Hawkins Sandblasting, Inc. v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.
Decision Date | 15 February 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 94-3108,94-3108 |
Citation | 668 So.2d 1042 |
Parties | , 21 Fla. L. Weekly D401 HAWKINS SANDBLASTING, INC., Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. JACKSONVILLE SHIPYARDS, INC., Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Jack Schemer, Judge.
Dennis J. Wall of Dennis J. Wall, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Courtney Wilder Stanton, Jacksonville; Dudley D. Allen of Wilbur & Allen, Jacksonville, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Hawkins Sandblasting, Inc. (Hawkins) seeks reversal of the judgment requiring it to indemnify Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. (JSI) for money JSI paid as a result of an injury one Billy W. Parrish apparently suffered. The corrected final order awards "defense costs including legal fees of $78,000.00 and defense costs of $14,760.21, and $35,000 in reimbursement for the settlement made with Billy W. Parrish." Hawkins also contends, assuming liability arguendo, that the amount of attorneys' fees which it was ordered to reimburse was excessive, and that no award of prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees was authorized. On cross-appeal, JSI argues that the trial court erred in ruling (on motion for summary judgment) that the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Act immunizes Hawkins against noncontractual liability arising out of Mr. Parrish's claimed injury, and that the amount of attorneys' fees indemnified was too low. We affirm the judgment, rendering the cross-appeal moot, except as to the amount of attorneys' fees.
When the steamship American Kestrel put in for repairs at JSI's shipyard, JSI subcontracted with Hawkins to perform certain work on the vessel. At the time of the alleged injury, Mr. Parrish was standing on a dock at the shipyard, as part of the team assembled to paint the American Kestrel. He was under Hawkins' supervision, but as an employee of Consolidated Industrial Skills Corporation (CISCO), with whom Hawkins had contracted for labor. As his employer, CISCO had obtained insurance to secure any benefits to which Mr. Parrish might become entitled under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1988).
Because "maintaining a vessel at a marina on a navigable waterway is substantially related to traditional maritime activity," Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 2898, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990), a contract to paint the superstructure of a ship already launched "relates to ships and vessels, masters and mariners, as the agents of commerce," Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 736, 81 S.Ct. 886, 890, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961), in a way that brings disputes arising under the contract within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. See, e.g., Sirius Ins. Co. (UK) Ltd. v. Collins, 16 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.1994) ( ); Smith v. United States, 980 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir.1993) ( ). By virtue of the saving to suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (1949), however, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over most maritime claims.
The circuit court had jurisdiction to decide the contractual indemnity claim at issue here.
However, maritime law, not state law, is applicable even though the action is brought in a state court. Wilburn Boat Company v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 348 U.S. 310, 75 S.Ct. 368, 99 L.Ed. 337 (1955); Still v. Dixon, 337 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976).
Peninsular Fire Ins. Co. v. Wells, 438 So.2d 46, 48 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA), review dismissed, 443 So.2d 980 (Fla.1983); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917).
Aside from its inability to provide a remedy in rem for a maritime cause of action, th Court has said that a state, "having concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit" so long as it does not attempt to make changes in the "substantive maritime law." Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co. 264 U.S. 109, 124, 44 S.Ct. 274, 277, 68 L.Ed. 582.
Stated another way, the "saving to suitors" clause allows state courts to entertain in personam maritime causes of action, but in such cases the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called "reverse-Erie" doctrine which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the states conform to governing federal maritime standards. (Citations omitted).
Hughes v. Unitech Aircraft, Inc., 662 So.2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-223, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986)). The circuit court also had jurisdiction to decide the tort claims, which grew out of events that took place on land or an "extension of land." See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971); Gaspard v. Amerada Hess Corp., 13 F.3d 165 (5th Cir.1994).
The work Hawkins undertook entailed use of a high pressure industrial pressure washer or "water blaster" in preparation for painting. When water under pressure dislodged an improperly connected hose, Mr. Parrish was injured, or so he alleged in a complaint he filed against JSI in circuit court. His complaint asserted that JSI negligently assembled, inspected, and maintained the industrial pressure washer. On the third day of a jury trial, before he rested his case, he settled with JSI for $35,000, and the jury was discharged. JSI admitted neither negligence nor injury when it settled with Mr. Parrish.
Later the trial "resumed" before the judge, on the issues remaining between JSI and Hawkins, whom JSI had brought in as a third-party defendant before the trial began. As an affirmative defense to JSI's crossclaim, Hawkins alleged "active negligence" on JSI's part. But JSI admitted, and the trial court found, no negligence of any kind. The record contains no evidence that JSI--as opposed to Hawkins--attached the hose that came off, or otherwise contributed in any way to any injury Mr. Parrish may have suffered.
Some two years after the trial began, the trial court entered a corrected final order requiring Hawkins to indemnify JSI for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in resisting the Parrish claim, for the amount paid to settle the claim, and for prejudgment interest--on fees, costs, and settlement amount alike. The trial court found liability on the basis solely of a purchase order fixing the terms of the contract between JSI and Hawkins. See, e.g., West v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 765 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.1985). While expressly not finding JSI negligent, the trial court concluded that negligence on JSI's part, if any, would not defeat JSI's entitlement to full indemnification. After Hawkins appealed, we relinquished jurisdiction for determination of the amount of prejudgment interest, which the trial court set out in an amended final order and judgment.
Among the terms and conditions of the purchase order which embodied the contract between JSI and Hawkins--as to which the trial court found Hawkins "was on full notice"--were the following:
Workmen's Compensation, including the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, Employers Liability, Comprehensive General Liability and Automobile liability coverages with limits of Liability for bodily injury of not less than $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence and property damage liability of not less than $100,000 per occurrence.
Hawkins contends that nothing in its agreement with JSI protects JSI from the consequences of JSI's own negligence. But it is clear these provisions require indemnification if JSI in no way contributed to an injury that Hawkins caused.
The record does not support Hawkins' essential factual premise--that negligence by JSI contributed to an injury Mr. Parrish sustained. We...
To continue reading
Request your trial