Ring v. City of Woburn

• Decision Date: 25 June 1942
• Citation: 43 N.E.2d 8,311 Mass. 679
• Parties: RING et al. v. CITY OF WOBURN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

311 Mass. 679

43 N.E.2d 8

RING et al.

v.CITY OF WOBURN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

June 25, 1942.

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Swift, Judge.

Action under General Laws (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 34, inserted by Statutes 1939, c. 294, by Timothy F. Ring and others against the City of Woburn. From unsatisfactory decrees, respondent appeals.

Modified and affirmed.J. E. Henchey and J. H. McLaughlin, both of Woburn, for petitioners.

J. Gorrasi, City Sol., of Woburn, for respondent.

Before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, DOLAN, COX, and RONAN, JJ.

COX, Justice.

These are four petitions in equity brought by ten or more taxable inhabitants of the respondent city under the provisions of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 34, inserted by St.1939, c. 294. Demurrers to three of the petitions were overruled by interlocutory decrees, and it was agreed that trial on the merits might proceed without any action on the demurrer in the other case, its final disposition to depend upon the final disposition of the other demurrers. The respondent, however, waived its appeals from these interlocutory decrees in this court.

The several petitions relate to the alleged failure of the respondent in the years 1938 to 1941, inclusive, to provide an amount of money sufficient for the support of the public schools, as required by said c. 71. They were heard by a judge of the Superior Court, who filed a memorandum of findings and rulings, applicable to all cases, and a final decree, favorable to the petitioners, was entered in each case. The respondent appealed from each final decree. The evidence is reported, together with a statement of agreed facts, submitted ‘as evidence in place of ordinary proof and [it] is merely a part of the evidence and not a case stated.’ It is for us to decide the case according to our own judgment giving due weight to the findings of the judge which, based in part upon oral evidence, will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong. Fuller v. Lovell, 304 Mass. 542, 547, 24 N.E.2d 528.

Statute 1939, c. 294, approved on June 15, 1939, provides as follows: ‘Every city and town shall annually provide an amount of money sufficient for the support of the public schools as required by this chapter. Upon petition to the superior court, sitting in equity, against a city or town, brought by ten or more taxable inhabitants thereof, or by the mayor of a city, or by the attorney general, alleging that the amount necessary in such city or town for the support of public schools as aforesaid has not been included in the annual budget appropriations for said year, said court may determine the amount of the deficiency, if any, and may order such city and all its officers whose action is necessary to carry out such order, or such town and its treasurer, selectmen and assessors, to provide a sum of money equal to such deficiency, together with a sum equal to twenty-five per cent thereof. When such an order is made prior to the fixing of the annual tax rate the foregoing sums shall be required by such order to be provided by taxation in the manner set forth in section twenty-three of chapter fifty-nine; and when such an order is made after the annual tax rate has been fixed according to law such sums shall be required by such order to be provided by borrowing in the same manner and for the same period of time as is provided under clause (11) of section seven of chapter forty-four in the case of final judgments, subject to all other applicable provisions of chapter forth-four, except that, in the case of a town, such borrowing shall be made by the town treasurer, with the approval of a majority of the selectmen, and no vote of the town shall be required therefor. Said court may order that the sum equal to the deficiency be appropriated and added to the amounts previously appropriated for the school purposes of such city or town in the year in which such deficiency occurs and may order that the amount in excess of the deficiency be held by such city or town as a separate account, to be applied to meet the appropriation for school purposes in the following year.’

The first two petitions relate to alleged deficiencies in appropriations for the years 1938 and 1939, and the question arises whether this statute, which was not approved until June 15, 1939, is applicable to those petitions. The general rule of interpretation that all statutes are prospective in their operation, unless an intention that they shall be retrospective appears by necessary implication, is well recognized, and it is only statutes regulating practice, procedure and evidence, that is, those relating to remedies and not affecting substantive rights, that commonly are treated as operating retroactively, and as applying to pending actions or causes of actions. Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co., 220 Mass. 1, 3, 107 N.E. 426, Ann.Cas. 1917A, 145, and cases cited; Bernhardt v. Atlantic Finance Corp., 311 Mass. 183, 40 N.E.2d 713. Said § 34, prior to the enactment of St.1939, c. 294, not only created the duty on the part of municipalities, but also provided the remedy for the breach of that duty. School Committee of Lowell v. Mayor of Lowell, 265 Mass. 353, 357, 164 N.E. 91. Said § 34, as now appearing, imposes no new duty upon municipalities, although it is true that the language of its first sentence is not quite the same as it was before amendment. For example, the word ‘sufficient’ is substituted for the word ‘necessary,’ but it seems apparent from the use of the word ‘necessary’ in the next sentence that there was no intention of enlarging or modifying the duty that is imposed upon every city and town. The remedy, however, is changed, and apparently to the material advantage of any municipality that violates the duty that is created. The present section discloses a legislative intent to make the remedy more practical and efficient. Callahan v. Woburn, 306 Mass. 265, 277, 28 N.E.2d 9. The principle that statutes affecting the remedy only are liberally interpreted in order to effectuate their purpose is applicable to one providing a more effective remedy for the enforcement of a prior right. Wynn v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 281 Mass. 245, 249, 183 N.E. 528.

One question that arises is whether G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 34, inserted by St.1939, c. 294, seeks to impose other than judicial functions upon the Superior Court. It is not to be assumed that the Legislature intended any such thing. Selectmen of Milton v. Justice of District Court of East Norfolk, 286 Mass. 1, 6, 189 N.E. 607. See Driscoll v. Mayor of Somerville, 213 Mass. 493, 494, 100 N.E. 640. Said § 34 relates in the first instance to the support of the public schools, ‘as required by this chapter.’ Said c. 71, as more fully appears hereinafter, contains provisions relative to what a municipality must do by way of supporting the public schools, and we are of opinion that the question, whether, in a given case, the support that has been furnished is that required by this chapter, presents a judicial question. See O'Connor v. Brockton, 308 Mass. 34, 37, 30 N.E.2d 842. It does not purport to transfer to the judiciary any question of expediency as to appropriations or to require the court to enter into any consideration of municipal policy of financial administration of a city or town. The court, however, is required to determine whether the requirements of said c. 71 have been met. Judicial questions presented require consideration by this court. Selectmen of Milton v. Justice of District Court of East Norfolk, 286 Mass. 1, 6, 189 N.E. 607;Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 615, 147 N.E. 681;Whalen v. First District Court of Eastern Middlesex, 295 Mass. 305, 308, 3 N.E.2d 1005, and cases cited.

The respondent's charter, St.1897, c. 172, § 28, vests the management and control of the public schools in the school committee. No question is raised as to the status of the petitioners or as to the functioning of the duly elected school committee during the several years in question. The judge found that the committees in each year, seasonably within the law, submitted estimates of the ‘expenditures' voted by it as necessary for the support of public schools, ‘as required by Gen.Laws, Ch. 71.’ These estimates contained amounts necessary to pay the teachers and the superintendent of schools, based upon contracts in effect at the commencement of each fiscal year. Some of the teachers were on tenure and some on a yearly basis, and the rates of salary were fixed by the school committee. The estimates also included sums necessary to pay the contracts of ‘janitors, custodian of buildings, clerks in the offices of the School Department, school physician, school nurses, supervisor of attendance,’ all of whom were under the protection of the civil service law, and three non-civil service employees, also on contracts in effect at the commencement of each of the four years. The estimates also included further sums representing nonsalary items such as coal, lights and other supplies. There is a finding as to the subjects taught in the elementary schools, ‘which under the provisions of General Laws, Ch. 71, shall be taught,’ and also a finding of the subjects taught in the high school, all of which the school committee voted as ‘expedient to be taught.’ No question is raised as to the respondent being required to maintain the high school. There are further findings that the teachers taught throughout the years and were not employed in any other work, and that the schools were not kept longer than the time required by law. See § 1 of said c. 71.

The difference between the estimates submitted by the school committee and the amount of appropriation in each year is the amount that the judge found to be the deficiency necessary for the support of the respondent's public schools as required by said c. 71, and the cause given for the deficiency is the failure on the part of the respondent to...