Shone v. State

• Decision Date: 22 January 1968
• Citation: 237 A.2d 412
• Parties: Michael Edward SHONE v. STATE of Maine et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 412

237 A.2d 412

Michael Edward SHONE v. STATE of Maine et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 22, 1968.

Henry N. Berry III, Cape Elizabeth, for appellant.

John W. Benoit, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for appellees.

Before WEBBER, TAPLEY, MARDEN, DUFRESNE and WEATHERBEE, JJ.

DUFRESNE, Justice.

Michael Edward Shone, age 15, on May 15, 1967 by judgment of the Juvenile Court for the Ninth District, Division of Southern Division, was adjudged to have committed a juvenile offense by reason of his breaking, entering and committing larceny at the Blue Moon Cafe, Portland, Maine and was ordered committed to the Boys Training Center (Center) under 15 M.R.S.A. § 2611, subd. 4, par. B, for the term of his minority, unless sooner discharged by the superintendent. 15 M.R.S.A. § 2714. Transferred from the Center to the Reformatory for Men on or about May 28, 1967 under 15 M.R.S.A. § 2717 for incorrigibility, Shone sought relief from his alleged illegal imprisonment in post-conviction habeas corpus under 14 M.R.S.A. § 5502.

Petitioner contends that the permissive administrative transfer under 15 M.R.S.A. § 2717 without notice and hearing and without judicial approval was an invidious deprivation of his constitutional rights under both the State and Federal Constitutions. Constitution of Maine, Art. I, Section 6-A; Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, § 1. He claims specifically that the statute is unconstitutional as being in violation of the due process clauses of both constitutions and of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The single Justice below ruled favorably on the constitutionality of the transfer statute and dismissed the petition. Appealing to this Court, petitioner will receive no greater satisfaction as we also find no merit in his constitutional attack.

Initially, let us pause to insert the fact that this appeal does not raise for our consideration any issue of abuse of discretion on the part of the authorities in the administration of the transfer statute, such as insufficient factual reasons under the statute to justify the transfer order. Furthermore, petitioner concedes that, except for its alleged constitutional deficiency, his transfer from the Center to the Reformatory was statutorily proper.

The transfer statute, 15 M.R.S.A. § 2717, as can readily be observed, does not expressly provide either for notice and hearing at the hands of the administrative officials nor does it intimate even by implication any requirement of court approval. Certificate of incorrigibility and recommendation of the superintendent of the Center together with approval from the Commissioner of Mental Health and Corrections respecting the prospective transfer is all that is necessary. The statute in pertinent part reads as follows:

'Any child committed to the center whose presence therein may be seriously detrimental to the well-being of the center, or who wilfully and persistently refuses to obey the rules and regulations of said center may be deemed incorrigible, and upon recommendation of the superintendent may be transferred to a reformatory with the approval of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Corrections, but no child shall be transferred under the age of 15. To so transfer, the superintendent shall certify that the child is incorrigible upon the mittimus in the case with the recommendation that transfer to the appropriate reformatory be effected. Upon approval by the Commissioner of Mental Health and Corrections, the transfer may be effected any time thereafter. It shall be the duty of the officers of the reformatory to receive any person so transferred and the remainder of the original commitment shall be executed at the reformatory, except that in the event a child so transferred has, in the opinion of the superintendent of the reformatory and of the superintendent of the center, benefited from the program at the reformatory, to such an extent that return to the center would be in the best interest of the child and of the community, such child may be returned to the center.' (Emphasis supplied.)

In Green v. Robbins, 1962, 158 Me. 9, 176 A.2d 743, we viewed custodial transfer of inmates from the Reformatory to State Prison without further action of any court as within legislative competence, notice being taken that the original judgment and sentence were in no way changed or affected. Courts generally have held such administrative transfers within constitutional permissiveness, invading in no way any of the inmates' constitutional rights. Courts regard the possibility of transfer to the state penitentiary as an incident impliedly present in the reformatory sentence imposed by the court. The possibility of transfer must be read into, and becomes an integral part of, the reformatory sentence just as effectively as if set forth at length therein. The determination of the existing circumstances authorizing the transfer unless otherwise directed by the Legislature is properly delegated to institutional officers as an administrative duty and is no usurpation of judicial power. See, Stagway v. Riker, 1913, 84 N.J.Law 201, 86 A. 440; Glazier v. Reed, 1933, 116 Conn. 136, 163 A. 766; Uram v. Roach, 1934, 47 Wyo. 335, 37 P.2d 793, 95 A.L.R. 1448; Moffett v. Hudspeth, 1948, 165 Kan. 656, 198 P.2d 153; Tinsley v. Crespin, 1958, 137 Colo 302, 324 P.2d 1033; Annotation, 95 A.L.R. 1455.

We do recognize that the instant transfer from the Boys Training Center to the Reformatory for Men is not on the same level as transfers from the Reformatory to the State Prison. The Center in the eyes of the Legislature was not meant to be considered as a penal institution. The State is directed to establish and maintain centers to rehabilitate boys between the ages of 11 and 17 committed thereto as juvenile offenders. 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 2712, 2714. The superintendent in constant residence at the center, § 2712, is given all the power which a guardian has over his ward and all the powers which parents have over their children as to the person, property, earnings and rehabilitation of every child committed to the center. Section 2712 provides that in order to accomplish such intended purpose of rehabilitation of juvenile offenders there shall be employed 'the disciplines of education, casework, group work, psychology, psychiatry, medicine, nursing, vocational training and religion related to human relations and personality development.' See, in contrast thereto, 34 M.R.S.A. § 1501, wherein the Reformatory is defined as a correctional institution and the State Prison as a penal institution.

In Wade v. Warden of State Prison, 1950, 145 Me. 120, 73 A.2d 128, our Court has detailed the benevolent purposes which the Legislature had in mind when it established the modern treatment to be given to juvenile offenders.

'He (the judge of a juvenile court) does not pass upon the crimes and misdemeanors of childhood wholly from the legal standpoint. The basic and primary idea of the legislature is salvation, not punishment. The nature of juvenile work is more philanthropic than the work of the common law jurist * * *. In the past the fundamental idea of the law has been punishment and not reformation, but modern legislation recognizes that the treatment of a child should be correctional and rehabilitative rather than punitive. The child of today is the adult citizen of tomorrow and should be removed from the influence of improper environments and directed into the paths of rectitude by preventative and corrective means, if the next generation is to live in a peaceful and law abiding community. The immature must be given the chance to become the good citizen, or if necessary be forced to give up an immoral or criminal life. It is the welfare of the child and the State, that the statute is aimed to protect, by exercising a parental control, without the scar of the so-called criminal record. Unfortunately, it will be necessary at times to inflict punishment on the vicious or depraved, and this the statute recognizes.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Our transfer statute does recognize also that in certain circumstances sterner treatment and better security than are available in a training center for youthful offenders must replace the benevolent attitude initially displayed toward the juvenile delinquent. When a boy wilfully and persistently refuses to obey the rules and regulations of the center or if his continued presence therein may seriously impair its well-being, the whole purpose of the juvenile law would be in jeopardy and the legislative goal completely frustrated, if administrative authorities in charge had not the power to remove such recalcitrant or offensive inmate. The statute permits expulsion of those who insist upon the disruption of the institution's program of education and rehabilitation, not so much as a measure of punishment to the individual youth, but rather as a device for the protection of the juvenile center itself in the interest and general welfare of all those who...