Hasson v. Cozens
| Decision Date | 19 January 1970 |
| Citation | 1 Cal.3d 576,463 P.2d 385,83 Cal.Rptr. 161 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 463 P.2d 385 Jerome HASSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert C. COZENS, as Director, etc., Defendant and Appellant. L.A. 29695. |
Minsky, Garber & Rudof and J. M. Groshan, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of the superior court granting a peremptory writ of mandate to compel the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter referred to as 'the department') to refrain from suspending plaintiff's driving privileges.
Facts: On May 13, 1965, plaintiff, in propria persona, entered a plea of guilty in Division 51 of the Municipal Court for the Los Angeles Judicial District of Los Angeles County to a violation of section 23102 of the Vehicle Code (misdemeanor drunk driving). Sentence was imposed, and an abstract of the conviction was forwarded to the department.
On October 24, 1967, plaintiff, in propria persona, pled nolo contendere in Department 1 of the Municipal Court for the Inglewood Judicial District of Los Angeles County to a violation of section 23102 of the Vehicle Code. Plaintiff represented to the court that his prior conviction was invalid, because he had not been represented by counsel, had not been advised of his constitutional right to counsel, and otherwise had not intelligently waived his constitutional rights. The court accepted such representations, and, on motion of the People, the allegation of the prior conviction was stricken. On November 15, 1967, the court imposed sentence and recommended that plaintiff's license not be suspended. 1 Again, an abstract of conviction was forwarded to the department.
On January 12, 1968, because of the two abstracts of conviction filed with the department, plaintiff was served by the department with an order of suspension suspending his privilege to operate a motor vehicle, purportedly pursuant to section 13352, subdivision (c), of the Vehicle Code. Section 13352, subdivision (c), of the Vehicle Code provides that upon a Second conviction for drunk driving within seven years the driving privilege of the person so convicted 'shall be suspended' for one year. (Italics added.)
On February 9, 1968, plaintiff filed a verified petition for writ of mandate in the superior court, alleging that he did not know at the time he made his pleas which gave rise to the convictions referred to above that he would lose his privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of one year by virtue thereof. He further declared that during the two proceedings he was not represented by counsel, was not advised of his constitutional rights to counsel, and was not advised that in the event he did not have sufficient funds to employ counsel, counsel would be appointed to represent him.
During pendency of the mandate proceeding, plaintiff moved the Los Angeles Municipal Court to vacate and set aside his 1965 conviction on the ground that he had been denied his constitutional right to counsel and had not expressly waived said right. He made a similar motion in the Inglewood Municipal Court with respect to his 1967 conviction. Both motions, however, were denied in March 1968, and plaintiff did not appeal from either order of denial.
Thereafter, a hearing was had on plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate. After receiving in evidence verified pleadings and declarations and hearing argument on the matter, the superior court trial judge granted mandate.
Question: Was the trial court bound by the 1967 determination of the Inglewood Municipal Court that plaintiff's 1965 conviction was invalid and that plaintiff could therefore be sentenced as a first offender?
Yes. Since the sanctions which may be imposed upon a person convicted of drunk driving are increased if he has a prior conviction of the same...
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