Hassan v. State

• Decision Date: 11 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 14–10–00067–CR.,14–10–00067–CR.
• Citation: 346 S.W.3d 234
• Parties: Adbihakim HASSAN, Appellant,v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

346 S.W.3d 234

Adbihakim HASSAN, Appellant,

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 14–10–00067–CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

July 28, 2011.Discretionary Review Granted Jan. 11, 2012.

Alexander B. Wathen, Houston, for appellant.Randy Zamora, Houston, for appellee.Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices FROST and CHRISTOPHER.

OPINION

KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice.

Appellant Adbihakim Hassan appeals from the county criminal court at law's affirmance of his conviction of a misdemeanor traffic offense in municipal court. We reverse and remand.

Factual Background

Appellant was charged with a misdemeanor offense of failing to stop at a clearly marked stop line while facing a red light. He pleaded “not guilty.” At the jury trial in municipal court, Officer William Lindsey of the Houston Police Department testified that he saw appellant, who was driving a taxi cab, stopped at a red light intersection in Houston. Officer Lindsey described how appellant turned left from Westheimer onto Fountainview from the lane next to the left-turn lane while the traffic light for his lane remained red. No officer directed appellant to make the turn, and no sign or other traffic indicator gave appellant authority to make the left turn. Sergeant Ed Brian Robinson, who was on patrol with Officer Lindsey and who issued the citation to appellant, confirmed this testimony.

The jury convicted appellant of the charged offense, and the court assessed a fine of $200. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. He then appealed to the county criminal court at law.¹ The county criminal court at law affirmed the conviction.

In considering issues presented in appellant's brief in this court, we made a preliminary determination that appellant had made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the State's exercise of peremptory strikes in jury selection. We abated the case and ordered the municipal court to conduct a full Batson hearing. Following a hearing, the municipal court concluded that the State did not engage in purposeful racial discrimination and denied appellant's Batson motion. A record of the hearing and the municipal court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed with this court. This court reinstated the case, and we now consider the merits of the issues raised in appellant's brief.

Issues Presented

In this de novo appeal, our review is limited to those issues considered by the county criminal court at law. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 30.00027(b)(1) (in an appeal from a municipal court of record, the record and briefs from the appeal to the county court constitute the record and briefs at the court of appeals). Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, the trial court's denials of his motion to quash the complaint, motion for deferred disposition, and denial of his Batson challenge as well as an evidentiary ruling on an officer's testimony.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Under his seventh issue, appellant asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to sustain the conviction. In evaluating a legal-sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). The issue on appeal is not whether we, as a court, believe the State's evidence or believe that appellant's evidence outweighs the State's evidence. Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). The verdict may not be overturned unless it is irrational or unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The trier of fact “is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the strength of the evidence.” Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). The trier of fact may choose to believe or disbelieve any portion of the witnesses' testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). When faced with conflicting evidence, we presume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Therefore, if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must affirm. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

A majority of the judges of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have determined that “the Jackson v. Virginia [443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ] legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (plurality op.) (Hervey, J., joined by Keller, P.J., Keasler, and Cochran, J.J.); id. at 912–15 (Cochran, J., concurring, joined by Womack, J.) (same conclusion as plurality). Therefore, in this case, we review the evidence under the Jackson v. Virginia standard as articulated in the preceding paragraph.

The specific statute appellant is alleged to have violated provides as follows:

(d) An operator of a vehicle facing only a steady red signal shall stop at a clearly marked stop line. In the absence of a stop line, the operator shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection. A vehicle that is not turning shall remain standing until an indication to proceed is shown. After stopping, standing until the intersection may be entered safely, and yielding right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully in an adjacent crosswalk and other traffic lawfully using the intersection, the operator may:

(1) turn right; or

(2) turn left, if the intersecting streets are both one-way streets and a left turn is permissible.

Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.007(d) (West 2011).²

Officer Lindsey testified that the intersection where appellant was ticketed is located in “Houston, Harris County” and that Westheimer and Fountainview are not both one-way streets, at which a left turn on a red light would have been permitted. He explained that at that intersection, Westheimer has four lanes and a single left-turn lane. Appellant's vehicle was not in the left-turn lane, but in the lane next to it, designated as the “No. 1 lane.” According to Officer Lindsey, the light in the left-turn lane changed to a green arrow, and appellant turned left. The light for appellant's lane remained red. Appellant was stopped at the red light in a lane designated for traffic proceeding straight. Officer Lindsey testified that he could see clearly that the light was red and that appellant turned left from this lane, which was next to the left-turn lane. Appellant then proceeded southbound on Fountainview. Officer Lindsey testified that no officer had directed appellant to turn, and there was no other sign, device, or indicator giving appellant the authority to turn left from the lane his vehicle occupied. Based on his observations over a period of “quite some time,” Officer Lindsey believed the light was working properly. Sergeant Robinson confirmed that appellant was facing a red light westbound on Westheimer when appellant turned left onto Fountainview. Sergeant Robinson testified that the light was “cycling properly,” and he had seen it functioning several times while on patrol that night. This evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction. Appellant's seventh issue is overruled.

Denial of Motion to Quash

In his first and second issues, appellant asserts that the municipal court improperly denied his motion to quash the complaint. Appellant argues that the jurat in the complaint's oath is fundamentally defective because it bears a date shown as “7–25–05,” using an abbreviated two-digit year instead of using four digits.

We review the decision on a motion to quash under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); State v. Goldsberry, 14 S.W.3d 770, 772 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles, or acts arbitrarily or unreasonably. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (op. on reh'g).

A complaint is a sworn allegation charging the accused with the commission of an offense in justice and municipal courts. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 45.018(a) (West 2006). A complaint is sufficient if it shows that the accused has committed an offense against the law of the state. Id. art. 45.019(a)(4) (West 2006). A motion to quash should be granted only when the language concerning the defendant's alleged conduct is so vague or indefinite as to deny him effective notice of the acts he allegedly committed. DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).

The particularity in pleading required for an indictment or an information is not required for a complaint, and a complaint will not be dismissed due to a mere informality. Kindley v. State, 879 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.). The complaint in this case substantially complies with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 45.019(a).³ Subsection (e)(2) to article 45.019 provides that a complaint in municipal court may be sworn to before “the clerk of the court or a deputy clerk.” Id. art. 45.019(e)(2). This complaint was sworn to by the “deputy Clerk Municipal Court, Houston, Texas” on “7–25–05.” Well-defined and well-understood abbreviations may be used in an indictment, jurat, or complaint without rendering the instrument defective. Andrade v. State, 662 S.W.2d 446, 448–49 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983, pet. ref'd) (holding complaint's jurat containing commonly abbreviated date was adequate). We conclude that the jurat in this case is sufficient. The trial court did not abuse its...