Harwood v. State ex rel. Pillars
| Decision Date | 03 May 1947 |
| Parties | HARWOOD v. STATE ex rel. PILLARS. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Davidson County; Richard P. Dews, Judge.
Proceeding by the State, on the relation of Ruby Earline Pillars against John M. Harwood, Warden, etc., for writ of habeas corpus. To review a judgment granting writ, the Warden brings error.
Judgment reversed and petition dismissed.
Nat Tipton and C. Weber Tuley, Asst. Attys. Gen for plaintiff in error.
John W Hilldrop, of Nashville, for defendant in error.
The defendant in error petitioned the Circuit Court of Davidson County for the writ of habeas corpus, complaining that she was being unlawfully restrained of her liberty by John M Harwood, Warden of the State Penitentiary. The substance of the petition is that the said Ruby Earline Pillars was brought before the Juvenile Court at Nashville upon a felony charge; that she was adjudged guilty and sentenced to a reformatory for girls; that later she was ordered confined in the state penitentiary at Nashville by order of W. O. Baird, Commissioner of Institutions, on the ground that she was incorrigible. When the case was heard by the Circuit Judge on the technical record, the petition was amended as follows:
The foregoing amendment is not supposed to be a copy of any constitutional provision, but is a mere statement by the counsel as an amendment to his petition.
Section 4707 of the Code, the validity of which is attacked in this proceeding, provides (we refer only to the pertinent part of the section):
Code section 4700 provides: 'Judges of the criminal courts, county courts, juvenile courts, and city courts, are empowered, in their discretion, either when presiding in term or at chambers, to hear all complaints lodged against colored girls under the age of eighteen years, and to determine the same without a jury; provided that in all cases such accused, either in person or by counsel, shall have the right to a jury trial, which in no case shall be denied, if demanded.' (Italics ours.)
The foregoing Code sections are a part of the Public Acts of 1921 which established an institution known as 'Tennessee Vocational School for Colored Girls', the same being under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Institutions.
When the relator Ruby Pillars was committed to this institution for colored girls, she was between 15 and 16 years of age. She was represented by a reputable attorney of the Nashville bar. The mother was also in court at the time of the hearing. A certified copy of the record of the Juvenile Court shows that the relator admitted her guilt of having procured numerous valuable articles of merchandise from several department stores in Nashville by falsely representing herself to be the maid of a Mrs. Kennedy. Before obtaining the articles desired, she would call over the telephone, representing herself as Mrs. Kennedy and stating that her maid was coming in to buy certain articles. There was no question as to her guilt of the offenses charged against her. Neither the relator nor her counsel questioned the regularity of the proceeding, and there was no request for a jury trial.
Able counsel for relator has argued that Code section 4707 should be held unconstitutional on the ground that infants should not be committed to the state penitentiary by mere administrative agency and that any such order of committal is void. The trial judge sustained this contention, holding Section 4707 of the Code to be unconstitutional. From this judgment, an appeal was prayed and granted.
We are thus presented with the single question as to the constitutionality of the above section of the Code. We have no Tennessee decision dealing with this question. It is a matter of first impression. The validity of the Juvenile Court statute, Code 1932, § 10269 et seq., has been sustained by this Court against the charge that it authorizes a prosecution without indictment or presentment. Childress v. State, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S.W. 643. But thus far we have not dealt with the validity of statutes authorizing the transfer of infants from state reformatories to other penal institutions.
The principal argument made against the validity of Section 4707 is that the power granted by the statute to transfer incorrigibles to the penitentiary for the remainder of their sentence has the effect of imprisonment in the penitentiary without a trial by jury and without an indictment. Our statute creating Juvenile Courts provides, '* * * that in all trials under this title, any person interested may demand a jury or the judge of his own motion may order a jury to try cases.' Code section 10275. The act creating the Vocational School for Colored Girls provides that the right to a jury trial shall ' in no case be denied, if demanded.' Code, § 4700. (Italics ours.)
According to the undisputed facts of the instant case, the relator pleaded guilty to a charge of a felony; in fact, there was an admission of...
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...1972). On the other hand, as many or more cases do permit transfers of this type. Among cases so holding are Harwood v. State ex rel. Pillars, 184 Tenn. 515, 201 S.W.2d 672 (1947); Sonnenberg v. Markley, 289 F.2d 126 (C.A.7, 1961); Suarez v. Wilkinson, 133 F.Supp. 38 (D.C.Penn., 1955); Arka......
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