Hayes v. Booth Newspapers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1980
• Docket Number: Docket No. 43401
• Citation: 97 Mich.App. 758,295 N.W.2d 858
• Parties: William J. HAYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOOTH NEWSPAPERS, INC., Glen Boissonneault, Rudy Palloto, Robert Martin,Richard Childs, and Gary Taylor, individually and severally, Defendants-Appellees. 97 Mich.App. 758, 295 N.W.2d 858, 6 Media L. Rep. 2319
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 858

295 N.W.2d 858

William J. HAYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOOTH NEWSPAPERS, INC., Glen Boissonneault, Rudy Palloto, Robert Martin,Richard Childs, and Gary Taylor,

individually and severally,

Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 43401.

97 Mich.App. 758, 295 N.W.2d 858, 6 Media L. Rep. 2319

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

June 3, 1980.

Released for Publication Sept. 24, 1980.

[97 MICHAPP 759] Daniel D. Bremer, Flint, for plaintiff-appellant.

Jerome F. O'Rourke, Flint, for defendants-appellees.

Before DANHOF, C. J., and BEASLEY and CYNAR, JJ.

CYNAR, Judge.

On June 15, 1972, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint for libel. Said complaint was in response to two articles published in the Flint Journal, one of the newspapers in the Booth chain. The articles related to the actions of plaintiff in conducting the defense of one Mandric Strodder, accused of the first-degree murder of a Flint woman in 1970. The opinions of then Chief Justice Kavanagh and of Justice Williams in the case of People v. Strodder, 394 Mich. 193, 229 N.W.2d 318 (1975), reh. den. 395 Mich. 902 (1975), recount in part the tragic events which transpired during the course of that trial, presided over by Circuit Court Judge Philip C. Elliott. We note that the parties herein have stipulated that the trial transcript from that case is the only relevant transcript for purposes of this appeal. The stipulation provides as follows:

"NOW COME Plaintiff/Appellant and Defendants/Appellees, by and through their attorneys, and stipulate and agree that this appeal may proceed without a transcript of the oral arguments made when Defendant/Appellees Motions for Summary Judgment were heard. It is further stipulated and agreed that the only relevant transcript in this matter is the transcript of [97 MICHAPP 760] the trial People v. Strodder Court of Appeals docket no. 13131."

Count I of plaintiff's complaint addressed itself to an August 15, 1971, editorial appearing in the Flint Journal. ¹ Count II was based on an article [97 MICHAPP 761] printed in the February 26, 1972, issue of the paper. The article was directed at plaintiff's application for payment as Strodder's court-appointed attorney, and contained the following paragraph:

"During the trial Elliott questioned whether Hayes was in possession of his sanity and subsequently a court-appointed psychiatrist said Hayes was mentally incompetent to continue the trial."

[97 MICHAPP 762] The following day, February 27, 1972, the Journal ran an article which stated that the previous day's story had erroneously reported that plaintiff had been found to be "mentally incompetent", rather than "mentally competent", and that the error was regretted.

Defendants answered plaintiff's complaint and raised the affirmative defenses of: (1) fair comment, under M.C.L. § 600.2911; M.S.A. § 27A.2911; (2) First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and of the press; (3) truth; and (4) lack of actual malice.

Extensive discovery ensued through late 1974. On January 10, 1975, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to Count I, which motion failed to state with specificity the grounds upon which it was predicated. No affidavit accompanied the motion. In his brief in support of his answer in opposition thereto, plaintiff conceded that he was a "public figure" under the New York Times ² standard, at least for purposes of this litigation.

On December 22, 1977, ³ the trial court issued an opinion which held for defendants on the aforementioned motion, and entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count I on January 25, 1978.

On June 1, 1978, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to count II of plaintiff's complaint. As was the case with defendants' earlier motion, no supporting affidavit was appended to this motion. Summary judgment for defendants on count II was entered on August 18, 1978.

[97 MICHAPP 763] Plaintiff's application for delayed appeal as to both summary judgments was granted April 30, 1979, by order of this Court.

The Strodder trial was, as aptly stated by plaintiff Hayes during its course, unique in the annals of Michigan law.

Before trial, Hayes interposed a defense of insanity to the charge of first-degree murder, although in the 109 days between his appointment and commencement of trial he had seen defendant only once, and that only a few minutes prior to trial. Defendant initially expressed his displeasure with Hayes, but at some later point the relationship between Hayes and defendant improved to the point where defendant indicated complete satisfaction with Hayes's performance.

Toward the close of the prosecution's case, Hayes demanded that B. James Wright be recalled as a witness to further testify. In response to the court's request for an explanation, Mr. Hayes stated:

"Mr. B. James Wright strangled his wife. Will you get up and testify, sir?"

Hayes instructed the court to listen to him, demanded that Wright be placed under guard because he was dangerous, asked Wright whether he wanted to be advised of his constitutional right against self-incrimination, whether he wanted an attorney, and thereafter put Wright through a cross-examination which included allusions to Wright having murdered his wife. Wright denied the accusations. Hayes then asked to review the contents of the police file in the case. The prosecutor objected to this. People v. Strodder records Hayes's response and the colloquy that followed.

[97 MICHAPP 764] " 'The procedures are unimportant, I am asking that the whole record in this case be impounded, that no further prosecutions go on in this county, that this court and the prosecutor of this county be immediately suspended from office, and that Mr. Mandric Strodder immediately be set free. He is completely, absolutely innocent of this charge.'

"He refused to explain his actions further, but instead maintained:

" 'I ask that Mr. Strodder by reinstated on his bond. He is willing and has authorized me to say he's willing to compromise this case as follows:

" 'He's willing to live in this society as a free man if the people of the State of Michigan are willing to pick up his expenses for the rest of his natural life. Is that right Mr. Strodder?'

"The Defendant:

" 'Yes sir.'

"Shortly thereafter counsel announced that he did not want to participate 'any further in these proceedings', and answered in the negative when the court asked 'are you going to continue with the defense of this matter?'

" 'The Court : I'm going to order you to continue with the defense of this matter.

" 'Mr. Hayes : We have nothing further to say. Is that right, Mr. Strodder?

" 'The Defendant : Yes, sir, Mr. Hayes. * * * " 'The Court : Am I correct Mr. Hayes that you're telling me that you are refusing the order of the court to continue with the defense of this matter?

" 'Mr. Hayes (to the defendant ): Don't talk about the case any further.' " People v. Strodder, supra, 394 Mich. 205-206, 229 N.W.2d 322.

The next day, in order to proceed with trial, the court appointed co-counsel for defendant, and, after expressing his doubts as to Hayes' sanity, the court ordered a psychiatrist to observe Hayes. Following a week's continuance so that co-counsel could familiarize himself with the case, trial resumed. Thereafter, Hayes excoriated the court repeatedly, and barraged the prosecutor and many [97 MICHAPP 765] witnesses with a steady stream of vitriol and invective. The episodes in which Hayes made personal attacks on the court were many, although each cannot be recounted in detail.

A sampling of plaintiff's behavior indicates that, on at least three separate occasions, Hayes accused the court and the prosecutor of conferring and colluding on evidentiary rulings. He also charged the court with bias as to all such rulings. Plaintiff claimed that the court was only interested in convicting Mandric Strodder.

Hayes called the prosecutor to the stand as a defense witness. He next spoke to himself aloud while questioning witnesses and claimed that if he spoke loudly enough in doing this so that it could be recorded, the court would call him insane again. He threatened to investigate all participants in the trial and subpoena their criminal records in response to what he deemed traducement by the court of his investigator, Matthew Buder, a disbarred attorney.

Plaintiff later accused the court, the assistant prosecutor trying the case, the victim's husband, and the then Chief Genesee County Prosecutor of conspiring to obstruct justice in the Strodder case. He began referring to the judge as Mr. Elliott.

When the prosecutor attempted to object to a defense witness giving opinion testimony without being qualified as an expert, Hayes interrupted. The court remonstrated Hayes, stating:

"Mr. Hayes, when opposing counsel wants to be heard to make an objection, he has a right to be heard."

Hayes responded:

"If he's the Prosecutor."

[97 MICHAPP 766] Hayes next began to insult the intelligence of the court, glibly intimating that the court was unable to follow argument regarding the admissibility of evidence.

Plaintiff then intentionally asked leading questions on direct examination and attempted to impeach his own witnesses. Shortly thereafter, he told the trial judge he was ashamed of him. He admonished the judge that he was not going to be able to pick and choose admissible evidence under "your" rules of evidence.

Hayes charged the court with deliberately attempting to ruin his plans to vacation on Mackinac Island and warned the court that he was leaving for vacation and that the court would have to "put chains on me" to prevent him from doing so.

As trial continued, repeatedly stalled by Hayes's chastising of the court and the prosecutor, he began to refuse to call available witnesses, challenging the court to deny him his right to call witnesses in the order he desired. He did this knowing full well that some of these witnesses were not then available, but had been...