Hawkins v. Town of S. Hill
| Decision Date | 20 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 210848 |
| Parties | Richard HAWKINS, III, v. TOWN OF SOUTH HILL |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Richard F. Hawkins, III, Pro Se.
Melissa Y. York (Harman, Claytor, Corrigan & Wellman, on brief), Richmond, for appellee.
PRESENT: All the Justices
OPINION BY JUSTICE THOMAS P. MANN
Our government belongs to the people it serves. By extension information retained by governmental entities likewise belongs to the people subject to legislatively mandated exceptions, one of which is explored here. This is the foundation upon which the Virginia Freedom of Information Act ("VFOIA") rests. The government, though, is administered by individuals who, only by virtue of their public employment, are required to divulge information which would otherwise be private. Recognizing the tension between transparency and privacy, we use a commonsense and plain language paradigm, directed by precedent from this jurisdiction and aided by the statutes and cases from other states, to interpret and explain Code § 2.2-3705.1(1). By utilizing our interpretive holding, trial courts can manage, analyze, and evaluate questions which arise in this context.
This appeal requires us to determine the scope of the personnel information exemption to VFOIA and reconcile the competing interests of open access to public records and the privacy expectations of government employees. Richard Hawkins, III ("Hawkins") appeals the partial denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus ("Petition") and the purported denial of his request for attorney's fees and costs by the Mecklenburg County Circuit Court. In the Petition, Hawkins requested documents related to employment disputes in the Town of South Hill, (the "Town"), as well as attorney's fees and costs. Because the circuit court applied a definition of "personnel information" different from the definition outlined below, we reverse and remand for the court to review and, if necessary, redact and release the documents at issue. Moreover, Hawkins failed to obtain a ruling from the circuit court as to who, if anyone, was the prevailing party or the issue of attorney's fees and costs. Therefore, we find that he has waived those issues on appeal.
In the Fall of 2019, Hawkins began seeking documents from the Town relating to employment disputes involving the Town Manager and various employees. Between September 2019 and January 2020, Hawkins submitted four VFOIA requests. The Town provided a response each time, however Hawkins believed that the responses were deficient.
Following the final VFOIA response from the Town, Hawkins filed his Petition, pro se. Hawkins alleged that the Town asserted VFOIA exemptions too broadly and withheld documents that should have been released or redacted. He requested the circuit court to compel the Town to produce the requested documents, impose civil penalties under VFOIA, and award him his attorney's fees and costs. The Town filed a demurrer asserting that Hawkins failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted because the Town fully complied with VFOIA.
At a hearing on the demurrer, the parties narrowed the dispute before the circuit court to seven documents. Each document was withheld by the Town pursuant to the personnel information exemption set forth in Code § 2.2-3705.1(1).1 The first document was a demand letter from a Town employee's attorney to the Town attorney regarding the employee's discrimination complaints (the "demand letter"). The second document was a one-page petition to the Town's personnel committee from seven employees requesting a meeting regarding the Town Manager (the "employee petition"). The third document was an email chain from a town employee to the Town Mayor and City Council regarding discipline of that employee (the "email chain"). The fourth was an unsigned document received by the Town Mayor complaining about the Town Manager and Town work environment (the "anonymous complaint"). The final three documents were resignation letters from three different Town employees (the "resignation letters").
After reviewing the documents in chambers, the circuit court issued a letter opinion granting the Petition in part. The court applied definitions of "personnel record" from a previous version of the statute, instead of "personnel information." It concluded that the anonymous complaint was not exempt from disclosure and the employee petition was partially exempt from disclosure. The circuit court agreed with the Town that the demand letter, email chain, and resignation letters were exempt under VFOIA. The court did not address the issue of fees or whether Hawkins substantially prevailed. It asked the Town to prepare the order reflecting the letter opinion, because the court "agreed with the Town's positions more than it did not."
The Town moved for entry of an order because "[Hawkins] want[ed] to address the issue of attorney's fees." Hawkins filed no opposition to the motion. He endorsed the order, objecting to the denial of mandamus as to five documents, the court not awarding attorney's fees, and the court not holding that he was a prevailing party under VFOIA. Hawkins timely noted his appeal.
In his first three assignments of error, Hawkins challenges the circuit court's holding that the five documents were exempt from VFOIA under the personnel information exemption.
All three assignments address the circuit court's interpretation and application of Code § 2.2-3705.1(1). "Whether documents ... should be excluded under [VFOIA] is a mixed question of law and fact." Virginia Dep't of Corr. v. Surovell , 290 Va. 255, 262, 776 S.E.2d 579 (2015) (quoting American Tradition Inst. v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va. , 287 Va. 330, 338, 756 S.E.2d 435 (2014) ) (alteration added). "[W]e give deference to the trial court's factual findings and view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing part[y]." Id. (quoting American Tradition Inst. , 287 Va. at 338-39, 756 S.E.2d 435 ) (first alteration added, second alteration in original). However, this Court "reviews issues of statutory interpretation and a circuit court's application of a statute to its factual findings, de novo." Cole v. Smyth Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors , 298 Va. 625, 636, 842 S.E.2d 389 (2020) (citing Surovell , 290 Va. at 262, 776 S.E.2d 579 ).
The General Assembly enacted VFOIA to "ensure[ ] the people of the Commonwealth ready access to public records in the custody of a public body or its officers and employees." Code § 2.2-3700(B). "Under VFOIA, ‘[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by law, all public records shall be open to citizens of the Commonwealth ... during the regular office hours of the custodian of such records.’ " Bergano v. City of Virginia Beach , 296 Va. 403, 408, 821 S.E.2d 319 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Code § 2.2-3704(A) ). Moreover, "[a]ll public records ... shall be presumed open, unless an exemption is properly invoked." Code § 2.2-3700(B).
The legislature has set forth clear statutory canons of construction for the VFOIA. "By its own terms, the statute puts the interpretative thumb on the scale in favor of disclosure: ‘The provisions of [VFOIA] shall be liberally construed to promote an increased awareness by all persons of governmental activities and afford every opportunity to citizens to witness the operations of government.’ " Fitzgerald v. Loudoun Cnty. Sheriff's Off. , 289 Va. 499, 505, 771 S.E.2d 858 (2015) (quoting Code § 2.2-3700(B) ) (alteration added). Moreover, "[a]ny exemption from public access to records ... shall be narrowly construed and no record shall be withheld ... unless specifically made exempt pursuant to this chapter." Code § 2.2-3700(B).
This Court's role in interpreting a statute is a narrow one. "In construing statutory language, we are bound by the plain meaning of clear and unambiguous language." White Dog Publ'g, Inc. v. Culpeper Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors , 272 Va. 377, 386, 634 S.E.2d 334 (2006). "Where the General Assembly has expressed its intent in clear and unequivocal terms, it is not the province of the judiciary to add words to the statute or alter its plain meaning." Couplin v. Payne , 270 Va. 129, 137, 613 S.E.2d 592 (2005) (quoting Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. , 269 Va. 303, 313, 608 S.E.2d 901 (2005) ). However, "[i]f a statute is subject to more than one interpretation, this Court must ‘apply the interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent behind the statute.’ " JSR Mechanical, Inc. v. Aireco Supply, Inc. , 291 Va. 377, 383, 786 S.E.2d 144 (2016) (quoting Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc. , 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174 (2007) ). Of course, just because words in isolation may mean different things in different contexts, that does not render the statute, in toto, ambiguous. Our function is to interpret the statute in a manner that reflects the legislative intent.
Code § 2.2-3705.1 outlines exemptions to the mandatory disclosure provisions of VFOIA and requires "[r]edaction of information excluded under this section ... in accordance with § 2.2-3704.1." Code § 2.2-3704.01 states that "[n]o provision of this chapter is intended, nor shall it be construed or applied, to authorize a public body to withhold a public record in its entirety on the grounds that some portion of the public record is excluded from disclosure by this chapter or by any other provision of law." "[O]nly portions of the public record containing information subject to an exclusion ... may be withheld" and the entirety of a record may be withheld "only to the extent ... that an exclusion ... applies to the entire content of the public record." Id.
Substantively, Code § 2.2-3705.1(1) exempts "[p]ersonnel information concerning identifiable individuals" from disclosure. VFOIA...
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