Hausrath v. New York Central Railroad Company, 18156.
Decision Date | 10 September 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 18156.,18156. |
Citation | 401 F.2d 634 |
Parties | August John HAUSRATH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Samuel T. Gaines, Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant; Harold H. Sayre, Metzenbaum, Gaines, Krupansky, Finley & Stern, Cleveland, Ohio, on brief.
John F. Dolan, Cleveland, Ohio, for appellee; Thomas R. Skulina, Cleveland, Ohio, on brief.
Before PHILLIPS, EDWARDS and McCREE, Circuit Judges.
Appellant appeals from an adverse jury verdict in his suit against his employer, The New York Central Railroad Company, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).1 Appellant's claim was that he suffered a heart attack on November 7, 1963, while working on the air compressor inside a diesel locomotive compartment because of the negligence of appellee in failing to provide a reasonably safe place to work. The negligence alleged was that the diesel engine had not been shut down and allowed to cool before appellant was assigned to work on it.
Appellant's principal witness testified that the engine must have been running ten to twelve hours and that the heat in the engine compartment was 130 degrees or more. Appellee's evidence was designed to impeach this witness and tended to show that the engine in question had been running for only a short time on the date in question and that the temperature in the engine compartment could not have been that hot.
The District Judge, after hearing this and other disputed testimony, properly decided that the evidence presented questions for the jury. In submitting the case to the jury, however, he stated the law erroneously in relation to an important aspect of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We reverse for new trial.
The FELA provides in part that: "Every common carrier * * * shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier * * * for such injury * * resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment."2
The District Judge's charge to the jury appropriately employed the critical portion of the statute quoted above:
The District Judge then interpreted the statute as follows:
Subsequently in the charge he employed the phrase "the proximate cause" or "the direct cause" or "the real cause" 15 times in similar context.
Even in an ordinary negligence action, where the standards are set by the common law, such an instruction would generally be regarded as reversible error. There may, of course, be more than one proximate cause. If the negligence of a defendant in such a proceeding is a proximate cause, this is sufficient ground for recovery (assuming, of course, the presence of all other essential factors). Barringer v. Arnold, 358 Mich. 594, 101 N.W.2d 365 (1960); Restatement (Second), Torts § 431 (1966); W. Prosser, Torts § 41 (3d ed. 1964); 2 F. Harper & F. James, Jr., The Law of Torts § 20.2 (1956).
The proceeding currently under review, however, is brought under a federal statute wherein Congress deliberately adopted a negligence standard different from that of the common law. The phrase "resulting in whole or in part" was obviously designed to make even more explicit that negligence of an employer did not have to be the sole cause or "the proximate cause" of the injury in order to justify recovery.
The United States Supreme Court has given us specific interpretations of the FELA language which we have quoted. These interpretations are binding upon the district courts and upon us:
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...cause and did not suggest that a FELA plaintiff must show "substantial cause" in order to prevail. 54 Hausrath v. New York Central Railroad Co., 401 F.2d 634, 636-38 (6th Cir.1968). The Hausrath court found reversible error under both common law and FELA negligence concepts in instructions ......
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...theory that there can only be one cause of death sufficient for imposing liability flouts our precedent. See Hausrath v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. , 401 F.2d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 1968) ("There may, of course, be more than one proximate cause."). Still, Pritchard argues that Sparks's "heart attack c......
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Green v. River Terminal Ry. Co.
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