Hase v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 08 December 1908
• Citation: 98 P. 370,51 Wash. 174
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: HASE v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

98 P. 370

51 Wash. 174

HASE v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 8, 1908

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Boyd J. Tallman, Judge.

Action by Elizabeth Hase against the City of Seattle. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appealed. Reversed, and new trial ordered, with directions.

Shorett & Shorett, for appellant.

Scott Calhoun and James E. Bardford, for respondent.

DUNBAR, J.

The appellant brought an action against the city of Seattle for damages resulting from personal injuries. A claim for damages for said injury was filed with the city clerk of said corporation, and later a suit brought thereon. At the trial the claim provided for by ordinance was offered in evidence and objection was made to its introduction, which was sustained by the court. The court directed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the city, which was done. Judgment of dismissal was entered, and appeal followed. So that the only question in the case is whether the claim presented by the appellant to the city council was sufficient.

The principal objection urged to the claim, and the one on which the court rejected it, is that the claimant did not state her residence for the past year, and this alleged defect was the cause alleged by the city for refusing the claim. It is also insisted that the notice was not sufficient, in that it did not clearly set forth the defect in the sidewalk which was the alleged cause of the accident. The claim presented was as follows: 'To the City Council of the City of Seattle: The undersigned, Elizabeth Hase, hereby presents to the said city council her claim for damages against the city of Seattle, a municipal corporation of the state of Washington, in the sum of $10,000, which said claim is hereby filed with the clerk of said city of Seattle; that said claim for damages is on account of personal injuries sustained by the said Elizabeth Hase in the said city of Seattle on the 23d day of March 1907, at 9:30 p. m.; that said injuries consist of pain from a broken left forearm (a fracture known as 'Calles fracture'); also suffers much pain from being bruised through the chest, between the shoulder blades, and across the small of the back, and since the accident she has suffered nervous chills; that the said injuries were sustained by the said Elizabeth Hase on said date in the city of Seattle on the west side of sixth avenue, between Blanchard street and Bell street; that the said injuries were caused by said Elizabeth Hase falling through a defective sidewalk.' The ordinance demanding the presentation of the notice was as follows: 'All claims for damages against the city must be presented to the city council and filed with the clerk within thirty days after the time when such claim for damages accrued, and no ordinance shall be passed allowing any such claim or any part thereof, or appropriating money or other property to pay or satisfy the same or any part thereof, until such claim has first been referred to the proper department, nor until such department has made its report to the city council thereon, pursuant to such reference. All such claims for damages must accurately locate and describe the defect that caused the injury, accurately describe the injury, give the residence for one year last past of the claimant, contain the items of damages claimed, and be sworn to by the claimant. No action shall be maintained against the city for any claim for damages until after the same has been presented to the city council and sixty days have elapsed after such presentation.'

Counsel for appellant vigorously inveigh against the application of the rule of liberal construction insisting that the city is authorized under the laws and Constitution to make such provisions as it deems necessary for its protection, and that it is not the province of the court to destroy such provisions by construction. So far as the first proposition is concerned, it is not a question of construction, liberal or otherwise, for the ordinance plainly provides that the claimant must state in his notice his residence for one year last past. This language is not susceptible of any two meanings, and therefore the only question to be considered is the right of the city to make such a demand of a claimant as a prerequisite to waging his claim for damages. It is insisted that the uniform trend of authority is that such charter provisions are constitutional and wise, and some authorities are cited to sustain that contention, among them Scurry v. Seattle, 8 Wash 278, 36 P. 145. An examination of this case, however, convinces us that it does not announce all that is claimed for it by learned counsel. All that that case held was that the provision of the freeholders' charter of Seattle, declaring that no action shall be maintained against the city for any claim for damages unless such claim had been presented to the city council within six months after the time when such claim for damages had accrued, was not unconstitutional and void as being in contravention of the statute of limitations with reference to the commencement of actions; but it was also held in that case that the only limitation of the right of the city to make a provision concerning the time in which a claim for damages should be presented would be the limitation of a reasonable time, and that must necessarily always be a limitation to be taken into consideration, else cities would be conferred with power to destroy rights existing at the common law. As showing that it never was the idea of this court that the power of cities is unlimited, it was held in Tacoma v. State, 4 Wash. 64, 29 P. 847, that, although the freeholders' charter of a city may provide an ample method for the condemnation of private property for use as a public street, and legislative enactment may confer upon cities organized under freeholders' charters the authority to appropriate private property to corporate uses, such power was inoperative, in the absence of an act of the Legislature conferring the right of eminent domain and prescribing the method by which it should be exercised. And in State ex rel. Snell v. Warner, 4 Wash. 773, 31 P. 25, 17 L. R. A. 263, it was held that, under article 11, § 10, of the Constitution, authorizing a city of 20,000 or more inhabitants to form a charter for its own government, and providing for amendments thereto, no authority is given such city to extend its boundaries by amendment to its charter; the court in that case saying: 'While the provisions of the Constitution are to be given every liberal interpretation when the accomplishment of the purpose to be attained by them is at stake, we are bound to remember that they are somewhat unusual and extraordinary provisions, and that they are indirect restrictions on the power of the Legislature, which can prescribe rules for the government of every municipal corporation...