Hatcher v. Meredith

• Decision Date: 25 June 1943
• Citation: 173 S.W.2d 665,295 Ky. 194
• Parties: HATCHER, Secretary of State, et al. v. MEREDITH, Atty. Gen.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

173 S.W.2d 665

295 Ky. 194

HATCHER, Secretary of State, et al. v. MEREDITH, Atty. Gen.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

June 25, 1943

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing July 15, 1943.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Franklin County; W. B. Ardery, Judge.

Declaratory judgment action by Hubert Meredith, as Attorney General against George Glenn Hatcher, as Secretary of State, and others. From an adverse judgment, defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

G. L Tucker, of Williamstown, for appellants.

Hubert Meredith, of Frankfort, for appellee.

Before LAFON ALLEN, Special Chief Justice, and ROY SHELBOURNE, ALLEN P. CUBBAGE, B. J. BETHURUM, VICTOR BRADLEY, ROBERT H. WINN and I.B. ROSS, Special Associate Judges.

CUBBAGE Special Judge.

The General Assembly, at its regular 1942 session, passed an act which is Chapter 171 of the Acts of 1942, submitting to the electorate a proposed amendment to the Constitution of Kentucky, to repeal section 246 thereof and to substitute provisions which materially alter that section. On February 3, 1943, Honorable Hubert Meredith, as Attorney General, filed this action wherein said Act is assailed as being in conflict with several sections of the Constitution, and seeking a declaration of rights. The court was first called upon to determine whether the Act in question was constitutional, and, if the question of the constitutionality was determined adversely to the contentions of appellee (plaintiff below), then he prayed that the court adjudge whether the question to be submitted to the voters was to be stated on the ballot as set forth in the Act, or in the manner provided by Kentucky Revised Statutes, section 118.430, which directs that the Attorney General shall formulate the question to be stated on the ballot, in a manner calculated to inform the voters of the substance of the proposed amendment in order that they may understandingly decide whether they favor or oppose the suggested change.

A general demurrer was filed to the petition, and the trial court overruled the demurrer. Appellants (defendants below) stood upon their demurrer and declined to plead further. Thus the parties pitched the case upon the determination of the legal questions aforesaid, and apparently there is no issue as to facts. Judgment was entered declaring the said Act unconstitutional and void, and ordering appellants not to advertise the amendment or cause it to be placed upon the ballot for the vote of the people, and from said judgment appellants have prosecuted this appeal.

We are first confronted with the issue as to whether the Act which seeks to submit the proposed amendment is offensive to section 51 of the Constitution. The title to this act is as follows: "An Act to amend Section 246 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky relating to compensation for official services", and the position taken by appellee is that it is too limited in its scope and is not sufficiently broad to give notice of the full import of the provisions contained in the body of the Act. The right to propose a constitutional amendment has been granted to the Legislature by the framers of the Constitution, but the exercise of this right is not legislative in the ordinary sense, and indeed the Legislature is denied the privilege of amending the Constitution. That is a matter which can be determined only by the direct vote of the people as a whole. While the authority of the Legislature to suggest amendments to the Constitution is plenary, yet it differs widely from the function of the General Assembly to enact laws. The power to submit amendments to the vote of the electorate is special in its nature and may be exercised either by a bill, order, resolution or vote, as is provided by section 256 of the Constitution, and, so far as the title is concerned, the passage of the bill would have been just as valid without any title at all, and an order or resolution would have served the same purpose. So far as we are advised this particular question has not previously been before the court of last resort in this State, but the decided weight of outside authority supports the views which we have herein expressed. The cases of Cooney v. Foote, 142 Ga. 647, 83 S.E. 537, Ann.Cas. 1916B, 1001, and Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala. 386, 87 So. 375, are typical of the numerous decisions. Apart from this, our Kentucky Court of Appeals has consistently held that if the title to an act sets out the number of the section to be amended, it sufficiently accords with section 51 of the Constitution which requires the purposes of the act to be expressed in the title. Board of Penitentiary Commissioners v. Spencer, 159 Ky. 255, 166 S.W. 1017; Morrison v. Com., 197 Ky. 107, 246 S.W. 128; Guess v. Linton, 236 Ky. 87, 32 S.W.2d 718; Frost v. Johnston, 262 Ky. 592, 90 S.W.2d 1045; and Muffett v. Black, 263 Ky. 199, 92 S.W.2d 74.

The two outstanding changes which would result from the amendment of section 246 would be (1) to remove the present salary limitation as to public officials and permit the General Assembly to regulate the compensation of such officials and employees, and (2) to provide that such regulation shall affect the compensation of those in office, or elected to office, at the time of the adoption of the amendment, but thereafter the compensation of such officials shall not be increased or decreased during the terms for which they are elected or appointed. Sections 235 and 161 of the Constitution provide that the compensation of public officials shall not be changed during the terms for which they were elected or appointed. Complaint is made that two amendments are coupled together in one submission, and that they relate to different subjects in violation of sections 256 and 51 of the Constitution each of which sets forth a limitation that no amendment shall relate to more than one subject. If this contention is sound, the proposal would be in violation of the Constitution.

Thus our inquiry narrows to the question of whether the whole matter found in the amendment is so related to the general subject of the amendment as to have a natural connection with it, or is so foreign to it as to have no bearing upon the general subject matter and the object sought to be accomplished. Constitutional limitations such as the one now under consideration are intended to prevent the submission, as one amendment, of two or more propositions which are so widely separated in meaning and purpose as to have no logical interdependence. A single question on such a double proposal cannot be truthfully answered, "Yes" or "No", by a voter who favors one proposal, while opposing the other. He cannot vote at all without supporting what he desires to oppose or opposing what he desires to support. In this manner, the fate of one proposal might turn, not upon its own merits, but upon the popularity or unpopularity of the unrelated proposal with which it was linked. Such a proposal would relate to more than one subject and would violate section 256 of the Constitution. If, however, each provision of a proposed amendment is an integral part of a general plan, the amendment is not plural. It seems clear to us that there is but one subject contained in the proposed amendment of section 246 of the Constitution. The first proposition is that the General Assembly shall regulate the compensation of public officials and employees, and the second proposition is that such regulation of compensation shall apply to those in office, or who have been elected to office, at the time of the adoption of the amendment. There is no subject embraced in the proposal other than the regulation of the compensation of public officials and employees. The changes sought to be made are so logically and directly connected that none of them is independent, or foreign to the one subject of official compensation. A comparatively recent case before the Court of Appeals was that of Burke v. Department of Revenue, 293 Ky. 281, 168 S.W.2d 997, wherein an act was involved, the title of which was this: "An Act relating to revenue and taxation". In the body of the act the qualifications of tax commissioner were defined. It was contended that more than one subject was embraced, but it was held that the qualifications of a tax commissioner have a direct relationship to revenue and taxation, and that there was a single subject. In the case of City of Ravenna v. Boyer Fire Apparatus Co., 218 Ky. 429, 291 S.W. 782, 784, an attack was made upon the constitutionality of an act entitled: "An Act relating to cities of sixth class". There was a provision in it for the purchase of fire apparatus, and it was argued that this was not germane to the subject, but it was decided that only one subject was involved. See also Eastern Kentucky Coal Lands Corp. v. Commonwealth, 127 Ky. 667, 106 S.W. 260, 108 S.W. 1138.

Even though it may be said that the effect of the amendment will be to suspend, temporarily, sections 235 and 161 of the Constitution, this does not mean that more than one subject is embraced. The fact that an amendment impliedly repeals sections not mentioned therein does not thereby render it unconstitutional. Ex parte City of Paducah, 125 Ky. 510, 101 S.W. 898; Edrington v. Payne, 225 Ky. 86, 7 S.W.2d 827; Barnett v. Caldwell, 231 Ky. 514, 21 S.W.2d 838. A very pointed declaration upon this subject is found in Mitchell v. Knox County Fiscal Court, 165 Ky. 543 177 S.W. 279, 282, wherein it was held that an amendment to the Constitution impliedly modifies any existing section thereof with which it is in conflict. The court said: "Section 157a, being an amendment to the Constitution, necessarily annuls any and all former provisions of that instrument which conflict with it; and, since it permits the...