Hayes v. City of Brockton

• Decision Date: 26 April 1943
• Citation: 313 Mass. 641,48 N.E.2d 683
• Parties: HAYES et al. v. CITY OF BROCKTON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

313 Mass. 641

48 N.E.2d 683

HAYES et al.

v.CITY OF BROCKTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.

April 26, 1943.

Report to Supreme Judicial Court, Plymouth County.

Petition by Edward P. Hayes and others against the City of Brockton for determination of an alleged deficiency in defendant's appropriation for support of the city public schools for the year 1942, and to compel defendant to provide the deficit and a sum equal to 25 per cent thereof. A final decree was ordered to be entered dismissing the petition and the case was reported for the determination of the Supreme Judicial Court.

Order reversed in accordance with opinion.

Before FIELD, C. J., and LUMMUS, DOLAN, COX, and RONAN, JJ.

L. E. Crowley, of Boston, for petitioner.

H. C. Gill, of Boston, for respondent.

DOLAN, Justice.

This is a petition brought under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 34, inserted by St.1939, c. 294, by ten or more taxable inhabitants of the respondent City of Brockton, for the determination of an alleged deficiency in the amount of money appropriated by the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the city) for the support of the public schools of the city for the year 1942, and to compel the city to provide the amount of the deficit in that appropriation together with a sum equal to twenty-five per cent of such deficiency, in accordance with the provisions of the statute above referred to.

The case was heard by the judge upon the pleadings and an ‘agreed statement of facts.’ After hearing, the judge ordered that a final decree be entered dismissing the petition, and reported the case for the determination of this court.

The material facts may be summed up as follows: The city operates under a plan E charter, under which the management and control of the schools are vested in the school committee, which is authorized and empowered to exercise the powers and is bound to discharge the duties imposed by law upon school committees.

On December 5, 1941, the school committee presented to the then mayor of the city itemized and detailed estimates of the amounts it deemed necessary for the support of the public schools during the fiscal and calendar year of 1942, the total amount requested being $901,160.72. On January 5, 1942, the city government for the year 1942 was organized and Joseph H. Downey took office as mayor. In conformance with G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 44, § 32, inserted by St.1941, c. 473, § 2, the new mayor, within forty-five days after the organization of the new city government, submitted the annual budget for 1942 to the city council which approved that budget and appropriated the sums called for therein. The budget called for and the city council appropriated $867,660.94 for school purposes. The difference betwee the estimate of the school committee and the amount appropriated by the city council is thus $33,499.78. This total breaks down into differences between the estimates and the amounts recommended and appropriated for personal services and ordinary maintenance under the headings of ‘School Department,’ ‘Continuation and Vocational Schools,’ and ‘Evening Practical Arts'; for travel outside the State under ‘School Department’; and for new equipment under ‘Continuation and Vocational Schools.’ It is agreed that the only deficiencies now claimed are those for personal services under ‘School Department’ and ‘Continuation and Vocational Schools,’ and for ordinary maintenance under ‘School Department,’ which includes the salaries of janitors. The deficiencies claimed to exist are $24,123.98 for personal services under ‘School Department,’ $1,667.80 for ordinary maintenance under ‘School Department,’ and $2,910 for personal services under ‘Continuation and Vocational Schools,’ making a total of $28,701.78.

In November, 1941, the school committee voted to increase the maximum salaries of two hundred twenty-four women teachers $100 per annum; to increase the salaries of several principals and other supervisors and office employees; and to place the male teachers in the vocational and continuation schools upon the same salary scale as that of male teachers in the high school. The differences in the respective amounts of the committee's estimates and the city's appropriations under the headings ‘School Department’ and ‘CONTINUATION AND VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS' RESUlt From the mayor's Failure to include in his budget the sums required to pay those salary increases.

All subjects taught in the public schools of Brockton are required to be taught therein by G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, or are subjects that the school committee deems expedient to have taught. The city is not exempted by the State department of education from maintaining a high school as required by G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 4. The superintendent of schools and all teachers employed in 1942 were serving either under annual contracts or under ‘tenure’ in accordance with G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, §§ 38, 41 and 59. All other employees, including janitors, are under civil service.

It is unnecessary to recite other facts and figures appearing in the pleadings or agreed facts, since they relate only to the reasonableness of the estimates of the school committee and not to the question whether the sums requested are for expenses provided for under c. 71. It is to this question alone that this court may address its attention under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 34, inserted by St.1939, c. 294. See Ring v. Woburn, 311 Mass. 679, 683, 43 N.E.2d 8.

The legislative history of the governing statute has been fully reviewed in Callahan v. Woburn, 306 Mass. 265, 28 N.E.2d 9, and Ring v. Woburn, 311 Mass. 679, 43 N.E.2d 8. It is settled by those cases and the cases therein cited that G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, §§ 21-26, 37 and 38, which vest in the school committee the general charge of all public schools, including high schools, continuation schools and vocational schools, and the power to elect and contract with teachers, give the school committee the sole and absolute right to fix the salaries of those teachers, and that under section 34, inserted by St.1939, c. 294, the city is bound to appropriate an amount necessary to meet the salaries of teachers as fixed by the school committee. For the history of the previous remedies afforded by statute for the enforcement of a city's obligation in that respect, see Callahan v. Woburn, 306 Mass. 265, 28 N.E.2d 9;Ring v. Woburn, 311 Mass. 679, 43 N.E.2d 8.

It is objected by the city that G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 34, as inserted by St.1939, c. 294, is unconstitutional in that it imposes other than judicial functions upon the Superior Court. That statute provides in part that ‘Every city and town shall annually provide an amount of money sufficient for the support of the public schools as required by this chapter. Upon petition to the superior court, sitting in equity, against a city or town, brought by ten or more taxable inhabitants thereof * * * alleging that the amount necessary in such city or town for the support of public schools as aforesaid has not been included in the annual budget appropriations for said year, said court may determine the amount of the deficiency, if any, and may order such city and all its officers whose action is necessary to carry out such order, or such town and its treasurer, selectmen and assessors, to provide a sum of money equal to such deficiency, together with a sum equal to twenty-five per cent thereof’.

The question of the constitutionality of the statute was touched upon in O'Connor v. Brockton, 308 Mass. 34, 37, 30 N.E.2d 842, 844, the court saying, ‘we are far from convinced that the section cannot be so construed as to present a proper question for judicial decision * * *’; and in Ring v. Woburn, 311 Mass. 679, 683, 43 N.E.2d 8, 11, the court said, ‘It [the statute] does not purport to transfer to the judiciary any question of expediency as to appropriations or to require the court to enter into any consideration of municipal policy of financial administration of a city or town. The court, however, is required to determine whether the requirements of said c. 71 have been met. Judicial questions presented require consideration by this court.’ We think this was but another way of saying that in so far as the statute confers upon the courts the power to compel appropriations for the purposes permitted to be or required to be engaged in by school committees under c. 71 in accordance with their estimates, the statute is constitutional, and that it is to be construed, not as an attempt to confer upon the courts any executive or legislative power to determine the reasonableness of any such estimates, but only as providing the means of compelling appropriations in accordance therewith. This construction is in accord with the established principle that all rational presumptions are made that a statute enacted by the Legislature is valid, and that it ‘will not be treated as void unless it is impossible by reasonable construction to interpret its provisions in harmony with the fundamental law of the Commonwealth.’ Commonwealth v. Higgins, 277 Mass. 191, 193, 178 N.E. 536, 537, 79 A.L.R. 1304. ‘Where practicable, a statute must be so interpreted as not to render it contrary to the terms of the Constitution and also to avoid grave doubts on that score.’ Commonwealth v. S. S. Kresge Co., 267 Mass. 145, 148, 166 N.E. 558, 559, and cases cited. Reading the statute in the light of its origin and its development, we think that its plain purpose is solely to provide a remedy whereby the bounden duty of municipalities to appropriate moneys for the purposes set forth in c. 71, in accordance with the estimates of school committees, may be enforced; that this is not an executive or legislative function, but a judicial one. The purpose of the statute is to enforce obedience to the mandate of the Legislature by an appropriate proceeding. The statute is constitutional.

In Ring v. Woburn, 311 Mass. 679, 43 N.E.2d 8, it was decided...