium'. Section 12-88 provides as follows: 'Real property belonging to, or held in trust for, any organization mentioned in subdivision * * * (16) * * * of section 12-81, which real property is so held for one or more of the purposes stated in the applicable subdivision, and from which real property no rents, profits or income are derived, shall be exempt from taxation though not in actual use therefor by reason of the absence of suitable buildings and improvements thereon, it the construction of such buildings or improvements is in progress. The real property belonging to, or held in trust for, any such organization, not used exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes but leased, rented or otherwise used for other purposes, shall not be exempt. If organization is used exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes, such a portion only of any lot or building belonging to, or held in trust for, any such lot or building shall be so exempt only to the extent of the portion so used and the remaining portion shall be subject to taxation.' The defendant claims that the property is taxable and relies on the case of New Canaan Country School, Inc. v. New Canaan, 138 Conn. 347, 84 A.2d 691. In that case the school sought exemption for certain real estate under the provisions of § 1761(7) of the Revision of 1949, now General Statutes § 12-81(7). Subject to the provisions of § 1763, Revision of 1949, now § 12-88, it was entitled to a tax exemption on such of its property as was used for carrying out its purposes as an educational institution. In 1946 the housing shortage was such that it was difficult to hire teachers. The school purchased a house three miles from the school and used it for three of its teachers and their families and built a house 200 yards from the school for one of its teachers and his family. None of the pupils lived at the school. This court held that the statutory requirement that the use shall be exclusively for educational purposes is emphasized by § 1763, Revision of 1949, now § 12-88; that the houses were not used for any educational purposes whatever; that the existence of a housing shortage was irrelevant to the test of the Connecticut statute and that the houses were convenient residences for the teachers and were used as such; and that these properties were not exempt from taxation.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, urges that the instant case is governed by Yale University v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 42 A. 87, and Arnold College v. Milford, 144 Conn. 206, 128 A.2d 537, rather than by New Canaan Country School. 'In Yale University v. Town of New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 334, 42 A. 87, 93, 43 L.R.A. 490, the court held that 'the observatory buildings, the two houses furnished by the college for the officers of the observatory, (and) the adjoining land found to be reasonably necessary for the purposes of the observatory' were not taxable. In both cases it is apparent that the bhildings in question were a part of the college and used for its purposes. As to the observatory, we take judicial notice of the fact that the work of observers and students is in large measure done at night and that under these circumstances the houses in question were practically a part of the observatory.' New Canaan Country School, Inc. v. New Canaan, supra, 138 Conn. 351, 84 A.2d 693.

In Arnold College v. Milford, supra, all the property of the college, including dormitory space, part of which was occupied by a faculty member, and a caretaker's cottage, was held to be exempt from taxation. The sole question involved in that case was whether the property claimed to be exempt was (144 Conn. p. 210, 128 A.2d p. 539) "being used exclusively for carrying out' an educational purpose as those words are used in the statute. Forman Schools, Inc. v. Litchfield, 134 Conn. 1, 8, 54 A.2d 710. It is to be noted that so far as educational institutions are concerned the statute does not grant an exemption in the technical sense. Rather it merely states a rule of nontaxability. Consequently, it does not come within the rule that tax exemption statutes must be construed strictly against the taxpayer. St. Bridget Convent Corporation v. Milford, 87 Conn. 474, 478, 88 A. 881; Yale University v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 329, 42 A. 87, 43 L.R.A. 490. It is well established that the exemption granted is not limited to the buildings used for educational purposes in the limited and restricted sense. It extends to all of the...