Hayes v. Fowler
| Decision Date | 06 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. COA94-893,COA94-893 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | L. Pendleton HAYES and Edward Whalen, Petitioners, v. Sam FOWLER, Building Inspector, and Village of Pinehurst Board of Adjustment, Respondents. |
Michael B. Brough & Associates by Michael B. Brough, Chapel Hill, for Petitioners.
Poyner & Spruill by Lacy H. Reaves and Robin T. Morris, Raleigh, for Respondents.
Petitioners and respondents each appeal certain aspects of the trial court's order reviewing a decision of the Pinehurst Board of Adjustment (the Board). For the reasons set out below, we affirm the trial court.
Relevant procedural and factual information is as follows: On 4 April 1994, L. Pendleton Hayes and husband, Edward Whalen (petitioners), applied to respondent Sam Fowler, Village of Pinehurst building inspector (Fowler), for a permit allowing renovations to a historic home ("Maryhurst") which they had contracted to purchase. The owner of the property was the Catholic Diocese of Raleigh (the Diocese), and the premises, located approximately one-half block away from Sacred Heart Catholic Church (Sacred Heart), have been used by Sacred Heart since 1987 or 1988 as a meeting place for religious and secular groups and for events such as choir practice, religious instruction classes, meetings of the Knights of Columbus, bridge club meetings, board meetings for Sandhills College and the O'Neal School, social gatherings and other community functions. Petitioners indicated to Fowler that they planned "to live in the house and provide rooms for overnight transient guests, host meetings of private groups and host various classes."
Fowler ruled that the proposed uses, aside from use as petitioner's residence, were impermissible under the applicable Village of Pinehurst ordinance (the ordinance). Petitioners appealed to the Pinehurst Board of Adjustment (the Board), which subsequently affirmed Fowler's decision. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari in Moore County Superior Court. Petitioners alleged the Board erred by refusing to view use of Maryhurst as a bed and breakfast and as a site for meetings, social gatherings and classes, to be "accessory" to their residential use of the property, and further by declining to allow petitioners to continue usages of the property as operated by the Diocese and Sacred Heart.
Following a hearing, the trial court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Board's decision in an order dated 1 July 1994. The court set out the following conclusions of law:
1) Petitioners' proposed use of their property ("Maryhurst") as a bed and breakfast, or Guest House (Tourist Home) ... is not permissible [under the ordinance] as an "Accessory Use" [in the R-30 Zoning District];
2) ... [U]se [of Maryhurst by Sacred Heart] did not constitute use of the property as a 'church' (emphasis in original) within the meaning of Section 5.3.2 of [the ordinance]. .... Therefore, use of the property ... [by Sacred Heart] constituted a nonconforming use of the property which use may be continued by petitioners under Section 11 of the ordinance. ....
3) The determination by the Board ... was not arbitrary and capricious.
On appeal, respondents assign error to the trial court's second conclusion of law, while petitioners challenge the first and third.
The relevant sections of the ordinance read as follows:
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
Accessory Building and Construction. A subordinate use building or construction customarily incident to and located upon the same lot occupied by the main use building (guest cottages shall not be permitted).
Accessory Use. A use customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use or building and located on the same lot with such principal use of building (guest cottages shall not be permitted.)
Guest House (Tourist Home). Any dwelling occupied by owner or operator in which rooms are rented for guests, for lodging of transients and travelers for compensation, and where food may be served.
[]
These districts are established as districts in which the principal use of land is for single family dwellings. In promoting the general purposes of this Ordinance, the specific intent of each district is:
....
b. To prohibit commercial and industrial use of the land....
a. Accessory uses clearly incidental to any permitted use and which will not create a nuisance or hazard (guest cottages shall not be permitted).
b. Churches
....
Section 11. NON-CONFORMING USES
11.1 In General
Upon the effective date of this Ordinance and any amendment hereto existing and lawful uses of any building or land which at that time do not meet the minimum requirements of this Ordinance for the District in which the same are located ... shall be considered as non-conforming. It is the intent of this Ordinance to permit these non-conforming uses to continue until they are removed, discontinued, or destroyed, but not to encourage such continued use, and to prohibit any further non-conformance or expansion thereof.
11.2 Non-Conforming Uses of Buildings
....
If the non-conforming use of such building is discontinued for a period of one-hundred and twenty (120) days or more, every future use of such premises shall be in conformity with the provisions of this Ordinance....
Petitioners first contend the trial court erred by failing to hold that use of Maryhurst as a bed and breakfast constituted an "accessory use" as permitted by the ordinance. Petitioners maintain their proposed rental of four of the eleven bedrooms at Maryhurst would, under the ordinance definition of "accessory use," be "customarily incidental" to their use of the structure as a private residence. We disagree.
Questions involving interpretation of zoning ordinances are questions of law. Ayers v. Board of Adjust. for Town of Robersonville, 113 N.C.App. 528, 531, 439 S.E.2d 199, 201 (1994). Accordingly, the superior court is to apply a de novo standard of review to Board decisions involving application and interpretation of zoning ordinances, and the court may freely substitute its judgment for that of the Board. Ayers, 113 N.C.App. at 530, 439 S.E.2d at 201. In like manner, on appeal of the judgment of the superior court, this Court must apply a de novo standard of review in determining whether "the superior court committed error of law in interpreting and applying the municipal ordinance," Capricorn Equity Corp. v. Town of Chapel Hill Bd. of Adjustment, 334 N.C. 132, 137, 431 S.E.2d 183, 187 (1993), and may also freely substitute its judgment for that of the superior court. Id.
In construing municipal ordinances, courts are obligated to adhere to the fundamental principles of statutory construction and interpretation. Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co., Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of the Town of Nags Head, 299 N.C. 620, 629, 265 S.E.2d 379, 385, reh'g denied, 300 N.C. 562, 270 S.E.2d 106 (1980). The basic requirement is that we "ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislative body" as indicated by "the language of the statute or ordinance, the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish." Id.
Concerning the issue sub judice, i.e., whether petitioners' proposed use of Maryhurst as a bed and breakfast may be considered an "accessory use" contemplated by the ordinance, our de novo review reveals the intent of the ordinance to be reflected in Sections 2 and 5.3.2a. In these sections, "guest cottages" are expressly excluded from the definition of "accessory use." Although petitioners correctly insist that "guest cottage " (emphasis added) is not defined in the ordinance, the term is indistinguishable from the phraseology "guest house (tourist home)," described in Section 2 of the ordinance as
[a]ny dwelling occupied by owner or operator in which rooms are rented for guests, for lodging of transients and travelers for compensation, and where food may be served.
The foregoing comports in all respects with petitioners' proposed use of the property as a bed and breakfast. The language of the ordinance thus indicates with particularity the intent of the drafters that bed and breakfast establishments be excluded as permitted accessory uses within Zoning District [Zone] R-30, and the trial court did not err in affirming the Board's ruling to that effect.
Petitioners also challenge the trial court's rejection of their argument that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious. This contention cannot be sustained.
In considering whether an administrative decision was indeed arbitrary and capricious, this Court is obligated to apply the "whole record" test. CG & T Corp. v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Wilmington, 105 N.C.App. 32, 40, 411 S.E.2d 655, 660 (1992). This requires an examination of all competent evidence within the entire record to determine whether the agency decision is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. However, a court engaging in this process may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body, however compelling the circumstance, merely because reasonable but conflicting views emerge from the evidence. Id. Restrained by the foregoing standard and based upon a thorough review of the entire record herein, we conclude the Board's decision cannot be characterized as arbitrary and capricious.
The Village of Pinehurst acted within its legislatively endowed prerogative, pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 160A-381, to enact a zoning ordinance prohibiting bed and breakfast establishments within Zone R-30. Even conceding arguendo petitioners' assertion that Maryhurst may best be utilized as a bed and breakfast, this alone does not suffice to classify the Board's decision as arbitrary and capricious, particularly in view of the specific...
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