People v. Hawthorne

• Decision Date: 05 December 2006
• Docket Number: 2003-05646.
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. RUDOLPH HAWTHORNE, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

35 A.D.3d 499

826 N.Y.S.2d 147

2006 NY Slip Op 09274

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. RUDOLPH HAWTHORNE, Appellant.

2003-05646.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department.

Decided December 5, 2006.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rios, J.), rendered June 12, 2003, convicting him of murder in the second degree, assault in the

second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the conviction of murder in the second degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was indicted for, inter alia, intentional murder and depraved indifference murder for the death of Kelvin Armstead, and assault in the second degree for the severe bludgeoning of Milton Tennessee. At trial, the People presented a statement given by the defendant to the police wherein he admitted to being present in Armstead's apartment on the night in question and to striking both victims with a hammer. However, the defendant asserted, Armstead and Tennessee had been smoking crack and, when he refused to loan them money to buy more, they physically assaulted him and tried to go through his pockets. Thus, he told police, he only swung the hammer to ward off the attack. However, the People presented unrebutted and unimpeached medical evidence that Armstead suffered numerous and severe injuries, including a minimum of 10 blows to his head with a claw hammer, and that there had been an attempt to strangle Armstead while he was still alive. The defendant was convicted of, inter alia, depraved indifference murder, but was acquitted of intentional murder. On appeal, the defendant argues, among other things, that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of depraved indifference murder. We agree, and vacate the conviction and dismiss that count of the indictment.

It is now settled that depraved indifference to human life is a culpable mental state (see People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288, 294 [2006]). This Court recently summarized the relevant law as follows: "In order to prove a defendant guilty of depraved indifference murder, the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, the defendant recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby caused the death of that person or a third person (see Penal Law § 125.25 [2]).... The element of depraved indifference to human life comprises both depravity and indifference, and has meaning independent of recklessness and the gravity of the risk created. It is best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life—a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn't care whether grievous harm results or not. Reflecting wickedness, evil or inhumanity, as manifested by brutal, heinous and despicable acts, depraved indifference is embodied in conduct that is so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to render the actor as culpable as one whose conscious objective is to kill." (People v McMillon, 31 AD3d 136, 138-139 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 815 [2006] [internal citations and quotations omitted].) Thus, the use of a weapon can never result in a conviction of depraved indifference murder when there is a manifest intent to kill because a manifest intent to kill negates the core element of recklessness (see People v Payne, 3 NY3d 266 [2004]; People v McMillon, supra). Consequently, the Court of Appeals has emphasized, "a one-on-one shooting or knifing (or similar killing) can almost never qualify as depraved indifference murder" (People v...