Haugland v. North Dakota Employment Sec. Bureau

• Decision Date: 30 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 8942,8942
• Citation: 218 N.W.2d 181
• Parties: Erling G. HAUGLAND, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY BUREAU et al., Appellees. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 181

218 N.W.2d 181

Erling G. HAUGLAND, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY BUREAU et al., Appellees.

Civ. No. 8942.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

April 30, 1974.

Rehearing Denied June 4, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In appeals from decisions of administrative agencies, the district court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless it shall find, among other things, that the conclusions and decision of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact. Section 28--32--19, N.D.C.C.

2. The judgment of the district court in an appeal from a decision of an administrative agency may be reviewed in the supreme court on appeal in the same manner as any case tried to the court without a jury may be reviewed. Section 28--32--21, N.D.C.C.

3. In light of our review of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision of the Merit System Council, we find that its conclusions of law are supported by its findings of fact.

Wheeler, Wolf, Wefald & Durick, Bismarck, for plaintiff/appellant.

Lawrence E. Watson, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for appellees.

KNUDSON, Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court of Burleigh County affirming the decision of the North Dakota Merit System Council (hereinafter Council) denying the petition of Erling Haugland (hereinafter Haugland) that he be reclassified as an Information Specialist II and that he receive the pay of that classification retroactively from the beginning of his employment with the North Dakota Employment Security Bureau (hereinafter Bureau).

In December of 1970 Haugland applied to the Council for the position of Interviewer II with the Bureau. He passed the merit system examination therefor and was placed on the Council's 'register of eligibles' for the position of Interviewer II. In January of 1971 the Bureau requested the Council to provide it with a 'list of eligibles' for the position of Interviewer II, having a special qualification of a major in journalism, preferably with newspaper experience.

On January 7, 1971, the Merit System Director certified Haugland as eligible for the position of Interviewer II with a specific major, and on January 14, 1971, Haugland began his employment with the Bureau on a probationary status. On October 5, 1971, after his status had become permanent on July 14, 1971, Haugland requested that he be reclassified and paid as an Information Specialist II, claiming he had been performing the duties of that position.

On October 13, 1971, Haugland appealed to the Council from the denial by the Bureau of his request for reclassification, and on November 22, 1971, after hearing, the Council issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision denying his petition for reclassification.

Haugland appealed that decision to the district court of Burleigh County. That court granted judgment on January 17, 1973, affirming the decision of the Council. It is from this judgment that Haugland appeals to this court.

Although the question whether the findings of fact are supported by the evidence is not before us, nevertheless a resume of the facts is appropriate for a clear understanding of the situation in this case.

Haugland says that although he was hired under the classification of Interviewer II he was assigned duties in the Information Section of the Bureau; that his duties in the Information Section were different from those of an Interviewer II, and called for a higher scale of pay; that under the merit system, job descriptions were developed so that positions having similar duties could be classified at the same level to the end that all merit system employees receive 'equal pay for substantially equal work'; that applying the rule of 'equal pay for substantially equal work' Haugland should have been paid according to the classification of Information Specialist II instead of Interviewer II.

He says that after his request to the Bureau to be reclassified as an Information Specialist II and paid according to that classification, the Bureau assigned duties to him under the classification of Interviewer II, the classification for which he was hired. Thereupon Haugland resigned.

Haugland cites Burton v. United States, 186 Ct.Cl. 172, 404 F.2d 365 (1968), in support of his contention that he is entitled to the pay for duties assigned differing from the duties of his job classification. However, we are of the opinion that Burton does not support him, but rather does support the action of the Bureau in reassigning duties to him of the job classification for which he was hired. In Burton the court said that when management discovers a discrepancy between the description and the job, it must eliminate the discrepancy, but it can do this by changing, at its election, either the description or the job duties. Here, in the instant case, the Bureau did eliminate the discrepancy by changing the duties to conform to the job classification.

It was held by the Michigan Supreme Court that job classification is determinative of the rate of pay, regardless of the duties assigned, in Farrell v. State, 317 Mich. 676, 27 N.W.2d 135 (1947). There the Court said, 'Under civil service the employe's classification is a part of his contract of employment; and if, as in the instant case, his classification so specifies, his rate of pay is controlled thereby.'

However, whatever may have been the difference between the job classification and the duties assigned to Haugland, that difference is not determinative of this appeal, as Haugland in his appeal to the district court did not raise the question whether the findings of the Council were supported by the evidence, and on the appeals to the district court and the supreme court Haugland asserted only that the conclusions reached by...