Hayes v. City of Dalton
| Decision Date | 14 July 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 17909,17909 |
| Citation | 209 Ga. 286,71 S.E.2d 618 |
| Parties | HAYES v. CITY OF DALTON et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The court correctly construed the charter amendment of the City of Dalton, and properly denied the prayers of the petition for injunction against the mayor and council and other defendants named.
Jack Truitt Hayes filed a petition against the City of Dalton, its mayor and council, and in substance alleged: On May 2, 1951, an election was duly held, in which a majority of the voters participating therein voted that the City of Dalton should come under the 'Municipal Home Rule Law.' Ga.L.1951, pp. 116-127, approved February 13, 1951, Code Ann.Supp. Chapter 69-10. On December 12, 1951, a charter amendment was adopted abolishing the civil service commission, and under the amendment the office of chief of police was made an elective office. The plaintiff was elected chief of police in the election of February 13, 1952, to take office on the first Monday in March. On that date, after the plaintiff had qualified, the mayor stated that the police force personnel existing prior to March 3 would continue in office, and the new chief would nominate three lieutenants therefrom, with the right to nominate new personnel when vacancies occurred. The plaintiff objected, taking the position that under the charter amendment he had the right to nominate a new staff of officers. The plaintiff nominated three men as his choice of lieutenants, and they were approved by the police committee of council. The mayor and council refused to accept the names submitted by the plaintiff for a police force. Of the fourteen names submitted, eight had been officers in the police force whose tenure of office had terminated by the abolition of the civil service commission. The five men that the mayor and council insisted were on the police force were unco-operative and unfriendly to the plaintiff prior to the abolition of the civil service commission. The plaintiff was chief of police of the city, and the five men objected to by the plaintiff were members of the police force under him prior to November 7, 1950. By reason of unjustifiable acts on the part of the five men and the mayor, the plaintiff lost his job as police chief in 1950, without cause. No charges were preferred against him, although he made demand that whatever charges the mayor and governmental officials claimed against him should be published, and that he should be given a copy. He was never granted a hearing by the civil service commission. The five men recognized by the mayor and council as policemen, are directed by them to report for duty in uniform, and they do so report. (These five men are also named as defendants.) This action on the part of the mayor and council results in an independent armed force of men without authority to act as policemen. The unlawful action on the part of the mayor and council has resulted in a police department with only eleven men, besides the plaintiff, three being assigned to duties other than regular police duties. The actions of the mayor and council constitute unjustifiable interference with the duties of the plaintiff, and as a consequence of these acts there is grave danger to the public generally. The plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law against the unlawful and unreasonable interference of the defendants with his duties as chief of police.
The prayers were that the City of Dalton and the mayor and council be enjoined from trying to force the plaintiff to accept the other five defendants as police officers of the city, from interfering with the operation of the police department by giving any order, direction, or request that the five men report for duty as police officers, or wear the uniform of a police officer, or carry arms as a policeman; that the five men named be restrained from doing anything pertaining to the duties of policemen in the City of Dalton; for process, rule nisi; and for general relief.
By amendment, the plaintiff alleged: The charter amendment to the City of Dalton approved on December 12, 1951, abolished the police department of the city. The new act, creating a new police department, provides that the number of officers thereof should be determined by the city council, and defines the duties of the office of chief of police, created by the amendment.
The City of Dalton and the mayor and council filed a joint answer, in which they denied the material allegations of the petition, and alleged that the tenure of office of the five policemen was specifically continued by section 5 of the amended charter, and that they were members of the police force on March 3, 1952. At a meeting of the civil service commission held on October 17, 1950, the plaintiff was called before the commission and questioned regarding fines and bonds collected by him and not transmitted to the city treasury. At that time the plaintiff admitted that he had been short in moneys belonging to the city. (Extracts from the minutes were set out, showing an investigation by the police commission.) After the meeting, the police commission notified the plaintiff that they would prefer charges against him and give him a hearing, if he wanted it. The plaintiff told the commission that he did not want a hearing, that he preferred to resign, that he did not want the public to know about what he had done. During discussions with the plaintiff over a considerable period of time, the police commission had urged him to control and discipline the men on his force, which he had failed to do. The failure to control and discipline the men was not of such immediate concern as the misappropriation of moneys belonging to the city, and it was under such circumstances that the plaintiff resigned as chief of police of November 7, 1950. (An alleged copy of his letter of resignation is set out.) The defendants admit that they directed the five men objected to by the plaintiff to report in the usual manner to serve as policemen for the city. Under the amendment to the charter, all policemen on the force on March 3, 1952, when the plaintiff became chief, remained as officers until removed as provided for by the amended act. The plaintiff refuses to assign duties to them or to recognize them as policemen.
The defendants prayed for a declaratory judgment answering two questions, as follows: (1) Were the five men objected to by the plaintiff members of the police force on and after March 3, 1952? (2) Does the city have authority to remove the plaintiff from his elective office for insubordination and refusal to assign the men objected to by him, or can the chief of police be removed only as provided in section 6 of Ga.L.1951, p. 125, Code Ann.Supp. § 69-1011?
After hearing evidence, the court entered an order in which it was recited that the court did not deem it necessary to pass on the question of a declaratory judgment, requested by the defendants, since the judgment interprets and construes the charter amendment of the City of Dalton. The court's judgment construed sections 5, 6, and 9, and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief prayed.
The bill of exceptions assigns error on the judgment denying the injunction, and on exceptions pendente lite to a refusal by the trial court to sustain, or rule upon, the demurrers of the plaintiff to that part of the answer of the defendant relating to a declaratory judgment.
Isaac C. Adams, C. Ernest McDonald, Dalton, for plaintiff in error.
Pittman, Hodge & Kinney, H. E. Kinney, Dalton, for defendants in error.
The only substantial issue in this case is whether or not the five men objected to by the plaintiff as policemen were members of the police force of the City of Dalton on March 3, 1952.
The petition alleges, and the answer admits, that there were two elections in the City of Dalton, the first on May 2, 1951, in which a majority of the voters participating therein voted that the City of Dalton should come under the provisions of the 'Municipal Home Rule Law', Ga.L.1951, pp. 116-127, Code Ann.Supp. Chapter 69-10. The second election was held on December 12, 1951, in which a charter amendment was approved by a majority of the qualified voters. The act amended was the Dalton charter amendment approved February 12 1945, Ga.L.1945, p. 593. The voters participating in the charter amendment election of December 12, 1951, had printed on their ballots, 'For approval of amendment to abolish civil service commission,' and 'Against approval of amendment to abolish civil service commission.'
The charter amendment approved by the voters...
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