Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1948
• Docket Number: 47161.
• Citation: 30 N.W.2d 743,239 Iowa 149
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: HAYES et al. v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO. et al.

30 N.W.2d 743

239 Iowa 149

HAYES et al. v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO. et al.

No. 47161.

Supreme Court of Iowa

February 10, 1948

Ralph H. Munro, of Fairfield, for appellants.

Booker Smith, of Fairfield, and R. L. Read and A. B. Howland, both of Des Moines, for appellees.

GARFIELD Justice.

Plaintiffs own a farm of 257 acres in Jefferson county through which ran a line of defendant railroad. (We disregard the fact trustees of the railroad are also defendants.) In relocating a portion of this line defendant, proceeding under chapters 365, 366, Code 1939 (cc. 471, 472, Code 1946), condemned for new right of way a strip of about 11 acres through plaintiffs' farm. Upon completion of the improvement the old right of way was to be abandoned.

On October 23, 1943, a sheriff's jury awarded plaintiffs $4,584.16. Plaintiffs appealed to the district court from this award. Before the appeal was tried defendant served on plaintiffs an offer to confess judgment, which was not accepted, for one cent less than said award. Trial of the appeal resulted in verdict and judgment for plaintiffs for $4,010 from which they have appealed to us.

I. Plaintiffs' witness Kane, their tenant on the farm testified to the value of the farm as a whole before and after the condemnation. On redirect examination he described the dwelling house on the farm, built about four years before the condemnation, shortly before Kane moved there. Plaintiffs then asked the witness what in his judgment would be the value of the house in the fall of 1943. Defendant's objection that this was an improper attempt to put a separate valuation on the house was sustained. The ruling is assigned as error.

There is no showing what the answer would have been if one had been permitted. It was not shown the witness knew or had an opinion as to the value of the house. So far as appears, he might have answered he did not know. No offer of proof was made. No foundation was laid for this assignment of error. In re Estate of Heller, 233 Iowa 1356 1362, 11 N.W.2d 586, 590, and citations; Reynolds &amp Heitsman v. Henry, 193 Iowa 164, 169, 185 N.W. 67, and citations.

Aside from the above, we are not inclined to hold the ruling was reversible error.

There is some lack of harmony in the decisions as to the owner's right in cases of this kind to show the separate value of improvements upon the property. In Ranck v. City of Cedar Rapids, 134 Iowa 563, 566, 111 N.W. 1027, we observed it has been held proper for the owner to prove the cost and value of the house and other improvements on the premises, not as an independent item of damage but as explaining and supporting the estimates of value of the entire property. In Randell v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 214 Iowa 1, 10, 241 N.W. 685, largely on the authority of the Ranck opinion, the observation is repeated in discussing the admissibility of evidence as to cost of a fence. See also United States v. Becktold Co., 8 Cir., 129 F.2d 473, 478, and citations.

The Ranck case recognizes that the latitude allowed in admitting testimony of collateral facts in support of estimates of value must be left largely to the discretion of the presiding judge and we will not undertake to fix the limits of such discretion. The admission of such testimony was there held not to be an abuse of discretion.

The Ranck case involved the condemnation of an entire property consisting of a city lot improved for business purposes. The sole ultimate question was the value of the entire property at the time of the condemnation and not, as here, the difference in such value immediately before and after the condemnation. It is apparent the value of the improvement in the cited case had a much more direct bearing on the measure of recovery than would the value of the dwelling here.

In Welton v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 211 Iowa 625, 632, 233 N.W. 876, where a highway was condemned through a farm, it was held reversible error to permit the owner to show the separate value of different parcels of the farm. It was emphasized that an owner in such a case may not place a piece-meal valuation on different portions of his farm although the value of separate pareels may be shown on cross-examination of value witnesses. As bearing on this right of the cross-examiner see also Dean v. State, 211 Iowa 143, 151, 233 N.W. 36, which also recognizes that on direct examination value witnesses may express an opinion only as to the value of the entire farm.

There is much authority that in cases like this, on direct examination of value witnesses, ordinarily the market value of the land together with the improvements, taken as a whole and not separately, is to be shown--the value of the improvements apart from the land may not be thus shown. See 2 Lewis Eminent Domain, 3d Ed., section 664 (444), page 1144; Id. section 726 (486), page 1270; 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, section 253, page 892; Id. section 346, page 990; 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 273; McSorley v. School Dist. of Avalon Borough, 291 Pa. 252, 139 A. 848, 849, and citations; City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.2d 826, 90 A.L.R. 148, 158, and Anno. 159, 165; Forest Perserve Dist. of Cook County v. Chilvers, 344 Ill. 573, 176 N.E. 720, 722; Devou v. City of Cincinnati, 6 Cir., 162 F. 633.

While, as stated, the ruling under consideration was made during the redirect examination of the witness, there was nothing in the cross-examination which opened the door to the inquiry as to the separate value of the house. The question was in effect further direct examination.

We are content to hold here, without further consideration of the authorities, that the ruling complained of presents no abuse of discretion.

We may observe further that plaintiffs appear to have suffered little if any prejudice from this ruling. No part of the house was directly taken. The condemnation involved only a relocation of the railroad right of way through the farm. The dwelling was fully described as to age, kind of material, number of rooms and modern conveniences. A photograph of it was in evidence. The jury was sent to view the premises, doubtless saw the house, perhaps went through it, and observed its location with reference to the other buildings and the railroad right of way. It is not probable an estimate of the value of the house by the tenant, not shown to have any special qualifications for valuing it, would have materially affected the verdict.

II. On cross-examination of one of defendant's value witnesses, plaintiffs' counsel asked if he did not know this farm sold in March, 1914, for $31,500. While defendant's counsel was attempting to object to the question, the witness answered, 'I do not know it.' The objection was then made and sustained that the time of the sale was too remote from the time in issue here.

Perhaps a sufficient response to plaintiffs' complaint against this ruling is that since no motion was made to strike the witness' answer, it remained part of the record. Langner v. Caviness, Iowa, 28 N.W.2d 421, 425; State v. Rowe, 238 Iowa 237, 26 N.W.2d 422, 426, and citations.

However, we think the ruling presents no abuse of discretion. The scope of cross-examination of value witnesses is largely within the discretion of the trial court although considerable latitude is usually allowed. 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 560a(2). The rule is that the price paid for the property may not be shown where the purchase is so remote from the time of condemnation as to have no bearing on its value at that time. Orgel on Valuation Under Eminent Domain (1936), section 134, pages 454, 455; 2 Lewis Eminent Domain, 3d Ed., section 664 (444) pages 1144, 1145; 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 2d Ed., section 454, pages 1191, 1192; 18...