Hartley v. Macon Bacon Tune, Inc.
Decision Date | 11 July 1997 |
Docket Number | No. A97A0238,A97A0238 |
Citation | 227 Ga.App. 679,490 S.E.2d 403 |
Parties | , 97 FCDR 2661 HARTLEY et al., v. MACON BACON TUNE, INC. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Nelson & Lord, Ellis M. Nelson, Macon, for appellants.
Katz, Flatau, Popson & Boyer, Barbara S. Boyer, Macon, for appellee.
Robin T. and Teresa L. Hartley appeal from the grant of summary judgment to Macon Bacon Tune, Inc. d/b/a Precision Tune in the Hartleys' suit arising from an incident in which Robin T. Hartley slipped and fell in Precision Tune's place of business. Teresa L. Hartley's claim is for her loss of consortium.
The record shows that on the day in question Hartley accompanied his friend, Marsh, to Precision Tune's premises so Marsh could have his car checked out by his son-in-law, a Precision Tune employee. Even though Hartley may not have known it, the record shows that Marsh previously had been ordered by Precision Tune's owner not to return to the premises because Marsh, according to the owner, was always trying to get work done for free by his son-in-law and Marsh was a nuisance to have in the shop because of his drinking. Marsh did not pay for any work done that day. The record further shows, however, that Hartley had no purpose on the premises other than to accompany Marsh. They were hanging out together.
The record also shows that it was raining and rain water was running off the cars brought in for repairs. It was obvious the shop floor was wet.
When Marsh and Hartley arrived at Precision Tune, the son-in-law waved them in and Marsh pulled his car in one of the mechanic's bays to be checked out. Hartley, wearing flip flop sandals, got out of the passenger side of the car and started to walk around to the front when he alleges he stepped in some oil or something and fell. He testified that he later saw he fell in "a big puddle of oil" which looked like new oil; it was light colored.
Hartley also testified that if he had been looking down, he could have seen the oil, but he was looking at Marsh's son-in-law. The oil did not blend into the floor; anyone looking down could have seen the oil, and there was nothing to prevent him from seeing the puddle.
After discovery, Precision Tune moved for and was granted summary judgment. The Hartleys then filed this appeal contending that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remained for trial. Held:
1. The standards applicable to motions for summary judgment are announced in Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474. Further, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party should be given the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and the court should construe the evidence and all inferences and conclusions therefrom most favorably toward the party opposing the motion. Moore v. Goldome Credit Corp., 187 Ga.App. 594, 595-596, 370 S.E.2d 843.
2. Our initial consideration is to determine the legal status that Hartley enjoyed while he was on Precision Tune's premises. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Walker v. Daniels, 200 Ga.App. 150, 154, 407 S.E.2d 70. As Hartley's deposition shows that he was merely in Precision Tune to accompany Marsh, he was a licensee. Restaura, Inc. v. Singleton, 216 Ga.App. 887, 888, 456 S.E.2d 219. See Adams & Adams, Ga. Law of Torts (1996 ed.) pp. 97-99, § 4-1. Because there is no evidence showing Precision Tune wilfully or wantonly injured Hartley, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to Precision Tune. Additionally, even applying the higher standards of care owed to a business invitee, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to Precision Tune because the record shows that Hartley produced no evidence that Precision Tune had actual or constructive knowledge of any oil on the floor and the record also shows that Hartley, by not looking where he was going, did not exercise ordinary care for his own safety.
3. It has been asserted that once a licensee's presence is known to a proprietor, a licensee is entitled to the same standard of care as an invitee in a premises liability case. Although this concept unfortunately has been misapplied in some earlier premises liability cases, recent Supreme Court cases establish that it is used properly only in cases involving a defendant's active negligence. See Lipham v. Federated Dept. Stores, 263 Ga. 865, 440 S.E.2d 193 ( ); Trammell v. Baird, 262 Ga. 124, 126, 413 S.E.2d 445 (); Wade v. Mitchell, 206 Ga.App. 265, 266(2)(b), 424 S.E.2d 810 (). See also Adams & Adams, supra at p. 69, § 3-5 (). Thus, it is wrong to apply a rule applicable to active negligence cases in cases alleging a defect existing on the premises. "If the injury arises not from a preexisting defect in the premises but from a claim of active negligence arising from the owner's or occupant's alleged acts or omissions occurring at the time the plaintiff was on the premises, the liability test is the general negligence standard of foreseeability, rather than the more restrictive superior knowledge test." Adams & Adams, supra at p. 99, § 4-1.
Where an injury is caused by a condition on the property, (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original supplied.) Brooks v. Logan, 134 Ga.App. 226, 228(1), 213 S.E.2d 916. Therefore, because no evidence shows the oil came to be on the floor while Hartley was on the premises, the active negligence cases do not apply. Trammell v. Baird, supra.
Moreover, it is not clear how this case is different from the cases in which an owner has intentionally placed a slippery substance on the floor, or all the numerous cases in which it is alleged that foreign substances have been dropped, spilled, or left on floors. If adopted, the result of the active negligence analysis would be to eliminate the entire existing body of law regulating premises liability cases.
4. Any effort to disregard Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327, must be unsuccessful, if constitutional principles are to prevail. The Supreme Court of Georgia has not rejected or revised Alterman Foods. Therefore, the Alterman Foods standards are binding on this Court even though some may believe there is a better concept for allocating the burdens on the parties in these cases. "The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents." Ga. Const.1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI; Coffey v. Wal-Mart Stores, 224 Ga.App. 824, 827, 482 S.E.2d 720.
In the same manner, this Court cannot deem the guidance on foreign substance cases in Alterman Foods as mere dicta. Pretermitting whether this Court could ever reject guidance provided by the Supreme Court in cases of gravity and public importance on this basis (see Ga. Const.1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. V; OCGA § 15-2-8) is the fact that Alterman Foods has been the seminal case in this area of the law for over 16 years. Thus, even if the foreign substance guidance could have been considered dicta originally, common sense and judicial stability dictate that it is too late for that now. Alterman Foods has been cited with approval, followed, and relied upon by this Court and our Supreme Court (see Martin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 253 Ga. 337, 320 S.E.2d 174) and cases relying upon Alterman Foods have been cited, followed, and relied upon by this Court and our Supreme Court in cases too numerous to mention. Consequently, the Alterman Foods principles are too well established in our law to be swept away merely by claiming that they are dicta. Alterman Foods and the cases citing Alterman Foods are the controlling precedent in the area of foreign substance slip and fall cases.
5. We also cannot otherwise avoid the guidance of our Supreme Court in Alterman Foods by attempting to redefine the term "foreign substances." Oil on the floor of a garage or service station which was not...
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