Hartmann v. Minn. Dep't of Agric.
| Decision Date | 30 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | A16-0755 |
| Parties | Michael Otto Hartmann, Appellant, v. Minnesota Department of Agriculture, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Reversed and remanded
Sibley County District Court
Zenas Baer, Zenas Baer Law Office, Hawley, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Christina M.B. Herriges, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Michael Otto Hartmann initiated the current action against the Minnesota Department of Agriculture (MDA), seeking the return of property seized by the agency during searches of his farm and truck, and injunctive relief barring the agency from regulating raw-milk sales without going through rulemaking and from unconstitutionally interfering with his business. Hartmann was previously involved in litigation with the MDA from 2010 to 2011. In that prior action, the district court granted the MDA's petition for condemnation of food from Hartmann's farm. The district court also granted Hartmann's motion under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01 for voluntary dismissal of counterclaims that he had brought alleging constitutional violations, although the court—contrary to Hartmann's request—did so with prejudice. In the current action, the district court converted the MDA's motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, dismissed his claims for injunctive relief on the basis of collateral estoppel, and granted Hartmann some, but not all, of his requested relief on the return-of-property petition.
On appeal, Hartmann argues that collateral estoppel does not bar his claims for injunctive relief and that a genuine dispute of material fact precludes summary judgment on his return-of-property petition. We conclude that, because identical issues were not actually litigated and determined in the prior action, the district court erred in determining that Hartmann's claims for injunctive relief are barred by collateral estoppel. We further conclude that the district court did not err in determining that there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding damages on the return-of-property petition, but that, in light of the remand of the other issues, the court must reconsider the amount of damages. We therefore reverse and remand.
In 2010, the MDA embargoed food products at Hartmann's farm and petitioned the district court to condemn the embargoed food because it was adulterated and misbranded. Hartmann defended against the condemnation petition by asserting that he had a right underarticle XIII, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution to sell and peddle the products of his farm without interference by the MDA. Hartmann also asserted counterclaims against the MDA in that action, alleging that the MDA's actions had violated his due process rights and seeking damages and injunctive relief quashing the MDA's administrative orders. After a trial, the district court, in December 2010, granted the MDA's condemnation petition, rejecting Hartmann's defense under the Minnesota Constitution. The district court reasoned that, although the Minnesota Constitution gives farmers a limited right to sell and peddle the products of their farms without a license, it does not exempt them from regulations imposed on the production of those products.
At the same time, the district court in the condemnation action severed Hartmann's constitutional counterclaims. The MDA brought a dispositive motion on those claims. Hartmann did not respond to the MDA's motion but instead moved for voluntary dismissal of his counterclaims without prejudice under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01. The MDA objected to dismissal without prejudice. The district court agreed to dismiss the claims but decided do so with prejudice, explaining that it had been "inclined on prior occasions to dismiss the claims" but had refrained from doing so in order to "afford Hartmann every opportunity for due process."
In 2015, Hartmann initiated the current action. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 626.04 (2016), he petitioned for the return of property seized by the MDA during searches of his truck and farm in 2012 and 2013. Hartmann also sought damages and injunctive relief based on various theories of alleged constitutional violations, including deprivation of liberty and property interests without due process of law and violation of equal protectionunder the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and violation of the right to sell and peddle under the Minnesota Constitution. He also alleged that the MDA is barred from regulating raw-milk sales until the agency goes through rulemaking. The basis for this latter allegation is not clear—the petition cites Minn. Stat. § 32.397 (2016), but the parties and the district court referred to this claim as one of Hartmann's "constitutional claims."
The MDA moved to dismiss Hartmann's petition. The district court granted the motion with respect to Hartmann's damages claim for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) but denied the motion with respect to Hartmann's other claims for relief. As to the latter claims, the district court decided to treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 56 and gave the parties an additional opportunity to submit briefs. Following another hearing, the district court awarded Hartmann $68.33 in damages for seized property and granted summary judgment for the MDA on Hartmann's constitutional claims for injunctive relief—specifically, on Hartmann's request for an order barring the state from regulating raw-milk sales until it goes through rulemaking and on his request to enjoin the state from "interfering with the private transaction between Hartmann and his consumers."
Hartmann appeals.
I. The district court did not err in converting the agency's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.
Hartmann asserts that the district court erred in converting MDA's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into a motion for summary judgment with respect to his claims for injunctive relief and return of property. Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02:
If, on a motion asserting the defense that the pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
In deciding the MDA's motion, the district court considered matters outside of Hartmann's petition, including an affidavit and supporting documents submitted by Hartmann's counsel. "[W]hen the district court considers matters outside the pleadings, the motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim] shall be treated as one for summary judgment." Defs. of Wildlife v. Ventura, 632 N.W.2d 707, 711 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted), review denied (Oct. 24, 2011). The district court informed the parties that it was converting the motion and gave them the opportunity to make additional submissions and to be heard. The district court did not err.
II. The district court erred in granting summary judgment for the MDA on Hartmann's claims for injunctive relief on the basis of collateral estoppel, which may also affect the damages award under Minn. Stat. § 626.04.
Hartmann argues that the district court erred in granting the MDA summary judgment on his constitutional claims and in awarding him only $68.33 on his return-of-property petition. Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. On appeal, Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted). The facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Grondahl v. Bullock, 318 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn. 1982). Any uncertainty about whether an issue of fact exists must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Winstrom v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 636 N.W.2d 611, 613 (Minn. App. 2001).
Hartmann argues that the district court erred in concluding that his claims for injunctive relief are barred by collateral estoppel.1 "Whether collateral estoppel precludeslitigation of an issue is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo." Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004).
Kaiser v. N. States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. 1984) (quotation omitted). Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine and may be applied only if its application is fair. Barth v. Stenwick, 761 N.W.2d 502,...
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