Pasenelli v. Pasenelli
Decision Date | 21 October 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 02-11.,02-11. |
Citation | 2002 WY 159,57 P.3d 324 |
Parties | Kathryn PASENELLI, Appellant (Petitioner), v. Robert PASENELLI, Appellee (Respondent). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Tammy A. Burt of Harris Law Firm, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.
Mike Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming, Representing Appellee.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN1, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. HILL, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] Appellant, Kathryn Pasenelli (Mother), filed a petition in the district court seeking to modify a divorce decree so as to increase the child support payments due her by Robert Pasenelli (Father). The district court denied that motion and Mother contends the district court abused its discretion both in interpreting the parties' stipulation regarding child support, as well as in applying the statutory child support guidelines.
[¶ 2] We will modify, but will otherwise affirm, the district court's order and remand for entry of a revised order consistent with this opinion.
[¶ 3] Mother states these issues:
Father abbreviates that statement of the issues to this terse phrase: "Did the trial court abuse its discretion [in] denying the modification?"
[¶ 4] Proceedings in this matter commenced on December 5, 1997, when Father filed a complaint for divorce. A stipulation settling the issue extant between the parties was filed in the district court on March 18, 1998. That stipulation revealed that the parties were the parents of four children, who were, at the time, ages ten, eight, three, and nine months. Mother was awarded primary physical custody of the children and has been their primary caretaker throughout their lives. Father was required to pay Mother $950.00 per month in child support for the four children. The stipulation contained this provision:
"...
The stipulation also provided that Father would pay Mother rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $400.00, for 48 months.2 The alimony was to be paid to Mother so that she could complete a four-year college degree, thus enabling her to better provide for herself and her children. The terms of the stipulation were "approved, confirmed and incorporated" into the divorce decree which was entered on March 20, 1998.
[¶ 5] On September 14, 2000, Mother filed a petition to modify the decree of divorce, alleging that the incomes of both Mother and Father had changed to such an extent that it would change the child support due her by 20% or more per month. On September 26, 2000, Father answered that petition contending that the parties' stipulation and the decree of divorce prohibited Mother from seeking a modification of child support until at least March 20, 2002. The district court held a hearing at which both parties testified. There was no disagreement about what Father's income was (approximately $45,000.00 per year) and what the presumptive support for the four children would be (approximately $1,350.00 per month). The only disagreement was what income should be attributed to Mother. Mother did not work, as she was going to college and caring for the four children. However, Mother agreed that a minimum wage income should be attributed to her for purposes of the child support computation. That attribution of income to Mother did not change Father's presumptive support level of $1,350.00. Father contended that Mother should be able to earn a lot more than minimum wage and that the district court should take into account the fact that Mother's parents contributed to paying many, if not most, of her household expenses. Father also contended that the district court should consider that Father had remarried and that he and his new wife had a child together, and wife had two other children from previous relationships. Complicating matters for Father, his new wife had returned to Mexico because of a problem with her visa and he was having to send her as much as $800.00 a month for support (though she too lived with parents and/or relatives).
[¶ 6] Mother's appeal challenges the reasoning contained in the district court's decision letter, as well as the order denying her motion to modify child support. First, the district court reasoned that the alimony was really more in the nature of child support and, therefore, Mother was already receiving the equivalent of $1,350.00 in child support. The district court also concluded that the stipulation recited above meant Continuing, the district court found that Father was
[¶ 7] The district court also found grounds on which to deviate from the presumptive child support level established by the governing statute. Those grounds were: "That [Father] has found time outside of his eighty-hour work week to woo and wed a new wife and as a result has another wife and child to support;" and also
[¶ 8] The district court viewed its role, in deciding the issues presented to it, as being governed by rules of contract construction. We view agreements with respect to child support with favor; however, we have held that child support agreements are not contracts and contract law has no place in the consideration of child support agreements. The primary consideration regarding child support agreements is the best interests of the child, and we will not turn to contract law to abrogate this controlling consideration. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 213-14 (Wyo.1995). Moreover, a custodial parent may not bargain away a child support obligation. That obligation inures to the benefit of the child, not the custodial parent. Whitt v. State ex rel. Wright, 2001 WY 128, ¶ 19, 36 P.3d 617, ¶ 19 (Wyo.2001); Hurlbut v. Scarbrough, 957 P.2d 839, 842 (Wyo.1998); Bellamy v. Bellamy, 949 P.2d 875, 877 (Wyo.1997); also see Wright v. Wright, 5 P.3d 61, 62-64 (Wyo.2000); and Garver v. Garver, 981 P.2d 471, 474 (Wyo.1999).
[¶ 9] Our methodology in analyzing cases such as these has been well summarized by Justice Thomas:
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