Hawkins v. Wv Dept. of Public Safety

• Decision Date: 12 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 33876.,33876.
• Citation: 672 S.E.2d 389
• Parties: David HAWKINS and Kim Hawkins, and Tyler Hawkins, Ashley Hawkins and Chase Hawkins, Minors, by and through their next friend, David Hawkins, Plaintiffs Below, Appellants v. The WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY a/k/a the West Virginia State Police, the Commission on Drunk Driving Prevention, and J. Mattman Security, Inc., Defendants Below, Appellees.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

672 S.E.2d 389

David HAWKINS and Kim Hawkins, and Tyler Hawkins, Ashley Hawkins and Chase Hawkins, Minors, by and through their next friend, David Hawkins, Plaintiffs Below, Appellants v. The WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY a/k/a the West Virginia State Police, the Commission on Drunk Driving Prevention, and J. Mattman Security, Inc., Defendants Below, Appellees.

No. 33876.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted September 23, 2008.

Decided December 12, 2008.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "Appellate review of a circuit court's order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo." Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W.Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995).

2. "Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review." Syllabus Point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

3. "Notwithstanding the broad language of the Workers' Compensation Act § 23-2-1(a) [1991], uniformed members of the West Virginia Division of Public Safety, who are covered under the Death, Disability and Retirement Fund, are not eligible for coverage under the Workers' Compensation System." Syllabus Point 1, Beckley v. Kirk, 193 W.Va. 258, 260, 455 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1995).

4. "Where a statute is of doubtful meaning, the contemporaneous construction placed thereon by the officers of government charged with its execution is entitled to great weight, and will not be disregarded or overthrown unless it is clear that such construction is erroneous." Syllabus Point 7, Evans v. Hutchinson, 158 W.Va. 359, 214 S.E.2d 453 (1975).

5. "Interpretations as to the meaning and application of workers' compensation statutes rendered by the Workers' Compensation Commissioner, as the governmental official charged with the administration and enforcement of the workers' compensation statutory law of this State, pursuant to W.Va. Code § 23-1-1 (1997) (Repl.Vol.1998), should be accorded deference if such interpretations are consistent with the legislation's plain meaning and ordinary construction." Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. ACF Industries, Inc. v. Vieweg, 204 W.Va. 525, 514 S.E.2d 176 (1999).

G. Thomas Smith, Esq., Smith, McMunn & Glover, Clarksburg, for Appellants.

Gary E. Pullin, Esq., Wendy E. Greve, Esq., Pullin, Fowler & Flanagan, Charleston, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM:¹

In this appeal from the circuit court of Kanawha County, we are asked to consider whether the West Virginia State Police² has immunity from negligence-based lawsuits by its uniformed members for injuries sustained in the course of and as a result of their employment. The circuit court below concluded that the State Police does have such immunity, and dismissed a lawsuit filed by a uniformed state trooper who alleged he was injured on the job as a result of his employer's negligence.

As set forth below, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal order.

I.

On September 20, 2005, the appellant and plaintiff below, David Hawkins, was working as a sergeant for the appellee and defendant below, the West Virginia State Police. Sergeant Hawkins was assigned to an anti-drunk driving unit, and was working in a mobile office called the "Batmobile."

Sergeant Hawkins alleges that the Batmobile has a defective door latch that protrudes approximately 1 ½ inches into the doorway at elbow level. The latch — of which there is one at each of the four doors on the Batmobile — is shaped like a hook, such that it routinely snagged the shirt sleeves of persons exiting the mobile office. Sergeant Hawkins and other state troopers had complained to their superiors, asking that the latches be modified.

On the day in question, Sergeant Hawkins was routinely exiting the Batmobile with a case slung over his shoulder. The case caught on the hook-shaped latch, yanking him backward and herniating three discs in his back. Sergeant Hawkins required emergency surgery, and now has permanent nerve damage. He was forced to take a disability retirement from the State Police.

Sergeant Hawkins filed a lawsuit against the appellee West Virginia State Police alleging that his employer's negligence in failing to repair or replace the door latch had contributed to his injuries.³ The State Police responded by filing a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that as a matter of law, the State Police was entitled to the immunity provided under the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, W.Va.Code, 23-2-6 [2003].⁴

In an order dated April 19, 2007, the circuit court granted the State Police's motion to dismiss the appellants' lawsuit. The circuit court concluded that the appellants' complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because, as Sergeant Hawkins' employer, "the West Virginia State Police can not be subjected to common law claims sounding in negligence by its employees for injuries sustained on the job."

The appellants now appeal the circuit court's April 19, 2007 order.

II.

Appellate review of a circuit court order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo. Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W.Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995). Similarly, where the issue in an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involves the interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review. Syllabus Point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

III.

The parties in this appeal do not dispute any facts, and agree that the sole issue for consideration is one of statutory construction. The question they ask us to resolve is whether, under the Workers' Compensation Act, a uniformed state trooper may bring a negligence action against his or her employer, the West Virginia State Police, for injuries caused by the employer's ordinary negligence in the course of and as a result of the trooper's employment.⁵ The appellants argue that there is no clear statutory provision in the Workers' Compensation Act making the State Police immune from suit. The appellee argues that such immunity may easily be inferred from a reading of several statutes, and from an understanding that, historically, the Legislature has statutorily accorded injured state troopers financial protection that is better than the protection provided under the Workers' Compensation Act.

The parties' arguments on the immunity question therefore revolve around competing interpretations of various statutes in different chapters of the West Virginia Code.

The appellants' argument begins by noting that the Workers' Compensation Act declares that:

The state of West Virginia and all governmental agencies or departments created by it ... are employers within the meaning of this chapter and are required to subscribe to and pay premium taxes into the workers' compensation fund for the protection of their employees and are subject to all requirements of this chapter[.]

W.Va.Code, 23-2-1 [2005]. In exchange for paying workers' compensation premiums, the appellants note that employers are statutorily entitled to immunity from suit, and that workers' compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy for employees of employers who subscribe to the workers' compensation system. W.Va.Code, 23-2-6 [2003] states in part:

Any employer subject to this chapter who subscribes and pays into the workers' compensation fund the premiums provided by this chapter or who elects to make direct payments of compensation as provided in this section is not liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for the injury or death of any employee, however occurring, after so subscribing ... and during any period in which the employer is not in default in the payment of the premiums ...

The appellants argue that W.Va.Code, 23-2-6 is clear that there are only two ways for the State of West Virginia and its agencies, as an "employer," to be immune from suit: either subscribe and pay premiums into the workers' compensation fund, or make direct payments of compensation to injured workers using a self-insured system that conforms to the Workers' Compensation Act.⁶

The appellants argue that the State Police did not subscribe to the Workers' Compensation Fund at the time Sergeant Hawkins was injured, and that the State Police has never subscribed or paid premiums into the fund. Furthermore, the appellants argue that the State Police never established a self-insured workers' compensation system that complies with the requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act. Accordingly, the appellants argue that the State Police is not statutorily entitled to immunity for work-related injuries negligently caused to its employees.

The appellee State Police concedes — as once did this Court — that "on its face" the statutes cited by the appellants would appear to require the State Police to subscribe to the workers' compensation fund. See Beckley v. Kirk, 193 W.Va. 258, 260, 455 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1995). However, the appellee argues that the Death, Disability and Retirement Fund for state troopers ("the DDR Fund"), found in W.Va.Code, 15-2-26 [2007]⁷, is a statutorily-created fund that allows the State Police to make "direct payments of compensation" to troopers injured on the job — and therefore, the State Police should be immune from suit under the provisions of W.Va.Code, 23-2-6. Supporting this conclusion, the State Police argues that the legislative history behind the creation of the DDR Fund, and the concomitant failure of the Legislature to budget for and require the State Police to pay premiums into the Workers' Compensation Fund, makes it clear that the Legislature intended for the State Police to be immune from suit for on-the-job injuries negligently caused to a state trooper, when the state trooper is eligible for benefits from the DDR Fund.

The appellee argues that this Court...