Haskell v. Merrill
| Decision Date | 23 May 1901 |
| Citation | 60 N.E. 485,179 Mass. 120 |
| Parties | HASKELL v. MERRILL et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
P.J. Casey, for appellants.
Robt. O. Harris & Frederick F. Haskell, for appellee.
This is a bill by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover property alleged to belong to the bankrupt's estate. The case was sent to a master, and exceptions were taken by the defendant Hodge to his report. These were overruled, and no appeal was taken. Afterwards the report was accepted and a decree was entered for the plaintiff. From this final decree an appeal was taken. The only question before us is whether the decree was warranted on the pleadings and report.
Both sides have argued the exceptions as if they were open, and therefore we think it proper to say that we see nothing in them. The objection to the jurisdiction in equity that there was an adequate remedy at law, comes too late. Jones v Keen, 115 Mass. 170; Crocker v. Dillon, 133 Mass. 91; Parker v. Nickerson, 137 Mass. 487; Whiting v. Burkhardt (Mass.) 60 N.E. 1. That of multifariousness is not argued. So far as objections are based on evidence it is enough to say that the master was not ordered by the court or asked by the parties to report it. Nichols v. Ela, 124 Mass. 333, 335; Freeland v Wright, 154 Mass. 492, 28 N.E. 678. The objection to findings that express in a single word, such as 'loan,' 'security,' 'delivery,' a conclusion of law from facts, on the ground that the constituents should have been stated, would interdict an important part of the English language. The function of such words often has been analyzed. Windram v. French, 151 Mass. 547, 551, 24 N.E. 914; Com. v. Clancy, 154 Mass. 128, 132, 27 N.E. 1001; Alton v. Bank, 157 Mass. 341, 343, 32 N.E. 228; Evans, Pl. (1st Ed.) 48, 139 143-146, 164. By stating the conclusion they allege by implication that facts exist which justify it. If for any reason it is material to go further, rulings can be asked which will separate the pure facts. Formerly the plaintiff's allegation of title was analyzed when necessary by giving color in pleading. Evans, Pl. 149-157. An exception to an alleged exclusion of evidence is not argued. It does not appear even that any such evidence was offered.
The only property concerned under the master's report is machinery found to have been transferred by a bill of sale to the respondent Hodge as security for advances. The instrument seems not to have been recorded, and the master finds in terms that there never was any delivery of possession. An exception taken to this finding is less frivolous than the others, since earlier in the report it is stated that after giving the security the bankrupt paid monthly rent for the use of it. We assume for the purposes of decision that the form of such a payment would have been evidence of a sufficient change of possession (Moors v. Wyman, 146 Mass. 60, 63, 15 N.E. 104), and there may be some ground for apprehending that the master adopted a different view. But we cannot say that the fact that the form of paying rent was gone through conclusively establishes the change. Harlow v. Hall, 132 Mass. 232. It should be mentioned, too, that a part of the machinery at least seems not to be the same as that covered by the mortgage.
Coming then, to the question whether the report justifies the decree, it follows that Hodge has no title as against the plaintiff. St. 1883, c. 73; Chick v. Nute, 176 Mass. 57, 57 N.E. 219; Bingham v. Jordan, 1 Allen, 373. It is true that under the last Bankrupt Act it looked a little as if property situated like this might be at a loss for a master. For while this court denied it to the mortgagee the United States courts denied it to the assignee in bankruptcy. Winsor v. McLellan, 2 Story, 492, Fed. Cas. No. 17,887, Ex parte Dalby, 1 Low. 431, Fed. Cas. No. 3,540; Coggeshall v. Potter, Holmes, 75 Fed. Cas. No. 2,955; Stewart v. Platt, 101 U.S. 731, 738, 739, 25 L.Ed. 816. The ground of the United States decision was that the assignee is the bankrupt. Lowell, Bankr. § 309. And no doubt it is traditional to regard such assigness as universal successors who like executors or other universal successors represent the person of him to whom they succeed. Chipman v. Bank, 156 Mass. 147, 149, 30 N.E. 610; Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Molleson, 5 Ct. Sess. Cas. (4th Ser.) 1125, 1138. Nevertheless in Bingham v. Jordan the statute was held to invalidate the mortgage as against...
To continue reading
Request your trial