Haseltine v. Shepherd

• Decision Date: 22 February 1905
• Citation: 59 A. 1025,99 Me. 495
• Parties: HASELTINE v. SHEPHERD et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

59 A. 1025

99 Me. 495

HASELTINE

v. SHEPHERD et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 22, 1905.

(Official.)

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Penobscot County.

Bill by Catherine F. Haseltine against Alvah J. Shepherd and others to obtain the construction of a will. Case reported, and decree ordered in accordance with opinion.

Argued before WISWELL, C. J., and EMERY, SAVAGE, POWERS, PEABODY, and SPEAR, JJ.

P. D. Dearth, Forrest J. Martin, and Howard M. Cook, for plaintiff.

D. D. Stewart, for defendants.

SAVAGE, J. This bill in equity is to obtain a construction of the will of Joseph M. Haseltine, brought by the widow, who is a devisee. The bill alleges, and hence the demurrer admits, that all persons interested are parties to the proceeding. The part of the will which is said to he of doubtful construction is as follows:

"To my beloved wife, Catherine F. Haseltine, I give, bequeath and devise all the rest and residue of my estate both real, personal and mixed, and all rights and credits thereunto belonging, to have and to hold to her sole use and benefit during the full term of her natural life, unless she shall marry again, in which event her rights in said property shall cease and determine the same as if she were dead. But until said death or remarriage she shall have full power to control and dispose of said property or any part thereof if needed for her support and benefit.

"To the children of my daughters, Mary and Elizabeth before named, I give, bequeath and devise whatever may remain of said property above described, at the decease or remarriage of my said wife, Catherine F. Haseltine, the same to be equally divided among them."

The complainant asks whether she can sell and convey the real estate devised to her in fee simple, in her lifetime, before remarriage, and whether her rights and interests in all of the property bequeathed and devised will terminate, should she marry again.

In Burgess v. Shepherd, 97 Me. 522, 55 Atl. 415, a construction of the same will was sought by the executor; but we dismissed the bill on the ground that, as executor, he had no interest in the residuary estate after he had turned it over to his widow, as it was plainly his duty to do, and that, in the administration of the estate, it did not concern him to know whether the widow could sell it in fee simple, or whether her rights would terminate upon remarriage. These were questions, it was held, which concerned only the life tenant or her assigns, and the reversioners or remaindermen.

Now, again, these same defendants resist stoutly any interpretation of the will by the court, even upon the bill of the devisee, who certainly is interested in the estate. It is contended that the court has no jurisdiction to answer questions like these, not to aid administration, but to inform the devisee what are her rights. It is said that, as between the devisees under a will, the court ought not to and cannot pass upon titles to property devised, at least until controversies arise, and that when controversies are ripe for litigation the parties should be remitted to their remedies at law. And it has been suggested that, even if the court has jurisdiction in a case like this, it ought not to be exercised until an exigency has arisen which requires a construction of the will. The learned solicitor for the defendants, however, denies that we have any jurisdiction in this case, and says that, in all the history of litigation in this state since the statute for the construction of wills on bill in equity (Rev. St. 1857, c 77, § 8, par. 7) was enacted, the court has never assumed jurisdiction over "questions between legatees or devisees depending upon the legal titles of the parties under a will, as between themselves, in which the executor had no interest," except in the case of Baldwin v. Bean, 59 Me. 481, which case we shall refer to hereafter. If there is any question concerning the scope of a jurisdiction which has been invoked in several score of cases within the last 50 years, it is time that it was settled.

The phraseology of the statute of 1857 has remained unchanged to the present time. Rev. St. 1903, c. 79, § 6, par. S. It confers jurisdiction upon the court in equity "to determine the construction of wills and whether an executor, not expressly appointed a trustee becomes such from the provision of a will; and in cases of doubt, the mode of executing a trust, and the expediency of making changes and investments of property held in trust." It is evident that this case does not fall within any of the provisions relating to trusts or trustees. No trust is involved here. No question is asked respecting the mode of executing any trust The complainant does not appear here as a trustee. She only seeks information as to her personal rights. In Merrill v. Hayden, 86 Me. 133, 29 Atl. 949—a case in some aspects very much like this—the court said of a devise to one for life, with power to spend the income and so much of the principal as the devisee should need: "There is nothing in the will creating a trust fund. * * * All the property was given directly to Maria to hold for life, and to be spent by her—income and principal—so much as she should need. Only the excess at her death over her needs during life was to go over to any one. The control was given to her. There is no suggestion of any guardian or testamentary trustee." Richardson v. Richardson, 80 Me. 585, 16 Atl. 250.

The jurisdiction of the court must be found, if at all, in the clause, "to determine the construction of wills." And here our attention is called to the fact that there is no punctuation mark whatever separating the phrase just quoted from the remainder of the sentence. If this has any significance, it would seem to be that the power to construe wills exists only in connection with the provisions which relate to trusts. It is enough, however, at this time, to say that the court has never considered itself so limited. It has answered hundreds of questions having no reference to trusts. Punctuation is an uncertain guide. It may aid, and frequently does aid, the court in construing contracts, wills, and statutes. But in many cases the meaning is so evident, notwithstanding the punctuation, that the court feels compelled to disregard it. State v. McNally, 34 Me. 210, 56 Am. Dec. 650; Palmyra v. Nichols, 91 Me. 17, 39 Atl. 338.

Much light may be gathered by examination of the decided cases where the court has either discussed its jurisdiction, or has assumed or declined to assume jurisdiction in cases analogous to the one now under consideration. The question of jurisdiction seems to have been first raised in Baldwin v. Bean, 59 Me. 481. In that case the bill was brought by the executrix, who was also devisee. See Burgess v. Shepherd, 97 Me. 522, 55 Atl. 415. The only question asked was whether the complainant, as devisee, took an estate in fee simple, or an estate for life only. It does not appear that any question of administration was involved. It was a question which concerned only the devisee and the heirs among themselves. The jurisdiction of the court was questioned by the defendants. "They say," said Walton, J., "they have never in any way interfered with the lands devised, and they deny the authority of the court to determine the rights of the parties in advance of any actual controversy." The right of the devisee, in case of actual controversy, to ask for a construction of the will, was not raised, but was necessarily assumed by the court when it answered the questions. With respect to the point which was raised, the court said: "We have had grave doubts whether this objection is not well taken. But the statutes of this state (Rev. St c. 77, § 5) provide that this court shall have jurisdiction, as a court of equity, to determine the construction of wills; and we are inclined to think it was the intention of the Legislature to secure to the parties in interest the right, in all cases of doubt, to have the opinion of the court as to the legal effect of a will, even in advance of any actual controversy.

"It is an old maxim that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and this is as true in law as in medicine. To prevent litigation is better than to end it. If by a bill in equity the parties in interest can all be brought before the court at one time, not only may a multiplicity of suits be avoided, but a Just result much more certainly obtained. And by removing any cloud that may rest upon their titles the owners will be enabled to deal with the property more understandingly, and, if need be, sell it for its true value, for purchasers will not then be deterred from buying it for fear they may buy a lawsuit with it. Influenced by these considerations, we think the statute conferring upon this court jurisdiction in equity to determine the construction of wills ought to be liberally interpreted, and that in all cases of doubt the parties should be allowed to have the opinion of the court, whether any actual controversies have arisen or not." This was not dictum. It was a judicial decision of the objection made to jurisdiction. The bill was sustained.

In Baxter v. Baxter, 62 Me. 540, the court determined the nature of the devised estate, as between the devisee for life and the heirs, and advised the devisee for life how, and under what conditions, he and the guardian of the heirs could convey the entire estate. In this case the necessity of such a sale was alleged.

In Verrill t. Weymounth, 68 Me. 318, the disposition by will of the reversion of a house was determined, the court holding that an after-born child took a vested remainder in fee simple, as devisee, which on his death descended to his mother.

In Sampson v. Randall, 72 Me. 109, a bill brought by executors, the court was apparently asked to say what would become of the testator's property after certain life estates should end. But the court declined to answer, on the ground...