Haskins v. Virginia Dep't of Soc. Servs.

Decision Date09 December 2022
Docket NumberCivil 3:22cv456 (DJN)
PartiesLINWOOD S. HASKINS, SR., Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAVID J. NOVAK, DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 11.) For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion and dismiss this case.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed his Amended Complaint on September 6,2022. (Amend Compl. (ECF No. 6).) Plaintiff sues the Virginia Department of Social Services Division of Child Support Enforcement ("VDSS"), Assistant Attorney General Corey Poindexter and two VDSS employees, Tony Nelson and Stephanie Smith. (Amend. Compl. at 2,4-5.) Although Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is often disorganized and exceedingly difficult to follow, Plaintiff asserts the following claims:[1] (1) criminal contempt, (2) fraud under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), (3) federal grand larceny and (4) deprivation of property and interest in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Amend. Compl. at 7-8.)

Defendants jointly moved to dismiss on September 30, 2022. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff responded on October 21,2022, (ECF Nos. 13,14), and Defendants replied on October 27, 2022, (ECF No. 15).[2] Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for review.

Plaintiff proceeds pro se, and the Court thus affords his Amended Complaint a liberal construction. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Hemphill v. Melton, 551 F.2d 589, 590-91 (4th Cir. 1977)). A plaintiffs pro se status does not excuse a clear failure to allege a federally cognizable claim, however. See Weller v. Dep 't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of certain claims brought by pro se plaintiff despite liberal construction). As the Fourth Circuit has explained, "[t]hough [pro se] litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept a plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

However, this principal does not apply to legal conclusions. Id. With these principles in mind, the Court accepts the following facts.

A. Factual Background

This case centers on three child support orders entered against Plaintiff in 1987 and 1990. On July 30, 1987, the Petersburg Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court ordered Plaintiff to pay child support under Case No. 194968. (Amend. Compl. at 10; see also ECF No. 3-1, at 7.)[3] In the months that followed, Plaintiff failed to make some or all of his required payments, resulting in arrears of $24,960.42. (ECF No. 3-1, at 7.) At some, unspecified date, a Virginia Court reopened Plaintiffs case in order to calculate arrears and interest, and in 2009, the VDSS began garnishing Plaintiffs Social Security benefits to pay off his outstanding balance. (Amend. Compl. at 10.)

Similarly, on January 17, 1990, a Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court[4]ordered Plaintiff to pay child support under Case Nos. 198185 and 209380. (Amend. Compl. at 10.) As with Case No. 194968, the VDSS later began garnishing Plaintiffs Social Security benefits to pay off the outstanding arrears related to these cases.[5] (Amend. Compl. at 10-11.)

B. Plaintiffs Complaint

Plaintiff asserts that his three child support cases are "terminated," "unenforceable" and "void" pursuant to Va. Code § 8.01-251(A) and Adcock v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 383 (2011). (See Amend. Compl. at 3, 5, 6, 9,12.) Specifically, Plaintiff concludes that each case "terminated by operation of law" twenty years after it was opened.[6] (Amend. Compl. at 10.)

Accordingly, he contends that Defendants have "abused their positions and power" and acted "in contempt of the Supreme Court of Virginia" by continuing to seek payment of Plaintiff s arrears and interest. (Amend. Compl. at 7,11-12.) Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants' actions constitute fraud under the FCA and "federal grand larceny." (Amend. Compl. at 7.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have deprived him of property without due process of law in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Amend. Compl. 8.)

Plaintiff seeks $120,000 in compensation, plus punitive damages. (Amend. Compl. at 12.)

C. Defendants9 Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 11.) Defendants present a laundry list of reasons why Plaintiffs claims must fail. As relevant for purposes of this Opinion, Defendants first assert that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue under the FCA or bring civil claims for alleged violations of criminal laws. (Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Def. Memo.") (ECF No. 12) at 6-7.) Second, Defendants argues that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to state any claim upon which this Court can grant relief.[7] (Def. Memo, at 8-13.) As discussed below, the Court agrees.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. A defendant moving for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the complaint on its face, asserting that the complaint "fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based," or may attack "the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, quite apart from any pleadings." White v. CMA Const. Co., Inc., 947 F.Supp. 231, 233 (E.D. Va. 1996) (internal citations omitted). In either case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof to establish jurisdiction. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). The Court must dismiss an action if it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).

By comparison, a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint or counterclaim; it does not serve as the means by which a court will resolve contests surrounding the facts, determine the merits of a claim or address potential defenses. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court will accept a plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations as true and view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130,1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must state facts sufficient to '"give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957)). As the Supreme Court explained in Twombly, a complaint must state "more than labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," though the law does not require "detailed factual allegations." Id. (citations omitted). Ultimately, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," rendering the right "plausible on its face" rather than merely "conceivable." Id. at 555, 570. Thus, to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must assert facts that are more than "merely consistent with" the other party's liability. Id. at 557. The facts alleged must be sufficient to "state all the elements of [any] claim[s]." Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002) and Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270,281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Finally, as relevant here, the Court may "consider matters of public record such as documents from prior state court proceedings in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127,139 (4th Cir. 2009).

III. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff May Not Prosecute Criminal Contempt or Federal Grand Larceny Through a Private Civil Action (Claims One and Three)

In Claim One, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants committed criminal contempt by enforcing various child support orders against him and garnishing his Social Security benefits in contempt of a Virginia Supreme Court case involving facts similar to his. (Amend. Compl. at 7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3285 (criminal contempt)).) In Claim Three, Plaintiff concludes that Defendants committed "federal grand larceny." (Amend. Compl. at 7.) Both claims lack merit.

"A private person may not initiate a criminal action in the federal courts." Ras-Selah: 7 Tafari: El v. Glasser and Glasser PLC, 434 Fed.Appx. 236,236 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) ("[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.")); Conn. Action Now Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1972) ("It is a truism ... that in our federal system crimes are always prosecuted by the Federal Government[.]")). Plaintiff fails to assert, and the...

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