Harvey v. State
| Decision Date | 15 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. S13A0598.,S13A0598. |
| Citation | 741 S.E.2d 625,292 Ga. 792 |
| Parties | HARVEY v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James Edward Bischoff, Bischoff & White, P.C., Fayetteville, for appellant.
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Christopher Michael Quinn, Paige Reese Whitaker, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
Appellant Michael Darnell Harvey was convicted of malice murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated assault in connectionwith the strangulation death of Valerie Payton.1 He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial in which he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and asserted the trial court erred in the admission of similar transaction evidence. Finding no error in the denial of his motion, we affirm.
[292 Ga. 793]1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was authorized to find that on October 19, 1994, Harvey fatally strangled, raped, sodomized, and assaulted Payton. Her nude body was discovered in an area frequented by Harvey with over 50 post-mortem incision wounds and a handwritten note stating, “I'M BACK ATLANTA, MR. X.” Medical examiners took vaginal and rectal DNA swabs; however, no DNA match was found using the RFLP DNA test available at the time. In 2004, Payton's preserved DNA swabs were sent to a private laboratory for contemporary testing using the STRS DNA test. That laboratory identified a distinct male profile. These test results were sent to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation in 2005, and after comparison with Georgia's DNA database, the GBI concluded the male DNA profile taken from Payton's body matched Harvey's DNA profile. Despite Harvey's denial that he knew or had sexually assaulted Payton, a subsequent STRS DNA test confirmed the DNA match. Handwriting analysis determined the note found on Payton's body may have been written by Harvey. The State also presented the testimony of three similar transaction witnesses who testified that appellant manually choked, raped and sodomized them at a time within two years of the crimes charged.
Although Harvey argues the verdicts are not supported by the evidence, we conclude the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). It was for the jury, not this Court, to determine the credibility of the witnesses, to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, and where appropriate, to determine whether the evidence excluded every other hypothesis save that of guilt. See Faniel v. State, 291 Ga. 559(1), 731 S.E.2d 750 (2012) (); Dean v. State, 273 Ga. 806, 807, 546 S.E.2d 499 (2001) ().
2. Harvey contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to present the testimony of three similar transaction witnesses for the purpose of showing his course of conduct of manually choking and raping women. Evidence of a similar transaction may be admitted if the State demonstrates that (1) evidence of the independent offense or act is being offered not to raise an improper inference as to the accused's character but for an appropriate purpose; (2) the evidence is sufficient to establish that the defendant committed the independent offense or act; and (3) there is a sufficient connection or similarity between the independent offense or act and the crime charged such that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).
Harvey concedes that “under present case law there was no error in allowing the similar transactions into evidence” 2 but urges the Court to adopt more severe restrictions limiting the admission of such evidence, “otherwise character and propensity are relevant and admissible in a criminal trial.” We reject this invitation, as we have in the...
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