Hawley v. Dresser Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. C-2-85-0332.,C-2-85-0332.
• Citation: 737 F. Supp. 445
• Parties: Chester G. HAWLEY, Plaintiff, v. DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC. and George A. Korb, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

737 F. Supp. 445

Chester G. HAWLEY, Plaintiff, v. DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC. and George A. Korb, Defendants.

No. C-2-85-0332.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, E.D.

May 15, 1990.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jack R. Alton, Patrick H. Boggs, John C. Wagner, Lane, Alton & Horst, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff.

John W. Zeiger, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Columbus, Ohio, Andrew M. Kramer, Nancy C. Lee, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

KINNEARY, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court to consider the motion of the defendants, Dresser Industries, Inc. ("Dresser") and George A. Korb, for partial summary judgment.

In 1985, the plaintiff, Chester Hawley, filed this employment discrimination action against Dresser, his former employer, and defendant George A. Korb, the Corporate Senior Vice President-Operations of Dresser. In 1981, Dresser demoted the plaintiff, then age 59, from his position as President of Dresser's Construction Equipment Group ("CEG") to Vice President-Planning for CEG. James C. Hilton, then age 39, replaced Hawley in the position of President. Hawley and Dresser agreed that the plaintiff would receive essentially the same salary and benefits following the demotion. In 1983, Dresser eliminated the plaintiff's position and, unlike other individuals in these circumstances, Dresser terminated Hawley instead of transferring him to another position within Dresser.

On May 8, 1984, Hawley's attorney mailed a letter to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission notifying it of the plaintiff's intention to file suit in federal court in order to assert a discriminatory discharge claim. In addition, the plaintiff filed an official charge form with the EEOC alleging discriminatory discharge on August 28, 1984. The plaintiff then filed this action on January 18, 1985.

On July 20, 1988, the Court denied a summary judgment motion filed by Dresser on discriminatory discharge claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Also, on March 8, 1990, the Court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment concerning certain issues regarding the writings which elaborate the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment. Further, on April 19, 1990, the Court denied the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of its March 8 Opinion and Order. In this motion, the defendants seek dismissal of most of Hawley's claims.

In considering the defendants' motion, the Court is mindful that summary judgment is appropriate only in limited circumstances. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that the standard of summary judgment "mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). This is true where, for instance, the dispute turns only on a legal question and the moving party must prevail as a matter of law even if the Court were to resolve all factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party. Miller v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 729 F.Supp. 1154, 1155 (S.D.Ohio 1990); see Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1222 (7th Cir. 1985); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2725, at 79 (2d ed. 1983).

A summary judgment motion also requires special treatment of the record. The Court "must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" and determine "whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2512, 2513; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Nonetheless, in making this determination the Court may not impinge upon the proper function of the jury. Therefore, all of "the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. With this standard in mind, the Court will address the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. The Court will consider each of the defendants' arguments in turn.

I. TIMELINESS OF ADEA DEMOTION CLAIM

The defendants' first argument is that the plaintiff cannot maintain his ADEA demotion claim because he failed to file EEOC charges on it in a timely fashion. Hawley maintains that Dresser demoted him from his position as President of CEG in July 1981 and replaced him with a younger person. The defendants, however, argue that Hawley failed to file a charge with either the EEOC or the Ohio Civil Rights Commission concerning the demotion.

The defendants then cite section 7(d) of ADEA which provides that no "civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed" with the EEOC. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982). Moreover, persons asserting discrimination claims must file such a charge "within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred." Id. § 626(d)(2). The defendants contend that since Hawley filed no charges asserting the demotion claim within the 300 day limit, he cannot maintain a civil action on the demotion theory; the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim.

In response, the plaintiff notes that he did in fact file a charge with the EEOC. He remarks that he submitted an official charge form on August 28, 1984. This charge, according to Hawley, makes a specific reference to discriminatory demotion and therefore supports the demotion claim in this civil action. Accordingly, this charge satisfies the statute which requires the plaintiff to file a charge with the EEOC.

The defendants state, however, that the demotion took place in July 1981. Hawley filed his charge form in August 1984, far beyond the 300-day limit. They argue that under ADEA the 300-day limit begins to run when the allegedly unlawful acts occur. Thus, the plaintiff's filing of a charge form was untimely, even if the Court were to construe it to include a claim of discriminatory demotion. The defendants also deny that the August 1984 charge form includes discriminatory demotion.

The plaintiff rebuts by contending that Dresser's actions towards him, including the demotion, were part of a continuing course of conduct which did not end until his termination. Given this continuing course of conduct, the Court should conclude that the time for filing did not begin to run until Dresser notified Hawley of the termination. Furthermore, the filing requirement is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. Where an "employer's own acts or omissions have lulled the plaintiff into foregoing prompt attempts to vindicate his rights," then the Court may consider the filing requirement to be waived or tolled. Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3rd Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821, 99 S.Ct. 87, 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978). Therefore, Hawley states that the time for filing should begin to run on the date of his discharge, not his demotion. Dresser notified Hawley of the discharge in September 1983. Apparently, Hawley believed at the time he drafted his responses, that charges filed in August 1984 would be timely, assuming the limit began to run in September 1983.

The defendants rejoin by noting that the time period begins to run on the date of the demotion, not later when the plaintiff learns of the discrimination. Also, the defendants contend that when an employer demotes and later terminates an employee, the time period for the demotion claim begins to run on the day in which the demotion occurs. Demotion is a completed action and would not be an act of a continuing nature. Finally, the defendants admit that the filing limit may be subject to equitable tolling, waiver, or estoppel. They posit, though, that tolling, waiver, and estoppel are not appropriate in this case. Therefore, Hawley's time for filing began on the date of the demotion and the charge form filed on August 28, 1984 was untimely.

Although the plaintiff stated in his memoranda concerning this motion that "the time limit for filing a claim with the EEOC did not begin to run until September 1983"¹ because of tolling, he has subsequently changed his position. In memoranda regarding a related motion, the plaintiff claims that tolling delayed the beginning of the 300-day limit not just until September 1983, but also until December 1983. Hawley reasons that since the parties were negotiating and that the date and terms of termination were "ambiguous" until December 14, the time limit began to run at the earliest on December 14. On that date, Gene Leeson had informed Hawley that his termination would be effective December 15.

In order to resolve this issue, the Court must turn first to the threshold issue of whether the plaintiff has filed a charge with the EEOC on the issue of discriminatory demotion. In his memoranda on this motion, the plaintiff does not allege that he filed a charge other than the one submitted on August 28, 1984. In the related motion, though, the defendants brought to the Court's...