Hawkins v. City of Lawrenceburg, 2002-CA-001706-MR.
| Decision Date | 12 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2002-CA-001706-MR.,2002-CA-001706-MR. |
| Parties | JIMMIE LEE HAWKINS, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF LAWRENCEBURG, KENTUCKY AND GARY CHILTON, MAYOR, APPELLEES. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Mark A. Bubenzer, Frankfort, Kentucky, Brief for Appellant.
Dave Whalin, Louisville, Kentucky, Brief for Appellees.
BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
AFFIRMING
Jimmie Lee Hawkins (Hawkins) appeals from an order of the Anderson Circuit Court affirming a police disciplinary decision of the City Council of the City of Lawrenceburg. The disciplinary decision, among other things, determined that Hawkins was guilty of incompetency, inefficiency, and the accumulation of minor infractions, and demoted Hawkins from Chief of Police of the Lawrenceburg Police Department to the rank of Patrolman 2. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
On August 19, 1982, Hawkins was hired by the City of Lawrenceburg as a police officer. In January 1999, appellee Gary Chilton took office as the Mayor of Lawrenceburg. On April 12, 1999, Chilton appointed Hawkins Chief of Police of the Lawrenceburg Police Department. During the following months, various incidents involving Hawkins occurred and were reported to Mayor Chilton. Among these were allegations that Hawkins verbally abused and berated police officers; used inappropriate language when disciplining police officers; disciplined police officers in front of others; created a hostile work environment; and threatened to commit suicide.
On August 23, 2000, Mayor Chilton sent Chief Hawkins a letter placing him on administrative leave with pay pending a psychological evaluation. On August 31, 2000, Hawkins underwent an evaluation by Dr. Dan Langer. On September 8, 2000, Dr. Langer issued a report concluding, among other things, that "[b]ased upon the evaluation, Mr. Hawkins appears psychologically fit for duty in the field of law enforcement."
During this period Mayor Chilton continued to investigate conditions at the Police Department by visiting police headquarters and talking to various police officers. As a result of his inquiries, Mayor Chilton concluded that Hawkins should not remain in his position as Chief, and on September 20, 2000, Chilton presented Hawkins with an offer to take a demotion to the rank of Sergeant "performing such police and public safety duties as the Mayor may direct, including but not limited to enforcement of the existing codes of the City." By letter dated September 21, 2000, Hawkins rejected the offer, asserted that he was entitled to the protections contained in KRS1 15.520,2 and threatened legal action against the City.
Following Hawkins' rejection of his offer, on September 22, 2000, Chilton issued a letter to Hawkins placing him on suspension. The letter charged Hawkins with incompetency, inefficiency, and the accumulation of minor infractions. The letter also scheduled a hearing on the charges.
The same day, September 22, 2000, Hawkins filed a "Verified Complaint with Jury Demand" in Anderson Circuit Court.3 Named as defendants were Mayor Chilton and the City of Lawrenceburg. The complaint alleged, among other things wrongful discharge and extreme and outrageous conduct, and sought, among other things, Hawkins' reinstatement as Chief of Police and monetary damages, including monetary damages for past and future wages and benefits, past and future mental anguish, psychological pain and suffering, and punitive damages. In conjunction with the complaint, Hawkins also filed a motion for temporary injunctive relief requiring that he be reinstated as Chief of Police. On October 10, 2000, Hawkins filed an amended motion for injunctive relief requesting the additional relief that the defendants be enjoined from conducting any hearings regarding disciplinary action against Hawkins. On October 16, 2000, Hawkins filed a motion for a temporary restraining order preventing the defendants from holding a hearing regarding Hawkins' situation. These motions to stop the hearing were denied.
On October 17, 2000, a hearing was held before the Lawrenceburg City Council addressing the disciplinary issues contained in Mayor Chilton's September 22, 2000, letter. The City Council subsequently announced its decision in its undated "Findings, Conclusions and Order." Under the decision, Hawkins was found guilty of incompetency, inefficiency, and the accumulation of minor infractions. Further, he was demoted to the rank of Patrolman 2 with his salary not to exceed that of the highest paid officer of that rank in the Lawrenceburg Police Department. In addition, Hawkins was suspended from duty without pay for six months, and at the conclusion of his suspension, was to be assigned to the duties of code enforcement officer.
On October 23, 2000, the defendants filed a notice in Anderson Circuit Court that they were removing Hawkins' lawsuit against the City and Mayor Chilton to Federal District Court on the basis that Hawkins' complaint had raised federal constitutional issues. On November 28, 2000, the Federal District Court issued an order dismissing Hawkins' federal due process claim and remanding the case back to Anderson Circuit Court for final determination.
On March 7, 2001, Hawkins filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint substantially mirrored his September 22, 2000, complaint except that the amended complaint sought the additional relief that the circuit court reverse the Findings, Conclusions, and Order of the Lawrenceburg City Council. On March 16, 2001, the defendants filed their answer to the amended complaint.
On June 25, 2001, Hawkins filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to CR4 12.03. On August 6, 2001, the defendants filed a response to Hawkins' motion for judgment on the pleadings and, in addition, filed their own motion for judgment on the pleadings.
On October 23, 2001, the circuit court entered an order denying Hawkins' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The order did not address the defendants' outstanding motion for judgment on the pleadings. Hawkins subsequently filed a notice of appeal with this Court.
On June 7, 2002, this Court entered an order dismissing Hawkins' appeal as interlocutory. See Hawkins v. City of Lawrenceburg, Case No. 2001-CA-002569-MR. On July 1, 2002, Hawkins filed a motion in the circuit court requesting that the circuit court enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment based upon the record as submitted together with the briefs of the parties.
On June 12, 2002, the circuit court entered an order again denying Hawkins' motion for judgment on the pleadings, affirming the Lawrenceburg City Council's findings, and dismissing Hawkins' appeal with prejudice. This appeal followed.
First,5 Hawkins contends that general principles of due process mandate a reversal of the circuit court and that the findings of the City Council should be reversed as its findings are clearly erroneous and not based upon substantial evidence.
Hawkins has appealed the City Council's disciplinary decision pursuant to KRS 15.520(2)6 and KRS 15.520(3).7 As KRS 15.520(2) is a trial de novo statute, the duty of the circuit court in this case is as set forth in Brady v. Pettit, Ky., 586 S.W.2d 29 (1979), as follows:
[I]n public employee discharge cases where there is a trial de novo statute, the discharged employee is entitled to something less than a classic trial de novo in circuit court. In this proceeding in circuit court the burden of proof shifts to the discharged employee. After review of the transcript of evidence or hearing the witnesses, the trial court is limited in its decision. The trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body, that is, there may not be a substitute punishment. The trial court may find the discharged employee has failed to meet the burden of proof and affirm the action of the administrative board; or if it is found that the employee has sustained the burden of proof, the trial court may set aside the punishment.
. . .
[R]eview of the transcript of evidence in circuit court is a corollary to the burden of proof which has shifted to the discharged employee. In circuit court the transcript of evidence is reviewed but the proceeding is not limited to this review; the discharged employee is accorded the right to call such additional witnesses as he may desire. The trial court's review is limited to a determination of whether the administrative body acted arbitrarily. (emphasis original).
To determine arbitrariness, the appellate court may review the record, the briefs, and any other evidence or testimony which would be relevant to that specific, limited issue. The appeal is not the proper forum to retry the merits. It is limited only to the question of whether the hearing body's action was clearly unreasonable. Crouch v. Jefferson County, Kentucky Police Merit Bd., Ky., 773 S.W.2d 461, 464 (1988).
The decision of the hearing body, though resting ultimately on opinion as distinguished from pure fact, represents a factual finding and is not to be disturbed unless it is arbitrary or unreasonable. "Arbitrary" means "clearly erroneous," which, in turn, means unsupported by substantial evidence. "Unreasonable" means that under the evidence presented there is no room for difference of opinion among reasonable minds. Crouch at 464 (quoting Thurman v. Meridian Mutual Insurance Company, Ky., 345 S.W.2d 635, 639 (1961)).
In its July 12, 2002, order, the circuit court affirmed the findings of the City Council, including its finding that Hawkins was guilty of all charges proffered against him. The findings of the City Council were, in relevant part, as follows:
Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the majority of which was uncontested and demonstrated a pattern of abusive and obscene language and discourtesy...
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