Matson v. State

• Decision Date: 16 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 69635,69635
• Citation: 819 S.W.2d 839
• Parties: John Dee MATSON, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 839

819 S.W.2d 839

John Dee MATSON, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 69635.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas,

En Banc.

Oct. 16, 1991.

Stanley G. Schneider, Robert A. Jones, Houston, for appellant.

John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty. & Timothy G. Taft, Glenn Gotschall and Keno M. Henderson, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge.

A jury convicted appellant, John Dee Matson, Jr., of capital murder and the death penalty was assessed as punishment. On appeal to this Court, appellant raises forty-four points of error. We will address only those points concerning (1) the jurisdiction of this Court, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the jury to hear certain evidence during the punishment phase of trial. We will reverse the conviction.

In his first point of error, appellant claims that this Court is without jurisdiction because the trial court rendered judgment before the jury issued its verdict. He bases his claims on the fact that the jury foreman failed to sign the verdict form during the guilt/innocence phase of trial and when this was discovered, after the court had accepted the finding of guilt, the trial court made the jury go back into deliberation to sign the form. Thereafter, the judge did not re-pronounce sentence and appellant claims that such actions deny this Court jurisdiction. We disagree.

Filed among the court's papers is what purports to be a judgment and sentence whereby appellant was found guilty of capital murder and the death penalty was assessed as punishment. We assume jurisdiction over the appeal. Texas Constitution, Article V, Section 5. Appellant does not contest that the trial court had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. If the trial court erred in sending the jurors back into deliberations in order to sign the verdict form, such would be trial error and would not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court or this Court. See generally, 49 C.J.S. Judgments, § 449 (1947 and Supp.1990). Appellant's first point of error is overruled.

In four points of error, appellant insists that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt. The indictment in this case alleged that appellant "while in the course of committing and attempting to commit the robbery of Phyllis Marie Hicks, intentionally cause[d] the death of Phyllis Marie Hicks, hereinafter styled the Complainant, by asphyxiating the Complainant by strangling her with his hands and by means to the Grand Jury unknown." A review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict is as follows:

On July 5, 1985, Phyllis Marie Hicks left her home at around 5 o'clock p.m. to go to a nearby food store. She drove the family 1978 Dodge van. Mrs. Hicks arrived at the food store and cashed a check for $378.00 for which she received one or two one-hundred dollar bills and the remainder in twenties and ones.

Later that same day, at sometime between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m., several persons saw appellant drive the Hicks' van into an apartment parking lot where Tores Doze was playing basketball with several others. Appellant called for Doze to join him and the two left in the van. They returned shortly thereafter. Appellant left. Between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. that night, appellant returned to the apartment again to pick up Doze. While waiting for Doze, appellant told a boy that the van belonged to his uncle. Appellant and Doze left and went to a night club. While there the two picked up an acquaintance of Doze, Jim White, and the three went riding around Houston. When they stopped to get something to eat, White observed that appellant had about three hundred dollars--two one-hundred dollar bills and the remainder in twenties. White asked appellant where he had obtained the money and appellant replied, "I choked this lady and took it."

At around 3:00 a.m., the trio went home. On the way White started playing around by sticking his head out of the van. When he spotted a police car nearby, Doze told appellant that he better "get White hip."

That next morning at around 7:45 a.m., appellant checked into a motel. Appellant requested a room for twenty-four hours. He told the motel manager that he did not have a vehicle. After the manager checked in appellant, he noticed the Hicks' van parked on the nearby corner. The van had not been there the night before and this aroused the manager's suspicion. The manager felt the hood of the van and discovered that it was warm. He then started to write down the registration and license plate numbers. While he was doing this, appellant walked by; the manager asked him if the van belonged to him and appellant responded that it did not. Appellant asked where the bus stop was located. The manager told him and appellant walked away. The manager then went to report the van to authorities keeping the van under surveillance while doing so. Before he could make the call, however, the manager saw appellant return to the van, get in and drive away. The manager followed. When appellant abandoned the van in an apartment parking lot, the manager phoned authorities. The police arrived but after running a check on the license plates they were unable to determine if the van had been stolen. The officers also checked if appellant had any outstanding warrants; he did not. They left the van and appellant alone.

At 10:00 a.m., maintenance workers discovered the nude body of Phyllis Hicks in an apartment dumpster. She had been strangled to death and her body had been covered with items from the van so as to conceal it.

There was evidence of sexual assault. An autopsy revealed that there was spermatozoa in the vagina. Pubic hairs were found in the van. Vaginal smears did not indicate secretor activity which is consistent with the male ejaculator being a non-secretor. Appellant is a non-secretor.

Early on Sunday, July 7, 1985, after officers learned that before her death Hicks had been driving the van connected to appellant, he was arrested at the motel room. At the time of the arrest, appellant wore a gold chain belonging to Mrs. Hicks and there was $219.00 in cash in his pocket. The police found a shopping bag containing new clothes inside the room. The police also arrested Doze and discovered in his bedroom a radio head set belonging to Mrs. Hicks's son that had been in the van.

Authorities discovered appellant's palm print on the driver's manual that was inside the van. Also, appellant's fingerprint was found on an inside window. Doze's fingerprints were found on the back of the rear view mirror located on the passenger's side of the van.

Appellant specifically asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove: (1) that he was the person that killed the complainant (point of error number fourteen); (2) that he intended the death of the complainant (point of error number fifteen); (3) the cause of the complainant's death was that as alleged in the indictment (point of error number sixteen); and (4) the manner of the complainant's death was that as alleged in the indictment (point of error number seventeen). ¹ We disagree.

Appellant principally relies upon Nathan v. State, 611 S.W.2d 69 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), to support his contention that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he was the person who killed the complainant. Reliance upon that case, however, is seriously flawed. In Nathan, this Court applied an outmoded approach to reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. Relying upon 24 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 742, the Nathan Court wrote:

"In criminal cases, a judgment of conviction, to be sustained on appeal, must be supported by evidence that produces a moral certainty of the guilt of the accused to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. The evidence will be insufficient to sustain the conviction where, although not leaving the accused free from suspicion of guilt, it still fails to show his guilt to a moral certainty, so as to exclude all reasonable doubt.

"In ascertaining whether the guilt of the accused has been established to a moral certainty, the appellate court will review the evidence in light of the presumption that the accused is innocent...." 611 S.W.2d at 75.

Once again, we disavow this language. See Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (opinion on rehearing); Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (opinion on rehearing); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450, 457 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (opinion on rehearing); Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (opinion on rehearing). When this Court is called upon to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence--in both circumstantial evidence cases and direct evidence cases--we determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in the original); Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). In Moreno, we further explained the correct way to apply the Jackson standard:

"... The court is never to make its own myopic determination of guilt from reading the cold record. It is not the reviewing court's duty to disregard, realign or weigh evidence. This the factfinder has already done. The factfinder, best positioned to consider all the evidence firsthand, viewing the valuable and significant demeanor and expression of the witnesses, has reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a verdict must stand unless it is found to be irrational or unsupported by ... the evidence, with such evidence being viewed under the Jackson light. Concrete application of the Jackson standard is...