Hatley, In re

• Decision Date: 31 January 1977
• Docket Number: No. 142,142
• Citation: 291 N.C. 693,231 S.E.2d 633
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: In re Mary Alberta HATLEY.

Page 633

231 S.E.2d 633

291 N.C. 693

In re Mary Alberta HATLEY.

No. 142.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Jan. 31, 1977.

Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten, by Isaac T. Avery III, Raleigh, for the State.

Jerry P. Davenport, Hillsborough, for respondent appellant.

BRANCH, Justice.

We initially consider the State's contention that this appeal is moot in light of the fact that the 90-day commitment order under which respondent was institutionalized has expired.

When events occur during the pendency of an appeal which cause the underlying controversy to cease to exist, this Court properly refuses to entertain the cause merely to adjudicate abstract propositions of law. Parent-Teacher Assoc. v. Bd. of Education, 275 N.C. 675, 170 S.E.2d 473. However, even when the terms of the judgment below have been fully carried out, if collateral legal consequences of an adverse nature can reasonably be expected to result therefrom, then the issue is not moot and the appeal has continued legal significance. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917.

The question of whether an appeal from an involuntary commitment order is rendered moot by the discharge of the patient was considered in the case of In re Ballay, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 482 F.2d 648. There the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated:

There is yet another independent reason why the present appeal is not moot--the collateral consequences of being adjudged mentally ill remain to plague appellant. We recently had occasion to consider whether the standard applied in criminal cases, that a 'case is moot only if it is shown that there is No possibility that any collateral legal consequence will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction,' Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1900, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (emphasis added), is applicable to contested civil commitment adjudications. We answered in the affirmative relying upon the multitude of legal disabilities radiating from the label 'mentally incompetent.' . . . Indeed, such an adjudication, while not always crippling, is certainly always an ominous presence in any interaction between the individual and the legal system. Such evidence will frequently be revived to attack the capacity of a trial witness. Depending upon the diagnosis, it may be admissible for impeachment purposes. Indeed, even in a criminal trial it may be available to attack the character of a defendant if he has put character in issue. Most significantly, records of commitments to a mental institution will certainly be used in any subsequent proceedings for civil commitment, a factor which may well have been influential in the present case.

Accord: In re Sciara, 21 Ill.App.3d 889, 316 N.E.2d 153.

As previously noted, Judge Paschal based his commitment order, in part at least, upon a finding that respondent had a history of prior commitments. The possibility that respondent's commitment in this case might likewise form the basis for a future commitment, along with other obvious collateral legal consequences, convinces us that this appeal is not moot. We, therefore, proceed to consider this case on its merits.

The General Assembly declared its policy as to involuntary commitment of the mentally deranged in the following language: 'It is the policy of the State that no person shall be committed to a mental health facility unless he is mentally ill or an inebriate and imminently dangerous to himself or others; . . ..' G.S. 122--58.1.

G.S. 122--58.7(i), in part, provides: 'To support a commitment order, the court is required to find, by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate, and imminently dangerous to himself or others. The court shall record the facts which support its findings.' Our legislative statement of public policy and the statutory requirements found in Article 5A of Ch. 122 of the North Carolina General Statutes are consistent with the recent case of O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396, which, Inter alia, holds that there is no constitutional basis for the involuntary confinement of an individual who is mentally ill if he is dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom. See also People v. Sansone, 18 Ill.App.3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733.

The only witness to appear at the commitment hearing in District Court was Mrs. Etta Couch, the mother and neighbor of respondent. Mrs. Couch testified that respondent had been confined to mental institutions in 1972, 1973 and 1974 because of 'nervous breakdowns.' She testified that Mrs. Hatley went into the house of a neighbor, Mrs. McPherson, while Mrs. McPherson was not there. On cross-examination the witness stated that she did not 'know firsthand whether Mrs. McPherson was actually in the house or not.' The evidence shows nothing inconsistent with a neighborly visit except that someone called a deputy sheriff who found respondent in the neighbor's home. The witness also stated that she signed an affidavit that respondent threatened a relative with a brick, but that she did not see the incident and 'had no firsthand knowledge' of this incident. She testified that there were times when, in her opinion, Mrs. Hatley should not be driving because 'when she was backing up, she wouldn't look over her shoulder like she should or make the proper sign. She would also back up too fast.' However, Mrs. Couch qualified this statement with the following language:

No, she did not almost have an accident at any time that I can recall. No, she does not drink and drive. No, when I was in the car with her the car never left the road. No, I never saw her run through a stop sign or violate a stoplight. No, she never came close to injuring a pedestrian. Yes, she seldom drives. She has driven more lately than she did in prior years. I think she could have an accident however, but for the past month she hasn't been driving too much.

The court accepted into evidence the medical report of Dr. Tom Wilson which was as follows Next of kin or other responsible person:

Parne Hatley

Rt. 6 Box 472

Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514

On 7--25--75, at 3:30 a.m. o'clock, I examined the above-named person in AT NCMH EMERGENCY ROOM, with the following findings:

Indications for Mental Illness or Inebriacy:

Erratic behavior that has included: (1) threatening a relative yesterday with a brickbat without provication (sic), (2) reportedly careless and reckless driving of her motor vehicle, (3) receiving money from church for 'food for poor persons' wh...