Hasty v. Hasty

Decision Date12 March 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-144,91-144
Citation828 P.2d 94
PartiesGeorge HASTY, Appellant (Defendant), v. Lucinda HASTY, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Bruce S. Asay, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Carol Serelson of Serelson and Serelson, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

Appellant is a thrice-married parent of three minor children from his first two failed marriages and his present third marriage. He challenges the district court's interpretation and application of the federally mandated child support guidelines enacted in W.S. 20-6-301 through 306 (Supp.1991) which resulted in an upward modification of the child support award he must pay on behalf of his minor child from the first marriage.

Appellant objected to his first wife's petition, sought on behalf of the parties' one minor child, for an upward modification of the $150 per month child support award as ordered in the parties' ten-year old divorce decree. Appellant asked the district court, as it interpreted and applied the child support guidelines, to give proper recognition to his support obligations to his two other minor children from his second and third marriages. In appellant's view, the district court would give such proper recognition by factoring in his three minor children when using the child support guideline matrix found in W.S. 20-6-304(a) to determine the rebuttably presumed correct amount of child support to award the minor child from appellant's first marriage.

In the district court's decision letter, later incorporated by reference into its modification order, the court acknowledged that the state legislature had provided for deviations from the child support guidelines, depending on the court-determined presence of one or more of the statutorily designated factors. The court declared, however, that appellant's argument did not fall within any of those factors, saying "this court has no choice but to apply the guidelines."

Finding error in the district court's decision that appellant's argument did not fall within any of the statutorily designated factors which may be considered for purposes of deviating from the child support guidelines, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in reaching its modification decision. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

Appellant and his first wife, the appellee, were married in 1969, and had two children. The parties were divorced in 1982. In the divorce decree appellee was awarded custody of the children, and appellant was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $150 per month for each minor child. Appellant met those obligations, married a second time, and had one child from that marriage, which ended in divorce. Appellant, who does not have custody of the minor child from his second marriage, is paying child support in the amount of $166 per month. Now married a third time, appellant resides with his present wife and their minor child. Thus, appellant is supporting his three minor children.

When the parties' first child recently reached his majority, appellant ceased paying child support for that child as allowed by the original divorce decree. Appellee filed a petition for an upward modification of the child support for the parties' second child, who is still a minor. Answering the petition, appellant denied that an upward modification was warranted. A district court commissioner held a hearing on the petition and afterward submitted a report to the district court that recommended an increase of child support from $150 to $745 per month. The commissioner arrived at the increased amount using the statutory child support guidelines matrix:

§ 20-6-304. Child support guidelines.

(a) Child support shall be expressed in a specific dollar amount and shall be determined in accordance with the following guidelines:

Obligor's

Monthly

                 Net Income      Number of Children
                                 1       2       3        4         5         6
                -------------------------------------------------------------------
                $  500-$1,000   17%     25%     30%      32%       37%       42%
                -------------------------------------------------------------------
                $1,001-$1,500   20%     28%     32%      35%       40%       45%
                -------------------------------------------------------------------
                $1,501-$2,000   22%     29%     32%      40%       40%       45%
                -------------------------------------------------------------------
                $2,001-$,3000   26%     30%     33%      40%       40%       45%
                -------------------------------------------------------------------
                $3,001-above   $780 *  $900 *  $990 *  $1,200 *  $1,200 *  $1,350 *
                -------------------------------------------------------------------
                

Note * Minimum dollar amounts.

----------

In using that matrix, the commissioner determined that appellant's child support for the parties' one minor child must be twenty-six percent (26%) of appellant's monthly net income, as shown on the guidelines matrix.

Appellant objected to the commissioner's report on several grounds. He contended the commissioner, in error, strictly applied the child support guidelines matrix as if appellant had only one minor child to support, thus ignoring appellant's support obligations to his other two minor children from subsequent marriages. After receiving the commissioner's report, the district court reviewed further financial information from appellant and considered his objections. The district court issued its decision letter rejecting appellant's objections, holding the child support guidelines would be applied. The district court then entered its order modifying the parties' 1982 divorce decree, increasing the child support by $595 per month for the parties' minor child. Appellant filed this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BACKGROUND

In a recent case, this court restated the standard of review applicable to appeals from child support modification orders and discussed features of the child support guidelines. Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293 (Wyo.1991). We need not here restate the applicable standard of review; rest assured, we shall apply it. We will, however, again discuss the background and the salient features of the child support guidelines, since the district court's allegedly erroneous application of them is the heart of this appeal.

Before the enactment of the child support guidelines legislation, either party to an original divorce decree could seek an upward or downward modification of a child support award under the authority of W.S. 20-2-113 and 116 (1987). 1 A petitioner who seeks child support modification under that authority must prove a substantial change of circumstances in order for the court to order a modification. Nuspl v. Nuspl, 717 P.2d 341, 345 (Wyo.1986). In any given case in which a substantial change of circumstances exists, "determination In Nuspl, the mother, as the custodial parent, petitioned for an upward modification of child support for the parties' three minor children. The noncustodial father resisted, claiming, among other things, he had remarried and had incurred expenses for his second wife and their two minor children. The parties did not dispute the existence of a substantial change of circumstances. The father, however, asserted the trial court abused its discretion in ordering an upward modification when it failed to consider the father's inability to pay in light of his remarriage and later-born children. Nuspl, 717 P.2d at 345. Responding to that assertion, this court reminded the litigants that in proceedings of this nature, "the paramount concern of the court is the child's welfare." Id. Tempering that statement, we acknowledged that a child support question must be decided with consideration of the paying parent's ability to pay, the receiving parent's spending habits, and all other surrounding circumstances. We also cautioned that, "[v]oluntary assumption of an additional obligation by remarriage or debt incurrence does not necessarily constrain responsibility to children of the prior marriage." We continued to recognize that, in the final analysis, child support decisions rest largely within the district court's exercise of discretion based upon all of the surrounding circumstances that exist in any particular case. Id.

of amounts of child support * * * invokes consideration of all of the circumstances including: (a) reasonable needs of the children; (b) reasonable contributory ability and responsibility of the father; and (c) reasonable contributory ability and responsibility of the mother." Nuspl, 717 P.2d at 345.

Over the years a growing number of critics have challenged the system which allows child support decisions to be made on the ad hoc exercise of judicial discretion which has led to unacceptably low and comparatively inequitable child support awards. Some of the criticism points out that the American public has a vested interest in the continuing economic viability of the federal public assistance program, Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC). Further, the taxpayers' burden increases whenever noncustodial parents fail to pay or underpay child support for their children who then must receive public assistance. Irwin Garfinkel and Marygold S. Melli, The Use of Normative Standards in Family Law Decisions: Developing Mathematical Standards for Child Support, 24 Family L.Q. 157, 159-62 (1990).

Congress responded to the challenge in 1984 through the child support amendments to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. 2 This enactment required the states to develop guidelines in the form of mathematical formulae for use by the courts in setting child support awards and that it be done by October, 1987. Later, Congress required the states to treat those guidelines as "rebuttably presumed correct." 3 Heeding the federal call, the Wyoming state legislature enhanced the existing child support enforcement...

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