Hartzell v. State Bd. of Examiners in Psychology, 21196

• Decision Date: 14 April 1980
• Docket Number: No. 21196,21196
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Arthur W. HARTZELL, Appellant, v. The STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN PSYCHOLOGY, Respondent.

Page 265

265 S.E.2d 265

274 S.C. 502

Arthur W. HARTZELL, Appellant, v. The STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN PSYCHOLOGY, Respondent.

No. 21196.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 14, 1980.

Andrew Kenneth Epting, Jr., of Wise, Cole & Pearlman, Charleston, for appellant.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbia, for respondent.

GREGORY, Justice:

Appellant Arthur W. Hartzell's application for licensure as a psychologist was rejected by respondent The State Board of Examiners in Psychology. This action was commenced by appellant's petition to the Court of Common Pleas alleging, inter alia, that the Board's ground for his rejection is invalid and therefore he must be licensed; and the statutory method by which members are appointed to respondent Board violates Article III, Section 1 of the South Carolina Constitution. The court below dismissed the petition. We affirm.

Appellant was notified by respondent Board that "(t)he primary reason for (his rejection) was that your program did not contain sufficient training in the four substantive content areas described in our guidelines." The lower court agreed with appellant that the pertinent portion of the guidelines relied on by respondent was void and unenforceable, in that the statutory requirements for licensure are materially altered thereby. See Brooks v. South Carolina State Board of Funeral Service, 271 S.C. 457, 247 S.E.2d 820 (1978). Respondent does not appeal this finding.

Notwithstanding the rule's invalidity, the lower court sustained the Board's action on the basis of appellant's failure to meet the statutory requirements of Section 40-55-80, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), which provides:

A candidate for such a license shall furnish the Board with satisfactory evidence that he: (a) is of good moral character; (b) has had four years of combined academic training in psychology and qualifying experience including a doctor's degree in psychology from an educational institution accredited and recognized by national and regional accrediting agencies whose credits are accepted by the University of South Carolina . . . .

The trial judge found appellant's doctoral program was not accredited and recognized by a national accrediting agency, nor were his credits accepted by the University of South Carolina. These findings are supported by the record.

We agree that to hold otherwise would be to require licensure in the face of obvious statutory noncompliance. Where a board finding is correct in principle it should not be reversed for failure to state all reasons underlying the finding, or for basing it primarily on an after-discovered invalid ground even though valid, statutory grounds exist nevertheless. See Spearman v. F. S. Royster Guano Co., 188 S.C. 393, 199 S.E. 530 (1938). We affirm the reasoning of the lower court.

The method of Board appointment is provided by Section 40-55-30, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), the pertinent portions of which are:

Members of the Board shall be appointed by the Governor from a list of qualified candidates to be submitted by the executive committee of the South Carolina Psychological Association, for terms of five years and until their successors are appointed and qualify . . . . If the association fails to furnish the Governor a list of eligible persons within the specified time preceding any vacancy the Governor shall appoint a qualified person as may seem to him to be proper.

Article III, Section 1 of our State Constitution vests the legislative power in the "General Assembly of the State of South Carolina." This Court has interpreted that investiture to prohibit the delegation of the appointive power to a private person or organization. Gold v. South Carolina Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 271 S.C. 74, 245 S.E.2d 117 (1978); Gould v. Barton, 256 S.C. 175, 181 S.E.2d 662 (1971). Appellant contends our recent decision in Gold mandates a finding that § 40-55-30, supra, is unconstitutional and in violation of Article III, Section 1. We disagree.

In Gold, we struck down Section 40-9-30, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), because that Section on its face...