Hauk v. State

• Decision Date: 08 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 49S00-9805-CR-262.,49S00-9805-CR-262.
• Parties: Leslie HAUK, Appellant (Defendant below) v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

729 N.E.2d 994

Leslie HAUK, Appellant (Defendant below) v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 49S00-9805-CR-262.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 8, 2000.

Katherine A. Cornelius, Marion County Public Defenders Office, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Jeffery A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Janet Brown Mallett, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee. SULLIVAN, Justice.

Defendant Leslie Hauk was convicted of and sentenced for Murder and Robbery. She appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court improperly refused her requests to instruct the jury on the crimes of Theft and Assisting a Criminal, and (2) the trial court improperly excluded evidence of a co-defendant's bad character. Finding the trial court's actions proper, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal because the longest single sentence exceeds 50 years. Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4; Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(7).

Background

The facts most favorable to the verdict indicate that on March 5, 1995, Defendant Leslie Hauk and her live-in companion, Daniel Sturgeon, brutally beat James Coffman with a crow bar and stabbed him numerous times with a kitchen knife. Defendant and Sturgeon stole as much as $1,500 from Coffman both after he died and during the course of time they spent drinking with and beating Coffman prior to killing him. After Coffman was dead, Sturgeon gave Defendant $389 and told her to get rid of the knife. Defendant left the crime scene, crashed her car soon thereafter, and was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Prior to suspecting her connection to Coffman's murder, the police found the kitchen knife in Defendant's car and credited her commissary account with the $389.

Gregory Anderson, a friend of Sturgeon's, testified that on March 6, 1995, he helped Sturgeon carry Coffman's body out of the house and they placed it in the trunk of Coffman's car. Two days later, Coffman's son located Coffman's car and called for a police officer; the two of them opened the trunk and discovered Coffman's body.

On March 13, 1995, the State charged Defendant with Murder,¹ Felony Murder,² and Robbery,³ a class B felony. A jury found Defendant guilty of all three charges, but the trial court merged the Murder and Felony Murder convictions, sentencing Defendant to 55 years for Murder and 20 years for Robbery, the sentences to be served concurrently. Sturgeon was also tried, convicted, and sentenced for his part in this matter. See Sturgeon v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1173 (Ind. 1999).

Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion

I

Defendant's principal claim, as best we understand it, is that because of a series of rulings by the trial court rejecting her requests for certain jury instructions, she was denied the opportunity to be convicted of crimes she acknowledged she committed and was convicted of crimes she did not commit. It was her defense that she bore no culpability for either the murder or robbery of Coffman — that Sturgeon was solely responsible for those crimes. But she admits that after Sturgeon had completed the commission of those crimes, she accepted the $389 and attempted to hide the knife. As such, she contends that she should have been convicted of Theft⁴ and of Assisting a Criminal,⁵ but not of Murder and Robbery.

In furtherance of this defense, Defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury on Theft and Assisting a Criminal as lesser-included offenses of Robbery and Murder, respectively. The trial court denied the request. Defendant contends in this appeal that the trial court's denial constituted reversible error in that she was entitled to the instructions as a matter of substantive law and, more broadly, the refusal to give the instructions effectively denied her a fair trial and the opportunity to present her defense.

Before proceeding to the merits of these claims, we note that Sturgeon made essentially the same argument in his appeal from his convictions for the same offenses. That is, he claimed that he bore no culpability for either the murder or robbery of Coffman — that Defendant was solely responsible for those crimes and that he was only guilty of assisting her after the crimes had been completed. See Sturgeon, 719 N.E.2d at 1182-84.

A

Defendant's argument suggests that she believes there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that she was guilty of Murder and Robbery. Given the structure of her argument, it is helpful to address that question first.

Defendant was convicted of Murder and Robbery under an accomplice liability theory. At a minimum, as evidenced by Defendant's own admissions and testimony, Defendant stole money from Coffman, observed his brutal murder, and fled the crime scene to dispose of one of the murder weapons. Indiana Code § 35-41-2-4 (1993) allows a defendant to be convicted of a crime based on accomplice liability, providing that one "who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense." Also, "[a]n accomplice can be held criminally liable for `everything done by his confederates which was a probable and natural consequence of their common plan.'" Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391, 396 (Ind.1999) (quoting Harris v. State, 425 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Ind.1981)). A jury may infer complicity and participation in a crime "`from defendant's failure to oppose the crime, companionship with the one engaged therein, and a course of conduct before, during, and after the offense which tends to show complicity.'" Id. "An accomplice is equally as culpable as the one who commits the actual crime." Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 687 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ind.1997)). If the jury believed nothing but Defendant's own testimony, the evidence was sufficient to support her convictions.

B

As to Defendant's claim that the trial court should have instructed the jury on Theft as a lesser-included offense of Robbery, we agree with the trial court.

When a defendant requests a lesser-included offense instruction, the trial court must apply a three-part analysis: (1) determine whether the lesser-included offense is inherently included in the crime charged; if not, (2) determine whether the lesser-included offense is factually included in the crime charged; and, if either, (3) determine whether a serious evidentiary dispute exists whereby the jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater. See Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566-67 (Ind.1995). The trial court should grant the defendant's request for a lesser-included offense instruction if it answers the third inquiry affirmatively. See id. at 567.

To determine whether a lesser-included offense is inherently included in a charged crime, the trial court compares the relevant statutes. See id. at 566. The requested lesser-included offense is inherently included in the charged crime if (a) the parties could establish commission of the claimed lesser-included offense by proof of the same material elements or less than all of the material elements of the charged crime, or (b) the only feature distinguishing the claimed lesser-included offense from the charged crime is that a lesser culpability is required to establish commission of the lesser-included offense. Id. at 566-67 (citations omitted).

The State agrees that theft is a lesser-included offense of robbery. Appellee's Br. at 3; see also Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 777 (Ind.1997) (citing Landers v. State, 464 N.E.2d 912 (Ind.1984)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073, 119 S.Ct. 807, 142 L.Ed.2d 667 (1999). Theft requires the knowing or intentional exertion of unauthorized control over the property of another person with the intent to deprive the other person of any part of the property's value or use. Ind.Code § 35-43-4-2. Robbery requires the same elements, as well as the use of threat or force. Id. § 35-42-5-1. The State charged Defendant with robbery, but could have established that Defendant committed theft by proving the elements of robbery, less the use of force. Therefore, theft is inherently included in a robbery charge. Because theft is inherently included in a robbery charge, we must determine whether a serious evidentiary dispute existed concerning the element distinguishing the two crimes — use of force — whereby the jury could have concluded that Defendant committed theft but not robbery. See Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. Defendant asserts that evidence was in dispute regarding whether she facilitated Sturgeon's robbery of Coffman or whether she merely accepted money that Sturgeon stole from Coffman.

Despite Defendant's claim, there was no dispute but that Coffman was the victim of force, in the form of a brutal and bloody attack, used to procure his money. Defendant admittedly witnessed Sturgeon bludgeoning and stabbing Coffman before taking his money. Whether Defendant facilitated or participated in the attack goes to the question of whether she is guilty as an accessory to the crime charged. See Simpson v. State, 628 N.E.2d 1215, 1221 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (holding that a defendant is not entitled to an instruction on theft as a lesser-included offense to robbery where the defense challenged the State's allegations that the defendant participated in the robbery, the only question before the jury was the defendant's participation in the crime, and there was no question that all of the elements of robbery were present), transfer denied. Defendant's defense that she personally did not engage in the use of force to take money off of Coffman's person does not create an evidentiary dispute regarding whether force was used in the commission of this crime, and so does not entitle Defendant to an instruction on theft as a lesser-included offense to her robbery charge. See Allen, 686 N.E.2d at 777 (holding that a defendant is not entitled to a theft instruction as a lesser-included offense of a...