Harvey v. Furrow

• Decision Date: 23 December 2014
• Docket Number: Docket No. Pen–13–285.
• Citation: 107 A.3d 604,2014 ME 149
• Parties: Susan C. HARVEY et al. v. Addison H. FURROW Jr. et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

107 A.3d 604

2014 ME 149

Susan C. HARVEY et al.

v.Addison H. FURROW Jr. et al.

Docket No. Pen–13–285.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: June 11, 2014.

Decided: Dec. 23, 2014.

Richard Johnson Jr., Esq., Edwards & Johnson, Lincoln, and Michael J. O'Toole, Esq. (orally), Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, P.A., Biddeford, for appellants Addison H. Furrow Jr. and Karen R. Lane.

Paul W. Chaiken, Esq., and Robert W. Laffin, Jr. (orally), Rudman Winchell, Bangor, for appellees George Blake and Gloria Blake.

Knud E. Hermansen, Esq. (orally), Old Town, and Michael H. Griffin, Esq., Griffin & Jordan, LLC, Orono, for appellee Susan C. Harvey.

Edward C. Russell, Russell & Silver, P.A., Bangor, for appellees David Blake and Faith Blake (adopting brief of George Blake and Gloria Blake).

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

Concurrence: ALEXANDER, J.

Opinion

SILVER, J.

[¶ 1] Addison H. Furrow Jr. and Karen R. Lane appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Anderson, J. ) in favor of Susan C. Harvey on her claims of title by adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence. Harvey cross-appeals from the court's judgment in favor of Furrow and Lane on Harvey's claims for slander of title and trespass. We conclude that the court properly found each element of adverse possession by constructive possession, and we find no error in the court's resolution of Harvey's claims for trespass and slander of title. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Furrow and Lane are the owners of record of an irregularly shaped parcel of land on Mattanawcook Lake in the town of Lincoln.¹ In 1998, Harvey's parents, Jack and Beverly Jensen, conveyed to Harvey a parcel that adjoined the Furrow property to the west, reserving a life estate for themselves.² Parties in interest George, Gloria, David, and Faith Blake (the Blakes) own parcels immediately to the west of Harvey's property. Harvey and the Blakes, relying on the property description that has appeared in deeds in Harvey's chain of title since 1931, contend that the Harvey–Furrow boundary is a straight line that effectively configures Harvey's lot into a narrow rectangle. Furrow and Lane, on the other hand, argue that the Harvey–Furrow boundary is made of two diagonal lines that meet at an “elbow.” As a result, the parties disagree about the ownership of a roughly eleven-acre triangular area of land. See Figure 1.

Figure 1. The configuration of the disputed boundary as advocated by Harvey and the Blakes, on the left, and by Furrow and Lane, on the right. The disputed area is shaded.

[¶ 3] After some unsuccessful attempts to resolve this dispute, Harvey filed an amended complaint in April 2008 seeking to establish and quiet title to the disputed area and alleging claims of trespass and slander of title.³ Furrow and Lane counterclaimed, asking the court to confirm their title and award damages for slander of title, common law and statutory trespass, and interference with an economic expectancy. The Blakes, as well as Lori Jensen–Marin, Albert Marin, and Terry McEwen were joined as necessary parties to the action by virtue of their ownership of property adjoining the disputed area.⁴

[¶ 4] After extensive discovery and motion practice, the court held a five-day bench trial beginning on March 26, 2012. At the outset of the trial, the parties stipulated as follows:

The area depicted on the Harris survey as the lands of Sandra Furrow, Addison Furrow, Jr., Terry McEwen, and Ellery Scott, collectively, defines the boundaries of what was formerly the Milner Farm as described in the deed from William A. Milner, Jr., et al. to Elsie J. Milner and Arthur H. Milner dated August 27, 1930 and recorded in the Penobscot Registry of Deeds in Book 1047, Page 228.

The Harris survey shows the boundary between the Harvey and Furrow properties as the elbow shape advanced by Furrow and Lane. Witnesses presented evidence related to trespass and slander of title claims, as well as evidence of the prior use of the disputed area.

[¶ 5] On May 22, 2013, the court granted judgment in favor of Harvey on her claims of adverse possession and acquiescence and on all of Furrow's and Lane's counterclaims. The court entered judgment partially in favor of Harvey on her common law trespass claim and awarded her damages of $7500 plus interests and costs. The court also entered judgment in Harvey's favor on one of her statutory trespass claims, awarding double damages and costs totaling $17,325 pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 7552 (2013). The court declined to award treble damages pursuant to section 7552 because it concluded that Furrow did not intentionally cause the damage to Harvey's property. The court entered judgment in favor of Furrow and Lane on each of the remaining claims, including Harvey's claim for statutory trespass damages pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 7551–B (2013). The court, acknowledging that it was doubtful that any justiciable claims remained, also stated that the Blakes had established a boundary by acquiescence against Furrow. Furrow and Lane timely appealed, and Harvey cross-appealed, pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2013) and M.R.App. P. 2.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 6] Furrow and Lane contend that the court erred in (1) determining that Harvey had established the elements of adverse possession, (2) determining that Harvey and Blake had established a boundary by acquiescence, and (3) construing the property description in the deed to Harvey's predecessor in title in a manner that contradicted the parties' stipulation. Harvey, in turn, challenges the court's rejection of her slander of title claim, its imposition of a state-of-mind requirement for trespass actions brought pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 7551–B, and its refusal to award treble damages pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 7552(4)(B). We address each argument in turn.

A. Constructive Adverse Possession

[¶ 7] Typically, an acquisition of title to property through adverse possession is limited to the area of property that has been actually occupied. See Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. Kelly, 654 A.2d 416, 419 (Me.1995). Pursuant to the doctrine of constructive possession, however, a person can obtain equitable title to the entire parcel described in her deed if she occupies a portion of that parcel in a manner sufficient to establish title by adverse possession. Campbell v. Whitehouse, 122 Me. 409, 417, 120 A. 529 (1923) ; see also 4 Herbert T. Tiffany & Basil Jones, The Law of Real Property § 1155 at 815 (3d ed. 1939) (stating that “one having ‘color of title,’ that is, claiming under what purports to be a valid muniment of title, although he actually occupies a part only of the tract covered by his muniment of title, is to be regarded as in possession of the whole tract”); Banton v. Herrick, 101 Me. 134, 138–39, 63 A. 671 (1906) ; Brackett v. Persons Unknown, 53 Me. 228, 231 (1861). To accomplish this, Harvey is required to demonstrate (1) that her possession of the disputed property was under color of title, and (2) that the use of at least a portion of the property by Harvey and her predecessors was sufficient to establish title by adverse possession.

1. Color of Title

[¶ 8] Harvey's deed appears to describe a rectangular parcel, the eastern boundary of which runs along the boundary of the Milner Farm.⁵ However, the shape of the Milner Farm boundary as described in the Furrow deeds and the Harris survey conflicts with that description, creating a latent ambiguity in Harvey's deed. Milligan v. Milligan, 624 A.2d 474, 477 (Me.1993) (“A latent ambiguity in a deed is created when, in applying the description to the ground, facts extrinsic to the document controvert or in some way render unclear the deed's apparently unambiguous terms.” (quotation marks omitted)).

[¶ 9] “When the language of a deed is susceptible of more than one meaning, the trial court must determine the grantors' intent from contemporaneous circumstances and from standard rules of construction.” Id. The grantor's intent is relevant even when applying the standard rules of construction, which provide that “boundaries are controlled by, in descending priority, monuments, courses, distances, and quantity unless this produces a result that is absurd or manifestly inconsistent with the parties' intentions.” Id. at 478 (emphasis added); see also Lloyd v. Benson, 2006 ME 129, ¶ 13, 910 A.2d 1048 (“The rules of construction should be applied beginning with the overarching goal of giving effect to the intent of the parties.”). We have previously stated, “The cardinal rule for the interpretation of deeds and other written instruments is the expressed intention of the parties, gathered from all parts of the instrument, giving each word its due force, and read in the light of existing conditions and circumstances. ” Sleeper v. Loring, 2013 ME 112, ¶ 16, 83 A.3d 769 (emphasis added) (quoting Perry v. Buswell, 113 Me. 399, 401, 94 A. 483 (1915) ).

[¶ 10] In light of this precedent, the trial court did not err in concluding that, although Harvey's predecessor-in-title “may not have owned what he was conveying, it is nevertheless clear ... that he attempted to convey a parcel having a rectangular shape” and that “it was the intention of the grantors and grantees in the Harvey chain of title that the parcel being conveyed had a rectangular shape, consistent with the plaintiff's claims, but contrary to the stipulated shape of the western Milner line.” Although Furrow's deed was superior to Harvey's deed, Harvey's deed described a rectangular parcel. Thus, Harvey's possession of the disputed property was under color of title, satisfying the first requirement of adverse possession by constructive possession.

2. Use Sufficient to Establish Adverse Possession

[¶ 11] To succeed in a claim of adverse possession, a claimant must demonstrate that his or her use of the property was (1) actual, (2) open, (3) visi...