Hatch v. Cole

• Decision Date: 17 January 1924
• Docket Number: 18150.
• Citation: 128 Wash. 107,222 P. 463
• Parties: HATCH et ux. v. COLE et ux.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

222 P. 463

128 Wash. 107

HATCH et ux. v. COLE et ux.

No. 18150.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 17, 1924

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Lindsley, Judge.

Controversy between J. W. Hatch and wife and Harvey L. Cole and wife submitted to arbitration under the statute. Award in favor of Cole and wife was confirmed by the superior court, and Hatch and wife appeal. Affirmed.

Goodsell & Farrington, of Spokane, for appellants.

Plummer Zent & Lovell and E. J. Farley, all of Spokane, for respondents.

MACKINTOSH J.

This matter arises under exceptions filed in the superior court to an award of arbitrators, where the court upon a hearing refused to set the award aside and entered judgment confirming it. The appellants had a claim against the respondent in the sum of $400, which was submitted to arbitration under the statute. The arbitrators filed an award in favor of the respondents in the sum of $368.65, which was, upon exceptions, set aside by the court, which resubmitted the controversy to the arbitrators who made a second award in favor of the respondents in the sum of $396.15, which is the award before us.

Various errors are presented for our consideration. The first is that the court was in error in denying the appellant's motion to set aside the first award and to take the controversy from the arbitrators, on the ground that the arbitration had been abandoned. The foundation for the argument of this assignment is that the parties had agreed that the arbitration might be abandoned in consideration that the appellants would not proceed with an action in court which they had begun upon their claim until such time as the respondents had an opportunity to prepare their defense to that action. We are unable to pass upon this assignment, for the reason that there is nothing before us by way of a statement of facts or bill of exceptions to show the proceedings before the trial court on the original award, and we therefore are unable to review that matter.

The second assignment is that the court, after setting aside the first award, erred in resubmitting the controversy to the arbitrators. What has been said in regard to the first assignment is also applicable here, and for that reason we are unable to determine the matters under this assignment.

The third assignment is that the court, upon the hearing of the exceptions to the second award, refused to make findings of fact or conclusions of law, although such findings and conclusions were requested by the appellants. Under section 422, Rem. Comp. Stats., it is provided that:

'* * * Judgment shall be entered as upon the verdict of a jury, and execution may issue thereon, and the same proceedings may be had upon said award, with like effect as though said award were a verdict in a civil action.'

The hearing upon exceptions to an award is not the ordinary civil action. It is a special statutory proceeding, and clearly does not contemplate that the courts should make findings of fact or conclusions of law, and therefore we find no error in the court's refusing to make such.

The next assignment is that the court erred in refusing to admit evidence to show that the arbitrators who filed the second award misbehaved themselves, committed errors of fact and of law, or were influenced by corrupt pressure in arriving at their decision. The statute of arbitration (section 424, Rem. Comp. Stats.) provides:

'The party against whom an award may be made may except in writing thereto for either of the following causes: 1. That the arbitrators or umpire misbehaved themselves in the case. 2. That they committed an error in fact or law. 3. That the award was procured by corruption or other undue means.'

Nothing appears in the record which would give rise to the claim that the award was procured by corruption or other undue means, under subdivision 3 above, and the face of the award shows no error in fact or law under subdivision 2 above. We have held that under this subdivision 2 the court will not review the case upon its merits, and that the errors of fact or law subject to review by the superior court under exceptions to the award are such errors of fact or law as appear upon the fact of the award. In School District v. Sage, 13 Wash. 352, 43 P. 341 (where the award was accompanied by a transcript of the testimony taken before the arbitrators), this court held that the testimony would not be considered and said:

'The argument of the learned counsel for appellant, as indicated by their brief, seems to proceed upon the theory that this court will try and determine the matters in controversy between these parties upon the evidence which was submitted to the arbitrators, and which has been transmitted to this court as part of the record herein. But such is not the theory of the law. The only power conferred by law upon the court below, respecting the questions presented by the exceptions was that which authorized it to refer the cause back to the arbitrators for amendment of their award in case it appeared that they had committed error in fact or in law, or if no such error appeared, to confirm the award as made. With the merits of the controversy the court had nothing whatever to do. It was not possessed of the case for the purpose of proceeding to its determination. * * * Neither is this court so possessed of it. * * * Having shown the extent and limit of the power of the court in the premises, under the statute, the question arises as to how it was to determine whether the errors complained of had been committed. Was it by an examination of all the evidence taken before the arbitrators, and upon which they based their award, or was the question to be determined from the award itself? The Legislature has provided that arbitrators shall have power to decide both the law and the fact that may be involved in the cause submitted to them, * * * and that is the common-law rule, upon a general submission, unless the arbitrators are restricted by the agreement to submit. * * * The Legislature has also provided, as we have seen, that awards may be set aside for error in fact or law, but inasmuch as there is no

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