Hatcher v. Range

• Decision Date: 09 June 1904
• Citation: 81 S.W. 289
• Parties: HATCHER v. RANGE et ux.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

81 S.W. 289

HATCHER v. RANGE et ux.

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 9, 1904.

Certified Questions from Court of Civil Appeals of Second Supreme Judicial District.

Action by J. A. Range and wife against J. E. Hatcher. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. On certified questions.

W. T. Allen, for appellant. Denny & Taylor, for appellees.

BROWN, J.

This is a certified question from the Court of Civil Appeals of the Second Supreme Judicial District. The statement and questions are as follows:

"This suit was instituted in the district court of Clay county, Texas, by the appellees, J. A. Range and Maggie Range, for actual and exemplary damages caused by slanderous language uttered by appellant in reference to the said Maggie Range. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in appellees' favor for $1,500 actual and $4,000 exemplary damages, from which judgment an appeal has been duly prosecuted, and the cause is now regularly pending before us for disposition.

"Omitting unnecessary statements, the appellees' petition is as follows: `That heretofore, to wit, on or about the 5th day of May, 1903, and many times prior thereto and subsequent thereto up to the time of the filing of this suit, the defendant, J. E. Hatcher, in Clay county, Texas, falsely, fraudulently, and willfully uttered, published, and circulated slanderous statements injuriously affecting the chastity of the said Maggie Range, and publicly stated to one W. H. Bombarger and divers other good citizens in Clay county, Texas, that two married men have been and are now at it with the said Maggie Range, or can have all the fun they want with her, meaning thereby that the said two men had and were now having habitual carnal intercourse with the said Maggie Range, and had lived a life of lewdness with her, and are now so living, and that she, in conjunction with them, are now and had been guilty of adultery and fornication; and also on or about the same date falsely, fraudulently, and willfully stated to one J. N. Crain and divers other good citizens of Clay county, Texas, that the said Maggie Range was a bad girl, and is now a bad woman, and had always been bad, and that she was a damn whore and a damn bitch or damn slunk, meaning thereby that the said Maggie Range was unchaste and was not a virtuous woman, and had never been virtuous as a girl. And that the said J. E. Hatcher also about the same time stated to C. E. Latham that the said Maggie Range was a whore, and that the reason that the said J. A. Range would not rent him (Latham) his place for this year (1903) was because he was jealous of him, the said Latham, and his wife, the said Maggie Range, meaning thereby that there had been an illicit carnal intimacy existing between the said C. E. Latham and the said Maggie Range. That said accusations and charges were without foundation in fact, and were wholly false, and were at the time they were made by the defendant known to him to be so, and were willfully and wantonly made to injure the plaintiff. That the plaintiff Maggie Range is now a virtuous and chaste woman, and has always been so from infancy, and has always been so reputed and esteemed and regarded by her neighbors and friends, and by all who knew her. That the defendant, J. E. Hatcher, very much disliked the plaintiff, and, to vent his spleen against them, has sought to injure and besmirch the reputation and character of his wife, Maggie Range, and to inflict shame and disgrace on both them and their children. That the uttering, publication, and circulation of the said slanderous statements has greatly wounded the feelings of both plaintiffs, and has caused both of said plaintiffs great mortification, and a sense of shame and disgrace, and great mental worry and suffering. That the said charges of moral turpitude made by defendant against plaintiffs has caused them to lose their high social standing, and has greatly injured their fair name and reputation, in the community where they live and where they are known. That plaintiffs have a family of children born of their said marriage, consisting of two girls and three boys, and the fact that the said charges and slanderous statements have been made and circulated against the said Maggie Range, their mother, adds to the mortification and sense of shame that the plaintiffs feel, and fills their hearts with anguish and gloom, and injuriously affects the social standing of the entire family in the community where they live, and among the people where they are known, and fixes and places upon the said plaintiffs and their said children a stain that will rest upon them and will follow them to their graves. That, on account of the slanderous statements so made and circulated by the said defendant, plaintiffs have been actually injured and damaged in the sum of $5,000, and they claim as exemplary damages for the willful and wanton circulation of said false statements the sum of $10,000.' Appellant answered by special exception to the petition, by general denial, and plea in justification that the statements imputed to appellant were true in fact.

"The evidence we think sufficient to support all of the material allegations of appellees' petition as above set out, and to negative appellant's plea of justification; but, in submitting the case to the jury, the court, among other things, charged: `I charge you the law applicable to this case as follows: (1) If you find and believe from the testimony that the defendant, J. E. Hatcher, uttered and published the statements as alleged in plaintiffs' petition, or any one or more of said statements as alleged in plaintiffs' petition, imputing the want of chastity to Maggie Range, and you further find such statements untrue, and that they were false, and that plaintiff Maggie Range has been injured thereby and sustained damages, you will find for plaintiffs such actual damages as Maggie Range has sustained thereby. (2) If you find for plaintiffs under the foregoing instruction, and you further find that such statements as are alleged in plaintiffs' petition were uttered and published maliciously and with intent to injure said Maggie Range by defendant, then you may also find for plaintiffs exemplary damages.' It is thus made apparent, we think, that the court treated the...