Hatcher v. Chairman
| Decision Date | 28 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. W2010-01163-COA-R3-CV,W2010-01163-COA-R3-CV |
| Parties | JOHNNY HATCHER, JR. v. CHAIRMAN, SHELBY COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, MYRA STYLES, MEMBER, SHELBY COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, BILL GIANNINI, MEMBER, SHELBY COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, ROBERT D. MEYERS, MEMBER, SHELBY COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, BRIAN STEPHENS, MEMBER, SHELBY COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, SHEP WILBUN, JR., MEMBER, SHELBY COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, THE CITY OF MEMPHIS, A CORPORATION; AND A.C. WHARTON, JR. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County
CH-09-2152-3
Kenny W. Armstrong, Chancellor
This appeal involves an election contest. The appellant was an unsuccessful candidate for mayor in a municipal election. After the election, the appellant filed this lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and contesting the election. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed.
Johnny Hatcher, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, pro se.
Allan J. Wade and Brandy S. Parrish, Allan J. Wade, PLLC, Memphis, Tennessee, for Defendants/Appellees, Shelby County Election Commission and The City of Memphis.
Donald A. Donati, William B. Ryan and Bryce W. Ashby, Donati Law Firm, LLP, Memphis, Tennessee, for Defendant/Appellee A. C. Wharton, Jr., in his individual capacity.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1Upon the resignation of the then-Mayor of the City of Memphis, Tennessee, Dr. W. W. "Willie" Herenton, a special election to fill the vacancy was scheduled for October 15, 2009. Among the candidates for the position was Plaintiff/Appellant Johnny Hatcher, Jr. ("Hatcher"). Twenty-five candidates were placed on the ballot. The winner of the special election, The Honorable A.C. Wharton, Jr. ("Mayor Wharton") received 65,491 votes. Hatcher received thirty-three votes.
Shortly after the election, on October 22, 2009, Hatcher filed the instant lawsuit against the Shelby County Election Commission ("Election Commission"), Mayor Wharton, and the City of Memphis ("City"). He amended his petition a few days later.
The amended petition sought declaratory and injunctive relief, to have the election voided, $355,000 in compensatory damages and $52 million in punitive damages. Although the petition was not filed as a class action, it asked the trial court to divide the punitive damages award amongst the registered voters of the City.
In his amended petition, Hatcher asserted that Mayor Wharton and several other mayoral candidates were not qualified because of an alleged interest in City contracts. He claimed that Mayor Wharton and other mayoral candidates were ineligible because they held public office when they filed their nominating petitions and pending the election, citing a Memphis City Charter provision. Hatcher requested injunctive relief prohibiting the Election Commission from certifying the results of the mayoral election or certifying the eligibility of the candidates whom Hatcher believed were ineligible. He contested the election and sought to enjoin Mayor Wharton from taking office, citing Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 2-7-112 and 113.Meanwhile, the Election Commission certified the results of the City of Memphis mayoral election. Mayor Wharton resigned from his position as Mayor of Shelby County shortly before being sworn in as Mayor of Memphis on October 26, 2009.
Subsequently, Hatcher filed a motion for summary judgment. Hatcher claimed that Mayor Wharton occupied an elected position at the time he filed his nominating petition to run for mayor, and as such, Hatcher asserted, "A.C. Wharton, Jr. was an unqualified, ineligible, illegal and invalid candidate for the Memphis Mayoral Special Election to seek or hold or be elected to the office of Memphis City Mayor, and he should not have been included on the ballot...."2 In support, Hatcher cited Section 17 of the Memphis City Charter, which he said rendered ineligible as a candidate any person who "at the time of his election and qualification, holds any other office...."
In response, the Election Commission and the City filed an answer denying that Mayor Wharton did not meet the qualifications required to run for the mayoral position, and asserting that the Memphis City Charter provisions and some of the statutes Hatcher relied upon were superseded or repealed by Memphis Home Rule Ordinance No. 1852, enacted in 1966. The answer also averred that Hatcher miscited statutes concerning election contests and denied that Hatcher was entitled to any type of relief. As affirmative defenses, the answer asserted that Hatcher's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that the request for injunctive relief had been rendered moot because the election results had been certified and Mayor Wharton had been sworn in as the Mayor of the City of Memphis.
Later, the Election Commission and the City filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and/or for trial on the merits on the grounds that Mayor Wharton was legally qualified and eligible to run for Mayor of the City of Memphis during the October 2009 special election. The motion argued that Hatcher's requests for injunctive and declaratory judgment were moot as a matter of law.3
Mayor Wharton filed a verified answer, a response to Hatcher's summary judgment motion, and his own summary judgment motion, adopting the factual statements and legal arguments made by the Election Commission and the City.4 In his verified answer, Mayor Wharton stated that he was elected as mayor of the City of Memphis with 65,491 votes, or approximately 59.9% of the total votes cast, that at approximately 10:30 a.m. on October 26, 2009 he resigned as Mayor of Shelby County, and at noon on the same day, he was inaugurated as Mayor of the City of Memphis.5 Mayor Wharton denied that Hatcher was entitled to any of the relief Hatcher requested.
The trial court held a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment on December 11, 2099. On December 15, 2009 the trial court issued a final order denying Hatcher's motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to the Election Commission and the City. The trial court cited the undisputed verified statements in Mayor Wharton's answer that he received the highest number of votes in the mayoral election, and that he resigned as Mayor of Shelby County before taking the oath of office as Mayor of the City of Memphis. Finding no disputed issues of material fact, the trial court held that "the determinative legal issue is controlled by dicta in Court of Appeals decision in Hatcher v. Election Commission, 2009 WL 1507684 at *4, which under controlling Supreme Court precedent this Court is obliged to follow." Based on this case, the trial court denied Hatcher's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Election Commission and the City. For the same reasons, the trial court subsequently granted Mayor Wharton's motion for summary judgment. Hatcher now appeals.
On appeal, Hatcher asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Election Commission, the City, and Mayor Wharton and in dismissing his petition. Hatcher also claims on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to determine Mayor Wharton's eligibility to run for the position of Mayor of the City of Memphis under the Memphis City Charter.
"Our review of a trial court's award of summary judgment is de novo with no presumption of correctness, the trial court's decisions being purely a question of law." Wylie Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Johnson, 179 S.W.3d 509, 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Co. v. Johnson, 100 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tenn. 2003)). Summary judgmentmay be granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.04; Estate of French v. Stratford House, __ S.W. 3d __, No. E2008-00539-SC-R11-CV, 2011 WL 238819 at *4 (Tenn. Jan. 26, 201 1). The party seeking summary judgment must show that there are no disputed material facts and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the summary judgment motion is properly supported, then the burden of production to establish a genuine issue of material fact shifts to the non-moving party. Id. "[A] moving party who seeks to shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof at trial must either: (1) affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party's claim; or (2) show that the non-moving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial." Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2008). At the summary judgment phase, neither the trial court nor the appellate court is to weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the trier of fact. Estate of French, 2011 WL 238819 at *4.
Competing motions for summary judgment must be evaluated separately. As to each motion, the court must determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to each motion, and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Trost, __ S.W.3d__, No. M2008-01679-SC-R11-CV, 2010 WL 5111414 at *7 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2010).
Hatcher first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Election Commission, Mayor Wharton, and the City, and erred in dismissing Hatcher's petition for declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and an election contest. He claims that the trial court erred in basing its decision on dicta in Hatcher v. Chairman, Shelby County Election Commission, et al.. No. W2008-01727-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 1507864, , rather than...
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