Hartman v. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama

• Decision Date: 05 August 1983
• Parties: 13 Ed. Law Rep. 579 James Michael HARTMAN v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, et al. 81-622.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 837

436 So.2d 837

13 Ed. Law Rep. 579

James Michael HARTMAN v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, et al.

81-622.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Aug. 5, 1983.

William P. Gray, Jr., of Gray & Espy, Tuscaloosa and J. Zack Higgs of Higgs & Mason, Huntsville, for appellant.

Paul E. Skidmore, University, for appellees.

ADAMS, Justice.

This appeal is taken from a summary judgment granted to the defendants. The plaintiff (Hartman) alleged in his complaint that the individual defendants, Albert S. Miles, Warner O. Moore, and Tony Strong, had made fraudulent representations to him on which he had relied to his detriment, and had taken arbitrary and capricious actions, or, alternatively, had acted in bad faith or under a mistaken interpretation of law, resulting in punishing Hartman twice for the same offenses. Hartman sought a writ of mandamus, a permanent injunction, and damages from the individual defendants.

Hartman raises two issues for our consideration:

1. Did the trial court err in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff's complaint alleged that the individual defendants had acted in bad faith, arbitrarily and capriciously, fraudulently, or under a mistake of law in punishing the plaintiff twice for the same offense?

2. Did the trial court err in failing to grant the plaintiff's motion for recusal?

We answer these questions in the negative, and affirm.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Hartman was a student at the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa, pursuing a degree in music education. At the end of the fall semester, 1979, Hartman received a grade of C in a music theory course in which he thought he should have received an A. In mid-January, 1980, after receiving notice of his grades, Hartman became very irate, argued with his professor, threatened him with violence and used abusive language toward him. In addition, he made harassing telephone calls to the head of the music department and several other University officials over a period of three or four days. On January 15 there was communication between the office of the University counsel and Hartman's attorney, followed by a letter from that office stating that "it is the view of the music department, at least, that Hartman should not be readmitted as a student to this institution during the current semester." There followed several telephone calls and letters, culminating in an agreement that Hartman would "sit out" the spring semester. When Hartman came onto the campus in March, 1980, with his attorney, and registered for the summer term, formal charges were filed against him, stating that he had breached his agreement. It was their contention that it had been understood between the parties, although not reduced to writing, that Hartman was not to enroll prior to the fall term. However, the formal charges were set aside, and in June the parties, with advice of counsel, entered into a new agreement. By this agreement Hartman could enroll for the fall term, but could not take any courses within the department of music. Additionally, Hartman was to receive psychological counselling and have reports sent from the counselling clinic to the University's Office of Student Affairs. Reports indicated that Hartman attended only five of nine scheduled appointments with the psychologist. There is also evidence that he attempted to register for music courses during the summer. In September, Hartman's attorney began inquiring as to the requirements for getting Hartman back into the music program. On November 7, 1980, Hartman requested a full due process hearing on the charges that had been brought against him. At the hearing, at which Hartman was represented by counsel, Hartman admitted the truth of the charges, and was given a voluntary withdrawal (suspension) until the fall of 1981.

This suit was filed in March, 1981. Hartman's petition for writ of mandamus contained in the suit was denied, as was his motion for temporary injunctive relief. There were numerous delays in the case. At one point the trial judge contacted Hartman's attorney by phone and told him that the University of Alabama was "our friends" and "we just shouldn't file suits like this against the University of Alabama." He further threatened to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss without further consideration. (After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the motion was denied.) The judge later expressed anger over the plaintiff's filing in this court of a petition for writ of mandamus to the trial judge, seeking injunctive relief. This Court denied the writ of mandamus without opinion. Ex parte Hartman, 406 So.2d 404 (Ala.1981). At the final hearing, in open court, the trial judge stated: "I realize our past in this case and I will have to accept responsibility that our path has been a little rocky." Later, during the same hearing, he said I want to again study this case carefully and I hope that whatever ruling I should make would be acceptable. I will apologize for anything that occurred prior to this time. That is not my duty to get up here and get mad at anybody. I may have gotten a little upset by the effort being made to get me out of the case but that is over with now but in any event I have simply done the best I know how and I intend to do that as I again study the situation we have here in this case.

We examine first the question whether the court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The defendants rely on Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1970), and Bowling v. Scott, combined with Bowling v. Mathews, 587 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.1979). Ferguson is a teacher termination case in which the appellate court outlined judicial review of administrative hearings in public institutions of higher learning. In that the case, the appellate court stated:

The rudiments of due process fair play in school administrative proceedings have been well outlined in this circuit with regard to the rights of college students who were subjected to disciplinary suspensions. They are entitled to a statement of the charges against them, the names of witnesses, the nature of the testimony of those witnesses and the opportunity of presenting a defense. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.1961).

430 F.2d at 856. Regarding judicial review, that court said:

If no federal right has been violated in the procedures followed, then the court should next look to the record as developed before the academic agency to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the agency to support the action taken, with due care taken to judge the constitutionality of the school's action on the basis of the facts that were before the agency, and on the logic applied by it. Johnson v. Branch [364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir.1966) ], supra. If the procedures followed were correct and substantial evidence appears to support the Board's action, that ordinarily ends the matter.

430 F.2d at 858.

In the Bowling cases, supra, also dealing with teacher termination, the appellate court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of ...