Hastings v. Hancock

• Citation: 842 F. Supp. 1315
• Decision Date: 10 December 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 92-2321-GTV.
• Parties: Terri L. HASTINGS and Juana Serda, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph HANCOCK, Eugene Morrison, d/b/a Superior School of Hairstyling, and Ruby Morrison, d/b/a Superior School of Hairstyling, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

842 F. Supp. 1315

Terri L. HASTINGS and Juana Serda, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph HANCOCK, Eugene Morrison, d/b/a Superior School of Hairstyling, and Ruby Morrison, d/b/a Superior School of Hairstyling, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 92-2321-GTV.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

December 10, 1993.

David W. White, Marcia L. Montgomery, Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan & Glassman, Overland Park, KS, for Terri L. Hastings, plaintiff, Juana Serda.

Carl E. Cornwell, Cornwell & Edmonds, Overland Park, KS, for Joseph Hancock.

James C. Morrow, Myerson, Monsees & Morrow, Kansas City, MO, for Eugene and Ruby Morrison.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VAN BEBBER, District Judge.

This case comes before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 32) filed by Defendants Eugene and Ruby Morrison. Plaintiff has responded and opposes the motion. For the reasons stated in this memorandum and order, the motion is denied.

This case concerns alleged violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to numerous incidents of sexual harassment by defendant Joseph Hancock during her enrollment at the Superior School of Hairstyling from January to June, 1992. Plaintiff's claims encompass both recognized types of sexual harassment: hostile environment and quid pro quo. See Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dept., 916 F.2d 572, 575 (10th Cir.1990). Plaintiff has also asserted a pendant state law claim for emotional distress.

Because the Morrisons were the owners of the school, plaintiff contends they are proper defendants in this action. In their motion, however, defendants contend that they are not liable for any alleged violation of Title IX by separate defendant Joseph Hancock because they were not involved with the Superior school during the time of the alleged harassment, and because defendant Hancock was not their agent.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine any evidence tending to show triable issues in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 13396 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S.Ct. 1187, 84 L.Ed.2d 334 (1985). A moving party is entitled to summary judgment only if the evidence indicates "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine factual issue is one that "can reasonably be resolved only be a finder of fact because it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. This burden may be discharged by "showing" that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who "may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. Thus, the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The pertinent uncontroverted facts established by the parties in accordance with D.Kan. Rule 206(c) are as follows:

Plaintiff Juana Serda was enrolled at the Superior School of Hairstyling from January to June, 1992. Plaintiff alleges no harassing conduct on the part of defendant Eugene and Ruby Morrison, but rather bases her allegations on the conduct of defendant Joseph Hancock. Plaintiff contends that during the course of her enrollment she was subjected to continued unwanted and uninvited sexual comments, questions, phone calls, and threats by Hancock.

Plaintiff acknowledges that she never complained to the Morrisons of any alleged sexual harassment by defendant Hancock. In fact, the Morrisons had nothing to do with the day-to-day running of the school during plaintiff's employment there. The Morrisons were not aware of any of the activities allegedly perpetrated by defendant Hancock.

Hancock had sole decision-making authority over the day-to-day operations of Superior. He was not evaluated, critiqued, or overseen by the Morrisons.

On August 29, 1991, Hancock and the Morrisons entered into a contract for a purchase option on Superior School of Hairstyling. The agreed price was $100,000. Hancock then began working at Superior on September 3, 1991. On January 14, 1992, the aforementioned contract was rewritten and retitled "Lease with Purchase Option." The contract was also renegotiated to reflect lease payments totalling $75,000. It was Hancock's intention to purchase Superior from the Morrisons.

The Lease with Purchase Option includes a clause stating that the lessee (Hancock) assumes liability for any claim arising from the location, condition, or use of the business premises, and shall indemnify the lessors for any liability arising from the location, condition, or use of the business premises during the term of the lease. The contract identifies the Morrisons as the owners of the school, and provides that title to the business's assets remain with the owners until purchased by the lessee. Additionally, the agreement indicates that the Morrisons were to set up a bank account for funds received from federal student loan and grant programs from which Hancock could draw.

Kansas State Statutes and Administrative Regulations mandate that the owner of a cosmetology school obtain a license for the school from the State Board of Cosmetology, that the license must be renewed annually, and that such a license is not transferable. The licenses issued by the state to Superior School of Hairstyling for the period from July 1, 1991, through June 30, 1993 indicate that Eugene and Ruby Morrison are the owners of the school.¹

The school is not incorporated, but was owned by the Morrisons as partners. The State Board of Cosmetology never received any written notification of a change in ownership or management of Superior. The Morrisons and Hancock did not formalize a bill of sale for Superior until April 12, 1993.

III. DISCUSSION

In 1992, the Supreme Court recognized that the implied right of action under Title IX would support a claim for monetary damages based upon the sexual harassment of a student by a teacher. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992). The Court held that, as in cases brought by employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when a teacher sexually harasses a student because of the student's sex, that teacher discriminates on the basis of sex. Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1037 (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)).

In the present case, the court is confronted with claims brought by a student at a vocational educational institution based upon the alleged sexual harassment of that student by the director of the school. In the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Ruby and Eugene Morrison, the court is faced with the specific question of whether individuals who were in the process of selling the school to the alleged harasser have any liability under Title IX for the alleged acts of harassment.

As an initial matter, the court notes that the Morrisons are sued as "Ruby and Eugene Morrison d/b/a the Superior School of Hairstyling" and not for any individual acts they may have taken. An educational institution is a proper defendant under Title IX. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified School Dist., 830 F.Supp. 1288, 1291 (N.D.Cal.1993). Because the Superior School of Hairstyling is not a separately incorporated entity, its owners would thus be the proper defendants in this action. Construing any controverted facts in favor of the nonmoving party, therefore, the court must determine whether the Morrisons are owners of Superior School of Hairstyling.

The uncontroverted facts established by the parties disclose that the license maintained for Superior was held in the name of the Morrisons during the entire time period when the alleged harassment of plaintiff Duron occurred. Additionally, the Lease with Purchase Option contract of January, 1992, identified the Morrisons as the owners of Superior. Although Ruby Morrison has testified at her deposition that she did not sign the applications for license renewal, this presents an issue of fact to be resolved by the factfinder at trial. The court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the Morrisons' ownership in the Superior School of Hairstyling.

Assuming that the Morrisons continued to have an ownership interest in Superior while it was operated by defendant Hancock and during plaintiff's enrollment at the school, the issue for the court to decide then becomes: "When is a school liable for acts of sexual harassment by one of its employees under Title IX?" In Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges and Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 317 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849, 108 S.Ct. 148, 98 L.Ed.2d 104 (1987), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that courts should turn to the well-developed body of case law under Title VII if confronted with an employment-related allegation of sex discrimination under Title IX. "Because Title VII prohibits the identical conduct prohibited by Title IX, i.e., sex discrimination, we regard it as the most appropriated analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards...." Id. at 316 n. 6.

In this case, however, the court is...