Hastings v. Hastings, 24034
| Decision Date | 16 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 24034,24034 |
| Citation | 201 W.Va. 354,497 S.E.2d 203 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Sharon M. HASTINGS, Appellant, v. Thomas A. HASTINGS, Appellee. |
1. Syl. Pt. 1, Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W.Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995).
2. "Questions relating to alimony and to the maintenance and custody of the children are within the sound discretion of the court and its action with respect to such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that such discretion has been abused." Syllabus, Nichols v. Nichols, 160 W.Va. 514, 236 S.E.2d 36 (1977).
3. " Syllabus point 2, Rexroad v. Rexroad 4. Syl. Pt. 1, Charlton v. Charlton, 186 W.Va. 670, 413 S.E.2d 911 (1991).
[201 W.Va. 356] 186 W.Va. 696, 414 S.E.2d 457 (1992)." Syl. Pt. 1, Durnell v. Durnell, 194 W.Va. 464, 460 S.E.2d 710 (1995)
5. " Syl. Pt. 5, Rogers v. Rogers, 197 W.Va. 365, 475 S.E.2d 457 (1996).
David J. Sims, Yahn & Sims, Wheeling, for the Appellant.
Gregory A. Gaudino, Petroplus & Gaudino, Wheeling, for the Appellee.
1
Sharon M. Hastings (hereinafter "Appellant") appeals a June 19, 1996, decision of the Circuit Court of Ohio County adopting the family law master's recommended order regarding divorce and distribution of property. The Appellant raises multiple assignments of error. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The Appellant and her former husband, Thomas A. Hastings (hereinafter "Appellee"), were married on October 15, 1983, and two children were born of the marriage. Thomas, born January 18, 1984, is presently thirteen years of age, and Jenna, born March 4, 1986, is presently eleven years of age. On May 4, 1994, the Appellant filed for divorce, alleging irreconcilable differences and other fault based grounds for divorce, including cruel and inhuman treatment, habitual drunkenness, habitual use of narcotics or dangerous drugs, and abuse and neglect of the parties' children. Final hearings before the family law master were held in May and August 1995. Although both parties were instructed by the family law master to submit recommended orders, Appellant's counsel failed to submit the requested recommended order. The family law master thereafter adopted the recommended order, verbatim, submitted by the Appellee's attorney, and granted the divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, admitted by both parties. The family law master found that the evidence did not establish cruelty, habitual drunkenness, habitual use of drugs, or abuse or neglect of the children.
Subsequent to the Appellant's petition for review, the lower court held a hearing and affirmed the family law master's recommended order, by a thorough twenty-seven page order dated June 19, 1996. The Appellant was awarded the care, custody, and control of the children subject to the Appellee's rights of visitation, and the Appellee was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $825 per month. The Appellee was also ordered to pay alimony of $240 per month for five years. The Appellant, raising multiple issues, now seeks reversal by this Court.
In syllabus point one of Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W.Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995), we explained:
In reviewing challenges to findings made by a family law master that also were adopted by a circuit court, a three-pronged standard of review is applied. Under these circumstances, a final equitable distribution order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory interpretations are subject to a de novo review.
We also specified as follows in the syllabus of Nichols v. Nichols, 160 W.Va. 514, 236 S.E.2d 36 (1977): "Questions relating to alimony and to the maintenance and custody of the children are within the sound discretion of the court and its action with respect to such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that such discretion has been abused."
The Appellant contends that the Appellee's problems with alcohol consumption contributed to the disintegration of the marriage, and the Appellant introduced evidence regarding behavioral problems experienced by the children as a result of their father's drinking habits. The Appellant's sister, Rose Halverson, for example, testified that the Appellee was expected to pick the children up at Ms. Halverson's home at five p.m. one evening. He was late to pick up the children, and when he did arrive, he was intoxicated. Ms. Halverson would not allow the children to ride with him. The Appellant also introduced evidence indicating that the Appellee failed to appear for family dinners and parties due to his alcohol consumption. The Appellant's uncle also testified that he occasionally saw the Appellee drinking in bars and that the Appellee was intoxicated on most of those occasions.
The Appellant also explained that as the Appellee's alcohol problems worsened and the relationship deteriorated, she began to suffer from an anxiety disorder and depression. She sought treatment from Dr. David Singer, a psychologist, and was diagnosed as being co-dependent and suffering from anxiety and depression. 2
During the final hearing before the family law master, the Appellant posed a question regarding the effect of fault on the amount of alimony awarded. The family law master responded to that question as follows: "Fault really has no bearing on how much alimony is ordered." 3 The Appellant contends that this exchange regarding the irrelevance of fault precluded her from introducing additional and more extensive evidence of the Appellee's alleged habitual drunkenness.
In her final recommended order, the family law master found that "[t]he evidence does not establish ... habitual drunkenness" and that the Appellant's demand of complete abstinence from alcohol became a continuing source of disagreement between the parties. "In any event," the family law master continued, "the [Appellant] admitted several acts of condonation...." The family law master thereafter noted several acts of sexual intercourse which allegedly demonstrated the Appellant's condonation of the Appellee's drinking The family law master and lower court ultimately concluded that the evidence did not establish habitual drunkenness. 4 However, we must also be cognizant of the Appellant's contentions that the family law master's comments regarding the irrelevance of the fault issue precluded her from introducing additional evidence of fault. 5
[201 W.Va. 358] habits, and concluded that "[t]he evidence clearly established that any alleged fault by the [Appellee] was condoned by the acts of the [Appellant]."
The family law master's comments regarding the role of fault in the determination of alimony evidence a misapprehension of applicable law which we cannot simply ignore. We have previously explained that fault as a ground for divorce and fault as an element in the determination of alimony are separate inquiries. In Durnell v. Durnell, 194 W.Va. 464, 460 S.E.2d 710 (1995), we recognized that while evidence of misconduct, adultery in that case, may not be sufficiently proven to "serve as a ground for granting a divorce[,]" such issue is still a valid consideration in the determination of alimony. 6 Id. at 468, 460 S.E.2d at 714. Based upon the principles of Durnell, we observed in Hillberry v. Hillberry, 195 W.Va. 600, 466 S.E.2d 451 (1995), that "the analysis of comparative fault issues becomes a two-prong inquiry; 7 first, evidence must be evaluated for its potential as a ground for divorce, and second, evidence must be evaluated as it impacts upon the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded." Hillberry, 195 W.Va. at...
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Gladys J. v. Ronnie J., 15-0191
...recognized that marital fault was a statutory factor to be examined by the court in determining spousal support in Hastings v. Hastings, 201 W. Va. 354, 497 S.E.2d 203 (1997), as follows:Indeed, we have even held that evidence of very aggravated marital fault may justify the award of premiu......
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Gladys J. v. Ronnie J., 18-0146
...award spousal support and, if so, in determining the amount. Gladys J. I, 2016 WL 3165981 at *4. We also noted that Hastings v. Hastings, 201 W.Va. 354, 497 S.E.2d 203 (1997),recognized that marital fault was a statutory factor to be examined by the court in determining spousal support . . ......